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ABSTRACT 
 
Mounir Mahmalat 
 
Crises, Fractionalization, and Reform –  
Inquiries into the Determinants of Political Collaboration 
 
This dissertation contains five studies for the award of a Ph.D. by monograph. The thesis addresses 
one of the underlying questions in the study of the political economy of reform: what institutional 
and socio-economic factors determine the extent to which political actors can collaborate on reform? 
The underlying argument this thesis makes relates to the operationalization of empirical models to 
address this question. The thesis will explain why and how reform can be understood and modeled 
as a multilayered phenomenon in empirical analysis, that is, as a function of its distinct characteristics 
that structure the way political actors engage in political transactions.  
 
After motivating the research question, chapter 2 reviews the literature on the political economy of 
reform and situates the contributions in this thesis. The following chapters, chapters 3, 4 and 5, are 
written and conceived as individual journal articles that, at the time of writing, are either already 
published (chapter 3), revised and resubmitted (chapter 4), or under review (chapter 5) in peer-
reviewed journals. Chapter 3 focuses on one dominant theory in the literature and discusses the 
methodological shortcomings in empirical analyses of the so-called crisis hypothesis, which posits 
that economic crises induce reform. The fourth chapter introduces and analyzes a novel data set on 
legislation in Lebanon based on agenda-setting theory, which the fifth chapter leverages for an 
empirical analysis of the determinants of political collaboration in Lebanon. To address the gaps in 
the literature identified before, the study develops a theory to interpret political collaboration and 
leverages a mixed-methods research design that draws on both a quantitative analysis of legislation 
data as well as 32 expert interviews with Lebanese political actors. Chapter 6 discusses outstanding 
conceptual issues of research on the crisis hypothesis based on the analysis in chapter 3. Chapter 7 
concludes with comments on policy relevance of the findings of this thesis and possible vistas for 
future research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 2015, the Lebanese parliament approved law no. 44, a controversial legislation aimed 
at “fighting money laundering and terrorist financing”.1 The purpose of the law was to ensure the 
stability of the financial sector by complying with United States regulations and sanctions aimed at 
curtailing economic and financial activities of organizations related to terrorist groups as well as drug 
and weapons smuggling.2 The law was controversial as the session in which it was enacted was 
unconstitutional and entailed potential distributional consequences on politically powerful groups 
financed by rents from related activities (Berthier, 2017).  
 
At the same time and despite a period of economic and fiscal hardship that set macroeconomic 
indicators on an unsustainable path (Le Borgne, Jacobs and Barbour, 2015), the same political actors, 
operating in the same configuration of political power, failed to approve other significant legislation 
that aimed to ensure financial stability. Among others, parliament failed to approve a budget law due 
to disagreements over the distribution of costs of reforms as well as concerns over accountability.3 
 
Moreover, both of these episodes of political collaboration – one of reform and the other of gridlock 
– took place in a period of “political paralysis” (Nader, 2014). Starting from 2011, the political 
implications of the conflict in neighboring Syria and its impact on Lebanon’s economy have caused 
political instability, which at that point had already led to the delay of parliamentary elections 
(originally due 2013), the appointment of a president (originally due 2014), and thereby significantly 
undermined legislative activity (in 2015, only 10 laws could be published that pertained to internal 
affairs, see chapter 4). Law no. 44 hence passed at a point in time in which collaboration on reform 
was largely impeded. 
 
While numerous accounts can be cited as to why the one bill passed while the other did not, the 
conventional wisdom for explaining why certain legislation gets approved while others do not tends 
to relate to personalized accounts and the fractionalized and sectarian nature of Lebanon’s polity 
(Makdisi and Marktanner, 2009; Leenders, 2012; Salamey, 2014; Salloukh et al., 2015; Hermez, 
2017; Karam, 2017). Lebanon’s polity is organized in a consociational democracy, which guarantees 
18 recognized sectarian communities representation in political and bureaucratic functions of the 
state (Lijphart, 1992; Makdisi and Marktanner, 2009) and leaves de facto power to the leadership of 
                                                     
1 The text can be accessed on the webpage of the Lebanese Central Bank: 
http://www.bdl.gov.lb/files/laws/Law44_en[3].pdf [accessed 25/07/1987] 
2 The law mandated the reporting of suspicious transactions, the maintenance of customer identification information, and 
facilitated the access to banking information by judicial authorities in what otherwise is an environment of strict banking 
secrecy. On the US strategy to curb money laundering, see for example: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dea-targets-
hezbollahs-money-laundering-ties-to-cartels/ 
3 Discussions on a set of other important bills have simply been postponed, such as the proposal for a wage hike of public 
employees and an electoral law. See interviews, chapter 5.   
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sectarian communities or oligarchs (Diwan and Haidar, 2019; Mahmalat and Chaitani, 2019). The 
2009 parliamentary elections, for example, resulted in the representation of some 22 different parties 
and factions, of which even the most well-established parties have very limited cohesion on policy 
positions (LCPS, 2018). Much of this literature maintains that reform gets protracted over the efforts 
of political actors, in their functions as representatives of sectarian communities, to maintain their 
relative economic and political prerogatives vis-à-vis each other.  
 
However, differing outcomes of collaboration on reform despite a similar configuration of political 
power is not only commonplace in Lebanon but also in other developing countries (Williamson and 
Haggard, 1994; Corrales, 1998; Galasso, 2014). Mostly in line with explanations for Lebanon, 
theoretical approaches tend to model the delay or adoption of reform with distributional conflict as a 
function of the degree to which a country is polarized and fractionalized (see Khemani, 2017, for a 
recent review). As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, while this literature offers important insights 
into the mechanisms by which reform gets adopted or delayed, it gives few insights into why actors 
encounter a varying degree of difficulty to collaborate on reform depending on the issue they are 
dealing with. In other words, generalized explanations of the delay of reform fall short of explaining 
variation in reform activity across policy areas, such as product market reform, trade reform, or tax 
reform, in the absence of a shift in the underlying configuration of political power.  
 
Explaining this phenomenon is important to identify the structural conditions that make reform more 
or less likely (Tompson and Price, 2009). In that way, the overarching question this thesis addresses 
is one of the fundamental questions in the study of the political economy of reform: what institutional 
and socio-economic factors determine the extent to which political actors can collaborate on reform? 
The goal of this thesis is to generate both theoretical and methodological approaches into how 
empirical analysis can generate more detailed insights into the mechanisms by which actors 
collaborate on reform. The underlying argument this thesis makes relates to the operationalization of 
empirical models to address this question. The following chapter will show why and how reform can 
be understood and modeled as a multilayered phenomenon in empirical analysis, that is, as a function 
of its distinct characteristics that structure the way political actors engage in political transactions.  
 
To arrive at these arguments, I derive the core concepts from political transactions theory (Spiller 
and Tommasi, 2003; Stein et al., 2006; Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2013). The central concept 
of these models is political transactions, which involve mutual agreements over political concessions 
that are intertemporal in nature, such as a vote for project X today in exchange for a concession on 
project Y tomorrow (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). The central argument of political transactions 
theory is that the functioning of political institutions impacts upon the capacity of political actors to 
engage in political transactions and, hence, the quality of policies. Because the concept of political 
transactions applies to democratic regimes independent from the structure of a polity, we employ it 
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as a theoretical framework in this paper. In what follows, the thesis refers to the exchange of 
intertemporal political transactions in the process of bargaining over legislation as political 
collaboration. That way, collaboration can be understood as the succession of political bargains 
between political actors by which legislation is processed: from the initial necessity assessment to 
drafting a bill, discussing and voting in respective institutions, and the eventual publication in official 
journals.  
 
To interpret the observable outcomes of political collaboration, two central terms must be 
distinguished. The term legislation refers to the entirety of legal documents that enter legal force. As 
legislation can contain political transactions that are of minor political significance some are of 
subordinated relevance for the study of political collaboration, such as the renaming of buildings or 
naturalizations (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this point). Therefore, this thesis focuses 
on reform which it defines as ‘high-profile’ legislation which establishes or amends impersonal rules 
and significantly changes the regulatory affairs of a country (see chapter 5). By differentiating reform 
based on policy areas and its institutional origins, empirical models, then, can infer more 
differentiated conclusions on the mechanisms by which the given socio-economic configuration of a 
polity impacts political collaboration, and thereby the occurrence of reform.  
 
I refer to fractionalization as the number of politically significant social groups with veto powers in 
the process of collaboration (Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). Extant studies on the 
political economy of reform generally find higher degrees of fractionalization to decrease the 
likelihood of reform in certain policy areas, such as trade or privatization (Banerjee and Munger, 
2004; Brooks and Kurtz, 2007; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008; Galasso, 2014), and the ‘level’ of reform 
(Tsebelis, 1999; Torenvlied and Haarhuis, 2008). As many of these findings are results of panel-data 
regression analyses utilizing reform indices, however, some studies provide ambiguous evidence and 
tend to leave transmission channels that could explain individual reform episodes underdetermined 
(see chapter 3).  
 
In order to derive a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of political collaboration, the thesis starts 
with a review of the literature on the political economy of reform (chapter 2). The chapter aims at 
answering the question of how literature on the political economy of reform has approached 
empirical and theoretical models to explain the phenomenon of reform, and which research areas 
remain underexplored? The chapter identifies in more detail gaps in the literature the contributions 
in this thesis address and how they contribute to extant knowledge.  
 
Thereafter, the thesis critically reviews the literature on a specific phenomenon in the political 
economy of reform, which is the (alleged) tendency for reform to follow crisis episodes (chapter 3). 
Starting from the observation that empirical results on this so-called “crisis hypothesis” exhibits a 
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high degree of ambiguity, the chapter aims to answer the research question of how this ambiguity 
can be explained. The chapter comes to identify a set of methodological and theoretical reasons that 
induce such ambiguity in interpreting the results of empirical models. I explain why empirical models 
offer only limited insights into the mechanisms by which crises give rise to political collaboration on 
reform that would not otherwise be possible. In doing so, the chapter reviews in ore detail what 
motivates large parts of this study, namely the methodological shortcomings related to the 
operationalization of reform. As empirical studies tend to utilize aggregate indices to indicate reform, 
which reflect the relative change in the legislative environment rather than instances of reform, they 
tend to fail to provide detailed insights about the mechanisms by which actors collaborate. The 
chapter is published as a journal article in the Journal of Economic Surveys and explains how more 
differentiated approaches to model crises and reform in empirical analyses can contribute to clarify 
ambiguous results in extant literature (Mahmalat and Curran, 2018).  
 
In an effort to circumvent the identified methodological shortcomings of aggregate reform indices, 
the thesis goes on to introduce a new data set on primary and secondary legislation based on the case 
of Lebanon (chapter 4). The chapter asks the question of how legislation data can facilitate a more 
nuanced analysis of political collaboration. I analyze the data set based on agenda-setting theory to 
illustrate its content and show how it can be leveraged to answer questions related to political 
collaboration. The creation of the data set further contributes to the literature on political attention 
by offering an approach to identify legislation that is of relevance for the study of political 
collaboration based on expert review.  
 
After having identified gaps in the literature and methodological shortcomings and having 
established a data set to address these shortcomings, the thesis offers both a theoretical and empirical 
explanation for political collaboration in Lebanon (chapter 5). The chapter seeks to answer the 
questions: why does a given degree of fractionalization impede reform in a certain policy area, while 
reform in others remains possible? The chapter develops a conceptual framework to explain how the 
characteristics of a reform can structure political collaboration. In a mixed methods approach, the 
chapter then inquires into the effects of political fractionalization as one of the key determinants of 
political collaboration. I argue that the properties of a reform project determine the extent to which 
fractionalization affects political collaboration on reform: the higher the institutional requirements 
of a reform are, i.e., the number and nature of political actors and institutions involved in accrediting 
the legislation, and the broader its impact, i.e. the number of groups that are affected, the more can 
fractionalization impede political collaboration.  
 
The sixth chapter comes back to the relationship between crises and reform. Departing from the 
methodological issues identified in chapter 3, I discuss in more detail remaining conceptual issues 
on the research on the relationship between crisis and reform. The research question of this chapter 
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asks why interest-based approaches to conceptualize crises fail to capture the core mechanisms that 
explain political outcomes. The chapter first explains why epistemological approaches based on 
ideational power are better suited to explain collaboration in times of crisis than interest-based 
approaches. Thereafter, it discusses why case study analyses can contribute to our understanding of 
the mechanisms that link the two concepts.  
 
The final chapter concludes with some remarks for future research in the field.  
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2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM – A STRATEGIC 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The concept of “reform” in economics commonly refers to changes in policies and institutional 
arrangements “which are aimed at improving an economy’s performance” (Drazen, 2000, p. 615). In 
these terms, reforms consist of individual or a set of policies which are deemed to perform better 
than the status quo to achieve economic goals. For Drazen (2000), reform is different from day-to-
day policy change in three points, which are key to understand the political economy of reform: first, 
the number of policy changes that must be made for a reform to be successful, second, the scope or 
level of the reform, both of the programme and its effects and, third, the uncertainty that is caused 
by the magnitude of the changes that are being implied (pp. 615). The literature on the political 
economy of reform then elaborates on a main question: Why are reforms not undertaken when they 
are found to be necessary for economic and social improvement?  
 
As I will argue in this chapter, the literature to date has tackled this question in three streams, which 
will be discussed successively (Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Tommasi and Velasco, 1996; 
Drazen, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Ashraf and Galor, 2013; Azulai et al., 2014; Khemani, 2017). 
These streams represent a set of studies that aim to address the above question from a similar angle. 
The first stream was instigated and spurred by the debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America 
and Africa and reached its peak in the 1990s (sub-section 2.1). This strand of research focused on 
macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal adjustment for which political consensus among interest 
groups is ultimately prescribed by budget and resource constraints as maintaining fiscal excesses and 
macroeconomic imbalances is simply impossible without risking severe economic crises. The answer 
this literature offers is that conflict among socio-economic groups causes the delay of reform over 
efforts to continue rent-seeking activities.  
 
The second stream of literature was motivated by the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition of 
former Communist countries from state-led to market-led economies (sub-section 2.2). This literature 
focused on reforms that had a greater focus on ideological change rather than on adjustment of 
policies to fiscal imbalances. However, the results were driven by powerful evidence of the superior 
economic outcomes of market-led resource allocation. The underlying question this stream of 
research tackled was, hence, why conflict of interest persists and societies fail to develop institutional 
mechanisms that curb the influence of special interests.  
 
The current and third stream of research addresses public sector reforms more broadly, such as the 
provisioning of public goods or the allocation of resources. For such reforms, however, evidence is 
less conclusive as to what optimal alternatives to the status quo would be (Rodrik, 1996). For 
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example, anti-corruption laws and institutions of similar design and function appear to have a very 
different impact across countries (Heeks and Mathisen, 2012).  
 
As I will discuss below, while all streams essentially originate in a rationalist school of thought, they 
offer different epistemological frameworks to analyze the underlying questions. The first stream 
analyzes who wins or loses out from reform and how credible commitments to compensate losers 
between the two could be formulated. The second stream examines the norms and preferences within 
a society that determine why a society gets stuck with suboptimal policy choices. These choices can 
persist because of non-cooperative behavior, that is, the rational belief of actors that they should 
value the self over the public interest, given the anticipated behavior of other actors. The third stream, 
by contrast, examines the roots of ideological disagreements among actors over economic and 
political fundamentals, such as the role of a government, resource allocation, or public goods and the 
social beliefs about the very nature of a problem that has to be tackled. Thus, this literature examines 
the reasons for differing preferences among social groups for policies and public goods, and why 
they can resist change even in light of evidence of a better performing policy. 
  
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence of these three complex strands of 
literature. I show how they are interwoven and can explain more general patterns of political 
collaboration on reform. The discussion focuses on the third and most recent stream, as the first two 
are partly discussed in the literature reviews of the chapters covering the body of the thesis, and helps 
to put into context the phenomena investigated in the thesis. Further, I identify open questions and 
possible avenues for future research.  
 
2.1. Stream 1: Commitment Problems  
 
In the literature of the first stream, reform commonly refers to “a major fiscal adjustment that 
significantly reduces a large budget deficit and/or stops a large inflation” (Alesina, Ardagna and 
Trebbi, 2006, p. 2). These reforms typically involve privatization, deregulation, liberalization of 
goods markets, labor market reforms, or trade liberalizations (Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998, p. 
3). These measures often entail an uneven distribution of the costs of reform across groups in the 
short-term before the benefits unfold in the long-term and increase the overall well-being of a society 
(Olson, 1982; Krueger, 1993; Rodrik, 1996; Tommasi and Velasco, 1996).  
 
The core of theoretical models aiming to explain the delay of reform, which are ultimately necessary 
to adhere to budget constraints and to avert outright crises, is the struggle of interest groups over 
political power and the distribution of the costs of reform. Alesina and Drazen (1991) provide the 
most widely cited intuition of how such political bargaining over reform can be delayed. In their 
model, interest groups strive to shift the costs of reforming onto other social groups by embarking 
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on a “war of attrition.” They attempt to wait each other out until one group concedes and acquiesces 
to reforms which may ultimately see them bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. Reform 
occurs, then, when distributional conflict among interest groups is resolved.  
 
The Alesina and Drazen model implies that the extent to which reform is delayed depends on the 
degree of political polarization as a function of distributional conflict. Distributional conflict, in turn, 
is higher the more unequal the income distribution is in a country. In other words, the war of attrition 
model implies that countries with higher levels of income inequality exhibit greater political 
polarization and longer periods of instability due to protracted reform. The reason for this is that 
groups cannot agree to sharing the costs of reform due to information asymmetries: agreement over 
the distribution of costs would entail revealing information about relative political power. Such 
conflict of interest is difficult to resolve efficiently as a commitment problem arises. Compensation 
mechanisms are generally incredible as each group cannot commit not to abuse their relatively 
greater political power in the future. The credibility of commitments can thus be understood as a 
problem about the future exercise of political power (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005).  
 
A series of other contributions links inequality in the form of initial unequal distribution of economic 
and political endowments to commitment problems. Inequality tends to benefit a narrow group of 
elites which extract rents from the economy. These elites are reluctant to allow institutional change 
as this could threaten their relative supremacy over political power and economic rents. Even when 
reforms are not a zero-sum distributive game and increase the well-being of the society overall, 
commitment problems arise to ensure that elites will not be relatively worse off. Rajan (2009) follows 
this intuition and provides a model that takes such unequal endowments as a root cause for 
underdevelopment. Each group in a society prefers reforms that benefit their own group, however, 
in an unequal society these reforms come at the expense of other groups’ rents. Rent preservation 
therefore inhibits support for comprehensive reforms. Similarly, Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) emphasize 
a commitment problem as the critical feature to explain why countries find it difficult to transition to 
a rule-of-law state, in which rent extracting from narrow elites would be curbed. According to their 
model, theft committed during the non-rule-of-law state cannot credibly be forgiven in a new state, 
which reduces the demand for reforms.  
 
Commitment problems also arise when the outcomes of reforms are uncertain ex ante. In another 
landmark contribution, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that actors develop a status quo bias 
because of the uncertainty regarding the distribution of endowments ex post. As the individual 
“winners” and “losers” from reform cannot be identified ex ante they prefer the status quo over 
reform.  
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The question then arises how states can exit this vicious cycle of rent preservation. Literature points 
to three mechanisms in particular: revolution or the credible threat thereof, a fundamental shift in 
elites’ preferences, or economic crises. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), for example, 
formalize the argument that the disenfranchised poor can contest power of rich elites by threatening 
revolution, in particular when opportunity costs are low, such as during recessions. Concessions of 
elites for reform and institutional change are made to prevent popular upheaval and their removal 
from power. Lizzeri and Perisco (2004) argue that such institutional change can come about even in 
the absence of the imminent threat of revolution. Elites come to prefer institutional change as they 
reappraise improvements in the provision of public goods due to socio-economic change. 
 
Lastly, a complex and multi-layered literature examines the role of crises as a trigger for reform.4 
Crises can create the conditions under which reform is undertaken that would not otherwise be 
possible. Olson (1982) offers an early interpretation of this mechanism. Social interest groups 
become powerful in times of economic prosperity and tend to oppose the reforming of rules that 
made them powerful in the first place. Their ability to block socially beneficial reform leads to the 
society becoming "sclerotic." Eventually, economic conditions deteriorate and turn into a crisis. 
According to Olson, only a crisis can weaken their vested interests sufficiently to be overcome.  
 
Ranciere and Tornell (2015) and Tornell (1998) offer more refined interpretations. In their models, 
powerful interest groups tend to overappropriate resources within an economy. As economic 
conditions deteriorate, declining aggregate resources limit the ability for future appropriations. 
According to Ranciere and Tornell, conflict among these interest groups erupts, which is resolved by 
the use of structural reform as a strategic tool to curb the power of rival groups within a new regime. 
Drazen and Grilli (1993) show that crises can accelerate the resolution of distributional conflict. 
Their model predicts that crises can ultimately be welfare enhancing as they accelerate the occurrence 
of reform and therefore leave the society overall better off in the long-run.5 However, as the body of 
this dissertation will discuss, the causal mechanisms by which crises can induce reform are not 
obvious and require detailed discussion.  
 
This line of literature, however, leaves a central question unanswered: Why are countries failing to 
develop institutional mechanisms that could solve commitment problems, even if the benefits of 
reform would be significant for society at large?6 Drazen and Easterly (2001) put the question another 
way by asking, why “things need to get very bad (and not just bad) to induce reform”? (p. 130, italics 
in original) The literature of the first stream already offered some answers to this question. Tabellini 
and Alesina (1990), for example, offer a model to explain excessive budget deficits or surpluses with 
                                                     
4 The link between crises and reform is only briefly touched upon in this section as it is discussed at length in chapter 3.  
5 Bruno and Easterly (1996) and Drazen and Easterly (2001) offer empirical confirmations of the Drazen and Grilli model.  
6 For example, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) argue that central banks constitute one such mechanism. Central banks are 
conferred to the responsibility to provide monetary policy based on technical expertise rather than political arguments 
which enhances the credibility of monetary policy. 
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the inability of present day voters to bind the choices of future voters. This entails not only a 
commitment problem but also hints at different sets of preferences, ideologies, and norms which 
determine policy choice. The war of attrition model by Alesina and Drazen (1991) can be interpreted 
in a similar way as well. If all groups could agree to bear the burden of the costs of reform equally, 
there would be no delay in stabilization. The ability of groups to agree on the distribution of costs, 
however, depends on their degree of polarization which can aggravated by differences in norms and 
preferences. The following sections review the literature on how such norms and preferences can 
induce polarization and impact political collaboration on reform.  
 
2.2. Stream 2: Social Norms of (Non-)Cooperation  
 
The second stream of research on the political economy of reform departed from investigating 
macroeconomic reforms and the contestation among organized interest groups that are finite in 
number. Instead, the second stream literature focuses on agency problems within a much more 
diffuse, numerous, and unorganized set of actors. Dixit (2003) offers an interpretation of the 
interrelationships between actors based on principal-agent theory in which political contracts are 
being exchanged. These interrelationships, however, can become very complex. The root problem is 
that political contracts lack enforceability as no independent, superior third party exists that could 
surveil them. Acemoglu (2003) argues that this lack of enforceability is the root cause of inefficient 
policies as these serve the interests of politicians and specific social groups at the expense of the rest 
of the population. As the contracts between principals and agents cannot be enforced externally, they 
have to be self-enforcing which entails a Prisoner’s Dilemma, that is, a situation in which the pursuit 
of individual interests leads to pareto-suboptimal outcome: each agent has an incentive to extract 
additional rents in favor of the own group at the expense of others because of rational beliefs that 
others do too. Finding solutions to this dilemma then depends on informal mechanisms to sanction 
defectors of political contracts, which reflects on the set of norms that governs social and political 
behavior. 
 
Dixit (2018), for example, applies these considerations to the case of corruption. He describes how 
businesses would each have an interest in not paying bribes for winning public tenders or licenses as 
it reduces their profit margins. Nevertheless, they get caught in a high-corruption equilibrium as they 
find it optimal to pay bribes to obtain contracts in the first place, based on the rational belief that 
other businesses pay bribes too. These norms of non-cooperation can be extremely rigid and sticky. 
Olken and Pande (2012) review the literature on anti-corruption campaigns and show how these 
norms survive institutional changes. Politicians and citizens tend to adapt their behavior and simply 
circumvent regulations to find new ways for corrupt behavior. Acemoglu and Jackson (2017) confirm 
these results more formally by discussing how laws and social norms interact. They show that laws 
that are in strong conflict with existing norms can ultimately have a negative effect. An abrupt 
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tightening of laws can induce a critical mass of people to prefer to break the law which makes 
effective enforcement even less likely. That way, law-breaking can “snowball” and exacerbate 
lawlessness. The authors stress that laws can be successful in shaping social norms when they are 
gradually imposed in accord with prevailing norms.  
 
The extent to which a polity can provide solutions to this dilemma depends on a range of 
characteristics of political institutions that structure political exchange. These characteristics 
determine the degree to which actors can collaborate on reform and the quality of the policies so 
produced. Spiller and Tommasi (2003) leverage formal transaction-cost theory to model political 
collaboration in the form of political transactions. These transactions take the form of intertemporal 
agreements in that political actors bargain over reform with political exchanges, such as a vote for 
project A today in return for resources or a vote for project B tomorrow. The authors discuss several 
features of a political environment that affect the ability of political actors to engage in intertemporal 
agreements. Among these requirements is the observability of “political moves” of other actors and 
the degree to which political bargain takes place in formal arenas which provide some sort of 
enforcement mechanisms.7 Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2013) and Tommasi, Scartascini and 
Stein (2014) develop this argument further and emphasize the intertemporal nature of political 
exchanges as a significant determinant that facilitates political collaboration. If actors are temporally 
linked, they develop incentives to set up a system of norms that can lend credibility to their 
exchanges.  
 
The legitimacy and behavior of political actors can be a significant factor in facilitating the credibility 
of political exchanges and influencing the norms of cooperative behavior. Hermalin (1998) models 
how political actors can assume a leadership role and thereby induce others to follow and support the 
leaders’ actions. Akerlof (2017) develops this argument further by providing a formal theory of 
legitimacy of political leaders. His model follows earlier research which identified electoral cycles 
as a significant predictor for the success of reform: new governments are found to be more likely to 
implement reform which some authors attribute to the higher degrees of legitimacy a government 
enjoys just after having been elected (Pinea, 1994; Williamson and Haggard, 1994).  
 
Akerlof argues that legitimate leadership introduces rules which followers feel a duty to fulfill. In 
doing so, their motivation increases to punish violators of rules they consider as legitimate. His model 
suggests that legitimacy of leadership, and the actions leaders can take to obtain it, can alter norms 
of cooperative behavior. Similar conclusions are drawn in Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) and Bidner 
and Francois (2013). Tompson and Rice (2009) confirm these considerations empirically in a 
comprehensive study on pension, labor, and product market reforms in OECD countries. The authors 
                                                     
7 Political transactions theory is discussed in more detail in the body of the dissertation, chapter 5.  
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emphasize that such reform is much more likely to succeed when political leaders have a strong 
electoral mandate for a reform and provide political leadership.  
 
Akerlof treats legitimacy as exogenous, a characteristic that leaders can choose to invest in. However, 
the origins of legitimacy for leaders and rules are not obvious but appear to have a significant impact 
on the degree to which they are followed. Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010), for example, show 
in an experimental study that rules are more likely to be followed by agents when they are chosen 
collectively and evolved endogenously, rather than being imposed by an external entity. Their results 
have important implications for development economists. They suggest that reform measures that 
are part of reform programs demanded by international organizations inherently have a lower 
likelihood to be implemented and followed. Their results speak to the literature on the success of 
international donor organizations to instigate reform, whose evidence is ambiguous (Abiad and 
Mody, 2005; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2011; Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2015).  
 
A central implication of this stream of research is that political constraints on reform result from 
norms that are suboptimal and curtail cooperative behavior and thereby political collaboration on 
reform. They may be characterized by features such as clientelism, or low levels of general trust 
which impede the credibility of intertemporal political exchanges and the legitimacy of leaders. The 
next section will explore how such norms can emerge from preferences inherent in a country’s 
constituencies. 
 
2.3. Stream 3: Divergence of Preferences  
 
This section briefly examines a large literature on the roots and repercussions of ideological 
disagreements among actors and social groups over economic and political fundamentals for reform. 
I first trace the origins of individual preferences by discussing the link between ethnic and ideological 
heterogeneity, cultural and economic attitudes, and economic outcomes. Thereafter, I examine the 
effects of these heterogeneities for political collaboration on reform. 
 
Roots of Diverging Preferences 
 
Ethnic divisions are found to be a basic underlying factor in explaining comparative economic 
development. Ashraf and Galor (2013) show that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity in 
the form of genetic diversity is associated with economic development in a hump-shaped form: high 
levels of diversity reduce income by increasing mistrust and non-cooperative behavior, while low 
levels of diversity impede a society’s aggregate productivity by reducing the capacity to adopt and 
integrate more efficient methods of production. Their findings complement a range of studies that 
investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on political and economic outcomes, in particular the 
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provision of public goods which will be discussed below (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly, 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Putnam, 2007). The degree of diversity within a society 
hence seems to be connected to political constraints to reform that, if implemented, would benefit 
society.  
 
One possible implication of the association of ethnic diversity with economic and political outcomes 
is that cultural differences and social values within a society matter (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 
2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) provide a widely referenced 
definition of culture “as those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” (p. 23, original in italics) While the debate 
about the effect of culture on economic development dates back many decades, recent advances in 
data provisioning and theoretical foundations make a more nuanced discussion possible. Alesina and 
Giuliano (2011), for example, use World Values Survey data to show that individuals who rely 
strongly on their family for service provisioning, insurance, and transfer of resources experience a 
lower degree of generalized trust, civic engagement, and political participation. Fisman and Miguel 
(2007) provide evidence on the extent to which cultural norms influence behavior as well. The 
authors show that politicians coming from more corrupt countries have received more parking tickets 
while being under immunity from the United Nations working in New York. These cultural values 
can be extraordinarily rigid and adapt only slowly to changing economic and political environments 
(Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013).  
 
Cultural and social values can hence serve as a predictor for political preferences. For example, there 
exists a large literature on the reasons for preferences of the size of governments and redistribution. 
Economic theory suggests that generally lower income individuals would prefer larger governments 
since higher income individuals within a society pay for it via relatively higher taxes (for example, 
Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The predictions of these models, however, fail to reflect reality where 
tax rates tend to be lower than predicted, even in democratic countries in which the median voter is 
poorer than the mean. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) address this puzzle and show that considerations 
of equality and fairness in the process of redistribution shapes policy preferences. They provide 
evidence that perceptions of fairness of social competition influence redistributive policies: in 
societies in which people believe that their individual effort determines their income, they will opt 
for low levels of redistribution. Instead, in societies in which people believe that the incomes are 
determined by luck or corruption, higher tax environments prevail.  
 
By confirming these results, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) investigate the relationship between 
individual preferences for fairness, expectations of income and preferences for redistribution. Among 
others, the authors find that respondents with lower income and higher preferences for fairness 
demand higher redistribution, however, individuals with higher upward economic mobility prefer 
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lower degrees of redistribution. Durante, Putterman and van der Weele (2014) provide similar results 
in an experimental setup. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that individual exposure to a 
political system, such as communism in their case, can drive distributional preferences as well. The 
results of these studies suggest that relative economic positions are only one driver of diverging 
policy preferences within a society. Other drivers include preferences for fairness or perceptions on 
the opportunities for upward mobility, which can be a cultural heritage. Giuliano and Spilimbergo 
(2014) show that economic crises and recessions can increase demands for redistribution. They 
provide evidence that individuals who lived through crisis situations are more likely to vote left and 
assign a greater role for governments. 
 
To date, much scholarly attention is being given to the role of citizens’ information for determining 
the origins of distributional and institutional preferences (Glaeser and Sunstein, 2013; World Bank, 
2016b). The leadership and legitimacy of politicians play a crucial role in this regard. However, one 
of the key questions emanating from models, such as the one from Akerlof (2017), is where 
legitimacy of leaders come from, and how this shapes preferences for public goods. After all, the 
literature on the roots of policy preferences requires more work, in particular in collaboration with 
research areas such as sociology and political science, to draw encompassing conclusions. 
 
Fractionalization and Ethnic Diversity  
 
The literature reviewed above leaves unexplained the question why politicians who have superior 
information and expert advice nevertheless protract reform that would be socially beneficial. 
Divergent preferences based on cultural heritage are not a sufficient condition for persistent 
disagreement on prudent compromise for reform. An answer to this question can be found in research 
on the impact of ethnic diversity and identity politics on the provisioning of public goods. As part of 
the literature of the third stream these studies give insights into how diverging preferences become 
organized and therefore influence political collaboration.  
 
Most contributions refer to diversity as fractionalization, a measure that takes the probability that 
two randomly drawn individuals from the a population will be of the same ethnicity or social group 
(Papyrakis and Mo, 2014). In a governmental context, fractionalization commonly refers to the 
“probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties” (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2016, p. 12). Fractionalization can be considered as 
a cost of overcoming differences for the exchange and supply of public goods. Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) show theoretically that ethnic diversity reduces government service provision. By 
assuming that spending preferences differ by group, greater heterogeneity consequently leads to 
disagreement over resource allocation and the adoption of a “compromise” good. Since this good is 
further away from groups’ preferences, citizens are less willing to fund the good.  
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While some recent works criticize this view in favor of spatial accounts (Soifer, 2016), evidence for 
the effects of fractionalization is abundant (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Putnam, 2007; Chakravarty 
and Fonseca, 2014). Beach and Jones (2017), for example, investigate the extent to which ethnic 
diversity within Californian City Councils affects spending on public goods. They find that more 
diverse city councils spend less on public goods, which is more pronounced for cities with high levels 
of segregation and economic inequality. The authors interpret these findings as confirming the 
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly model in that increased diversity creates higher levels of disagreement 
among political actors. 
 
More fractionalized countries also tend to exhibit lower levels of trust which hampers political 
collaboration, especially in countries in which few other ethno-religious characteristics establish 
cross-cutting dimensions of identity (Finseraas and Jakobsson, 2012). Alesina and Zhuravskaya 
(2011), for example, find that more ethnically “segregated” countries, i.e., countries in which 
ethnically distinct groups live more spatially separated, experience a lower quality of government. 
They find lack of trust to be the dominant transmission channel between segregation and low 
governance quality, which tends to be lower in more segregated countries. Other studies point out 
that the likelihood of violent conflict increases in more segmented countries (Vogt, 2018). 
 
Lack of trust among ethnicities might also play a role within governmental institutions, as lack of 
trust among political parties could impede collaboration among parties and hamper reform efforts. 
Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017) investigate the relationship between ethnicity as a 
predictor of cultural values and various political economy outcomes. They find that countries in 
which ethnicity is a strong predictor of cultural values tend to have a higher likelihood of civil conflict 
and lower provisioning of public goods. To explain these results, the authors point to increasing 
“social antagonism” in “societies where individuals differ from each other in both ethnicity and 
culture” (p. 2481).  
 
The effects of such social antagonisms can be exacerbated by inequalities across groups in 
fractionalized countries. Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) argue that economic 
inequalities between different groups within the same country shape comparative development more 
than ethnic plurality per se. They show in a study on Afghanistan that ethnic inequality is strongly 
and inversely associated with economic development, which goes beyond the inequality across 
regions and administrative units. In discussing transmission channels, they contend that unequal 
income distribution across ethnic groups leads to political inequality based on ethnic affiliation, 
thereby giving rise to between-group polarization and subsequently discriminatory policies. 
Similarly, Kyriacou (2013) shows that the quality of governments depends on the extent to which 
ethnic differences overlap with income differences. Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2008) confirm the 
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negative relationship between inequality and public goods provisioning in an experimental setup, 
while van Staveren and Pervaiz (2017) find social exclusion as a measure of inequality to be of higher 
relevance for growth than diversity per se. 
 
Identity Politics  
 
The above studies indicate that ethno-sectarian identity can follow similar mechanisms and fulfill 
similar purposes as interest group identity, which was the main unit of analysis in the first stream of 
literature discussed above. Identity politics, then, refers to exclusive political alliances that center on 
“inherited characteristics of social groups that seem to have little scope for voluntary adoption or 
rejection” (Cammett, 2014, p. 9), such as religion or ethnicity, rather than ideological position. 
Recent literature unveiled several mechanisms by which identity-based politics can shape political 
outcomes.  
 
Like fractionalization, identity-based politics can reduce the level and effectiveness of the 
provisioning of public goods. Chakravarty and Fonseca (2014), for example, study the role of social 
identity in determining the impact of social fragmentation on public goods provisioning using 
laboratory experiments. They find that increases in fragmentation reduces public good provisioning 
by majority group members, which appears to be driven by identity preferences rather than self-
interest.  
 
In this way, identity politics can aggravate political collaboration by undermining the effectiveness 
of political contestation and resource allocation. The provisioning of public goods can then be abused 
as a tool for electoral contestation among parties. Cammett (2014, 2015) investigates the role of 
public goods provisioning for identity-based parties. She provides evidence from Lebanon and shows 
that locally dominant political groups provide public goods, health care in particular, according to 
their electoral and political strategies rather than to the benefit of society. Along these lines, Salti and 
Chaaban (2010) show also for the case of Lebanon that the allocation of resources from central to 
local governments follows a “one-man-one-dollar rule” rather than a distribution according to needs: 
each community receives resources according to their population size rather than their relative wealth 
or necessity assessments.  
 
Another mechanism that connects identity politics and public goods provision is the quality of 
policies and politicians. Banerjee and Pande (2007) find that the competencies and capacities of 
politicians are likely to decrease in fractionalized polities, particularly in consociational ones. They 
provide evidence from India and show that parties that cater to caste identities more frequently rely 
on candidates that have a criminal record. In a theoretical contribution, the authors explain this result 
with voters’ preferences for reliable distribution rather than honesty. 
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Political Polarization  
 
Diverging preferences of social or ethnic groups can be exacerbated by various channels, such as 
information or economic shocks (Campante and Hojman, 2013). The farther away the preferences 
between groups are, the more difficulties groups encounter to collaborate on reform. In a seminal 
contribution, Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity and polarization had differing 
transmission channels by which they influence economic and political outcomes, a result more recent 
studies confirm (Gören, 2014).  
 
Prevailing concepts of polarization aim to measure the potential for latent conflict within a society. 
The concept was first formalized by Esteban and Ray (1994) who offer two mechanisms to capture 
the sum of effective interpersonal antagonism in a society: i) the degree of identification towards 
members of the own group and ii) the alienation felt towards other groups. Polarization becomes 
larger when group members become more similar vis-à-vis each other or the distances between 
groups increases. Following Esteban and Ray (1994), Torenvlied and Haarhuis (2008) adapt this 
definition to define policy polarization with differences in policy positions. 
 
The effects of political polarization have received much attention in recent political science literature, 
in particular the tendency to increase violent conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2008; Esteban, Mayoral and 
Ray, 2012). Once again, the war of attrition model by Alesina and Drazen (1991) provides an early 
indication of the mechanism by which polarization can influence collaboration on reform. In their 
model, actors refrain from collaborating in an effort to avoid revealing their relative political and 
economic strength to other actors by conceding to bear a share of the costs.  
 
In more recent work, polarization, then, is found to impact the adoption of “significant” reform by 
inducing legislative gridlock (Binder, 1999; D. R. Jones, 2001; Clinton and Lapinski, 2006). 
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006, pp. 175–189) show that polarization decreases law production 
more generally. Torenvlied and Haarhuis (2008) develop a spatial model of reform based on veto 
player theory that takes into account differences in policy positions among groups rather than 
distributional conflict. They show that higher levels of polarization decrease the “level” of anti-
corruption reform in African countries. 
 
2.4. Conclusion & Thematic Integration 
 
As this review has shown, the literature on the political economy of reform has provided important 
insights into how and why collaboration on reform takes place or gets delayed. However, it leaves 
important questions in need of further research. 
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The Effect of Crises on Political Collaboration 
 
As outlined above and discussed at length in chapter 3 and 6, the mechanisms by which crises impact 
reform are theoretically well-established but exhibit ambiguous results in empirical literature. In 
chapter 3, I trace back this ambiguity to methodological shortcomings of empirical models. The 
methodological limitations of empirical models relate to the operationalization of the concepts of 
crises and reform, which tend to rely on reform indices and fixed thresholds of macroeconomic 
variables to indicate crises. It is in particular the use of aggregate reform indices, reflecting the 
relative change in a legislative environment, however, that curtails the extent to which empirical 
models can provide insights into the mechanisms of political collaboration (Babecký and Campos, 
2011; Campos and Horváth, 2012).  
 
Chapter 6 elaborates on this discussion and identifies in conceptual and epistemological, rather than 
methodological, shortcoming in extant approaches on examining the relationship between crises and 
reform. The chapter shows why quantitative approaches have limited explanatory power to identify 
the mechanisms by which crises can make collaboration possible that would otherwise be blocked. 
This limitation originates in the nature of crises as an instance of insecurity, rather than uncertainty 
(Harberger, 1993; Blyth, 2002). In such situations, the assumption that agents act based on 
predictable objective functions becomes untenable: in severe crises, actors lose confidence in the 
beliefs and principles that have guided their actions in the past so that the ostensible material positions 
of actors become themselves underdetermined. This uncertainty about their own interests with regard 
to material positions can open pathways for alternative beliefs as to how the economy functions. The 
chapter therefore argues that constructivist interpretations of crises are potentially better suited than 
rationalist ones to indicate crises and emphasizes that empirical analyses should be careful in drawing 
direct causal relationships from individual crises episodes to reform episodes.  
 
The Effects of Fractionalization on Political Collaboration 
 
The literature reviewed above explains why a given degree of fractionalization can delay the 
occurrence of reform and covers the impact of fractionalization on political and economic outcomes 
in a significant body of research. However, the transmission channels that explain these outcomes, 
i.e. the dynamics of political collaboration on reform in fractionalized governmental institutions, are 
less understood. For example, the theoretical models by Tseblis (2002) or Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 
(1999) only explain why differences over spending preferences for public goods can lead to lower or 
delayed collaboration, not which compromise good will eventually be agreed upon. Similarly, 
empirical investigations such as those of Beach and Jones (2017), as well as experiments such as by 
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Chakravarty and Fonseca (2014) do not differentiate between the types of public goods eventually 
provided as a function of the characteristics of the population investigated.  
 
Extant literature therefore fails to sufficiently explain observable variation in collaboration on reform 
across time and policy areas. As will be discussed below, present day empirical models on the 
political economy of reform hamper a differentiated analysis of political collaboration by, for 
example, relying on aggregate indices of reform, which cannot account for the differing institutional 
requirements of distinct types of legislation. That way, important phenomena remain unexplained. 
As the example in the introduction of this thesis illustrates, why can fractionalization hinder 
collaboration on reform in some areas, while collaboration in others remains unaffected? Which 
types of reform are possible in the face of increased fractionalization, and which are blocked?  
 
This thesis argues that important insights on political collaboration can be gained when reform is 
treated as a multi-layered concept in empirical analysis. When differentiating reform not only 
between policy areas, but also between layers of governmental activity and governmental 
institutions, a researcher can obtain a fuller understanding of the political dynamics that shape 
collaboration on reform. To that end, I offer an alternative approach to measure reform. I establish a 
new data set containing all important legislative texts in Lebanon since independence 1943 until 
2016. Chapter 4 introduces the data set in detail and discusses agenda-setting theory to inform the 
analysis. The chapter shows that legislative activity in Lebanon can exhibit significant variation 
across policy areas, time, and governmental institutions despite being in settings of similar degrees 
of fractionalization. 
 
Towards a Framework to Explain Political Collaboration 
 
After having identified the gaps in the literature (chapter 2 and 3) and established a data set that lends 
itself to answer the research questions outlined (chapter 4), chapter 5 of this thesis provides a 
conceptual framework of political collaboration on reform. The framework addresses the underlying 
research question of this thesis and contributes towards a theory of political collaboration in order to 
explain variation of legislative activity across policy areas and time. The framework combines two 
theoretical approaches that allow a researcher to reflect the multidimensional nature of reform. First, 
the framework leverages political transactions theory (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003), which seeks to 
describe how the functioning of political institutions impacts upon the capacity of political actors to 
engage in political transactions and, hence, the quality of policies. Second, this view is combined 
with agenda-setting theory, which explains how and why specific policy issues receive political 
attention (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).  
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Based on the framework, I argue that the properties of a reform project determine the extent to which 
fractionalization affects political collaboration on reform: the higher the institutional requirements 
of a reform are, i.e., the number and nature of political actors and institutions involved in accrediting 
the legislation, and the broader its impact, i.e. the number of groups that are affected, the more 
fractionalization can impede political collaboration. In this way, the study provides more detailed 
investigation into the mechanisms that affect collaboration, in particular in fractionalized contexts. 
Theory, methodology and results are discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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3. DO CRISES INDUCE REFORM? A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTION, METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE ‘CRISIS HYPOTHESIS’ 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has reviewed and discussed dominant theories in the literature on the political 
economy of reform. One important theory that aims to explain political collaboration is the crisis 
hypothesis, which predicts that economic crises beget the implementation of economic reform. This 
notion is commonly referred to as the ‘crisis hypothesis’ and argues that ‘unsustainable’ economic 
conditions (and the fear they could deteriorate even further) serve as a catalyst for subsequent reform 
(for example Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodrik, 1996; Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). The hypothesis 
has become well established in economic literature and is regarded as an “orthodoxy” of the political 
economy of reform (Drazen, 2000, p. 444). 
 
When confronted with the global economic and financial turmoil experienced since the late-2000s, 
however, the central tenet of the crisis hypothesis appears to warrant further scrutiny. As noted by 
economist Nouriel Roubini in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, reform in the wake of a crisis 
is by no means a given: “Had policy makers failed to arrest the crisis, as they failed during the 
Depression, the calls for reform today would be deafening: there’s nothing like ubiquitous breadlines 
and 25 percent unemployment to focus the minds of legislators. But because the disaster was handled 
more deftly this time, the impetus for deep, structural reforms of the financial system has faltered.” 
(Roubini and Mihm, 2011, p. 183) 
 
Rather than characterizing the repercussions of the 2008 crisis as not having been ‘severe enough’ to 
trigger reform, this statement indicates that the impetus for reform might depend more on a 
government’s (in)ability to manage the immediate short-term consequences of a crisis. Further, it 
suggests that the determinants which facilitate the initial introduction and the eventual 
implementation of a reform agenda are not the same. This chapter argues that the way the crisis 
hypothesis commonly operationalizes its key concepts - namely, crisis, reform, and the political 
mediation surrounding the latter - make it difficult to take such distinctions into account for empirical 
testing. Empirical modeling then risks conflating the distinct causal connections between these three 
key concepts, which in turn undermines conclusive interpretation of results. 
 
Among prominent theories of the political economy of reform, the correlation between crisis and 
reform has received great attention but has yet to be fully understood (see Brooks and Kurtz, 2007). 
The hypothesis has been repeatedly criticized for failing to adequately reflect the complexity of the 
mechanism that links crisis and reform (for example Campos et al., 2010; Corrales, 1998; Edwards 
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and Steiner, 2000; Williamson, 1994). In response to such critiques, empirical models testing the 
crisis-reform link have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to the growing recognition that 
“[i]t is the type of crisis, and not just the existence of one, that is most crucial” (Hallerberg and 
Scartascini, 2015, p. 72). The application of the hypothesis has become diversified and has been 
applied to a wide set of crisis and reform measures, from inflation to employment and political crises 
and from financial to tax and healthcare reform. More recent studies have emphasized the origins of 
a given crisis (Waelti, 2015), and particularly the domestic institutional and political context that 
mediates the adoption of reform (for example Brooks and Kurtz, 2007; Campos et al., 2010; Galasso, 
2014). Thus, the incidence of reform as a response to crisis appears to depend on a much more 
complex set of factors than solely unsustainable economic conditions. Empirical testing requires a 
nuanced operationalization of both the nature of the crisis event and the reform process, as well as 
the political mediation in facilitating or hindering reform.  
 
This chapter scrutinizes the crisis hypothesis by surveying empirical evidence and assessing its 
methodological operationalization. The survey finds the empirical evidence for many of the most 
widely discussed crisis-reform links (such as inflation to financial reform) to be inconclusive and, 
with it, the predictive power of the hypothesis to be weak despite its wide acceptance. In particular, 
the common procedure of indicating crises via fixed thresholds is problematic as it fails to take into 
account perceptions of what constitutes a crisis, how these perceptions may vary over times and 
across regions, and how they translate into the perception of the need for reform. Consequently, the 
political mediation of reform during crises is context dependent and influenced by the broader 
economic and institutional environment, which potentially alters the manner in which political 
mediation for reform is thought to work in crisis-free times. Empirical testing would thus benefit 
from reflecting social perception, as well as cross-regional and temporal heterogeneity of political 
mediation for reform within the hypothesis’ key concepts. Comparative research methods that 
contrast the idiosyncrasies of different regions open up promising vistas for future research. They 
enable the integration of a political and institutional setting within a specific cultural, regional, and 
temporal context into a respective model. In this way, future research on the crisis hypothesis can 
enhance our understanding of how economic crises influence political dynamics in bringing about 
reform. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: The second section revisits relevant theoretical approaches on 
the crisis hypothesis. The third section surveys the empirical evidence and provides an overview of 
established crisis-reform links. Section four scrutinizes the general methodological 
operationalization of the hypothesis. Section five concludes by outlining implications for future 
research.  
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3.2. The Crisis Hypothesis in Theory  
 
The idea that economic crisis facilitates reform appears in a variety of theoretical guises. This section 
reviews relevant theoretical approaches and pinpoints aspects that make a translation into empirical 
models difficult to operationalize (for a more detailed review see Drazen, 2000).  
 
In explaining the dynamics of crises that enable reform, most theoretical approaches discuss 
variations of the interplay of social interest groups, which changes during crisis. In this vein, crises 
can be described as ‘moments of critical choice’ (Gourevitch, 1986). Crises enable a more open 
political environment by challenging established relationships between political actors and opening 
up opportunities for the creation of new ones. Olson (1982), for example, discusses social interest 
groups which become powerful in times of economic prosperity. Once those interest groups become 
powerful they tend to oppose the reforming of rules that made them powerful in the first place. Their 
vested interests block socially beneficial reform until conditions deteriorate and eventually turn into 
a crisis. According to Olson, only a crisis can weaken their vested interests sufficiently to be 
overcome. There exists no formal treatment of Olson’s contribution to our knowledge. 
 
Formal modelling follows rationalist views and takes the form of game-theoretic models. In such 
models, rational agents, here social interest groups, make decisions on adopting or blocking reform 
by projecting and comparing related streams of payoffs. Accordingly, reform becomes more likely 
when the payoffs associated with the option “non-reforming” diminish (see, for example, Velasco 
1999). Reform occurs when the expected stream of payoffs associated with reform “first exceeds that 
associated with the status quo” (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996, p. 198). As within the contribution by 
Olson, crises arise because interest groups tend to delay reform in ‘better times’. The delay, in turn, 
eventually causes economic conditions to deteriorate. Only when conditions ‘deteriorate sufficiently’ 
and eventually turn into a crisis, then, reform occurs. In Ranciere and Tornell (2015) and Tornell 
(1998), for example, powerful interest groups tend to overappropriate resources within an economy, 
which eventually is to the economy’s detriment. As economic conditions deteriorate, declining 
aggregate resources limit the ability for future appropriations. According to Ranciere and Tornell, 
conflict among these interest groups erupts, which is resolved by the use of structural reform as a 
strategic tool to curb the power of rival groups within a new regime. 
 
The model introduced by Alesina and Drazen (1991) appears to be the most widely discussed. Interest 
groups strive to shift the costs of reforming onto other social groups by embarking on a “war of 
attrition”. They attempt to wait each other out until one group concedes, and acquiesces to reforms 
which may ultimately see them bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. The model assumes that 
information is distributed asymmetrically in that each group only knows with certainty its own costs 
of reform. It is important to note that it is not the distributional effect of income that is relevant for 
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delayed reforming, but the conflict over the distribution of the burden. This implies that reforms 
whose cost distribution is dependent on political debate (such as tax reform or privatization) will be 
exposed to greater delay than reform for which less debate is required (such as financial reform) (see 
Lora and Olivera, 2004). 
 
Crises hasten the deterioration of a given stream of payoffs. Drazen and Grilli (1993) elaborate on 
the war of attrition model and show that crises can even be welfare-enhancing and hence ‘desirable’. 
A crisis enables an agreement on reform and on the distribution of related costs sooner than otherwise 
possible. The associated stabilization, then, would leave a country better off in the long-run.  
 
Such models entail two notions of crises that make a meaningful conceptualization for empirical 
testing complex. Firstly, they do not qualify the extent to which economic conditions need to 
deteriorate in order to be deemed a crisis and thereby trigger reform. The argument then risks 
implying that crises must have prevailed when reform occurred. In that sense, the absence of reform 
could simply mean that the crisis has not yet become ‘severe enough’, making the argument ‘virtually 
non-falsifiable’ (Rodrik, 1996). What makes the argument non-trivial then is the question why 
conditions often need to become very bad, and not just bad, in order to provoke reform (Drazen, 
2000). As Drazen and Easterly (2001) put it: “Why is it “business as usual” until times get really 
bad?” (p. 131) Interpreting the crisis hypothesis as arguing that reform more likely follows extremely 
serious situations, rather that only moderately bad ones, then, makes the argument falsifiable (ibid.). 
This argument lends itself to comparative statements in the sense that ‘more severe crises lead to 
more reform sooner’ (as applied in Bruno and Easterly, 1996, Drazen and Easterly, 2001, Alesina et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, the absence of a reference point complicates the task of defining precise 
thresholds for empirical models, beyond which conditions can be considered as sufficiently serious 
to be indicative of a crisis (see Section 4.1).  
 
Secondly, the models determine crises solely by means of economic variables. An economic 
deterioration then is thought to correlate somehow with the perceived need for reform. The mere 
deterioration of economic conditions, however, is not a sufficient condition for extant policies to be 
perceived as having failed and being in need of change. As Drazen (2000) puts it, “[i]t is not simply 
the view that the current situation is unacceptable, but that different types of policies must be tried.” 
(p. 446) Reform following crisis is thus not merely a product of economic conditions having become 
‘bad enough’. Rather, it is the perception that change is needed which constitutes a central component 
for the political mediation of reform (see Harberger, 1993). However, the definition of crises based 
on economic variables offers no insights into role of perception regarding either the crisis itself or 
the need of change. As discussed below, making sense of this relationship requires a fuller 
consideration of the political context as well as the origins of a given crisis (see Section 4.3).  
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This strand of literature then puts forward reasons why reform is adopted sooner rather than later. 
Tommasi and Velasco (1996) argue that crises induce a ‘sense of urgency’ (p. 199). Something needs 
to be done now, as the crisis requires immediate political action. Still, the perceived urgency for 
reform would apply primarily to stabilization efforts in an economic environment that has 
experienced significant deterioration within a short period of time, such as exogenous shocks that 
lead to price instability. A lengthy deterioration of state variables by contrast, which evolved 
endogenously as a consequence of protracted reform in ‘better times’, does not ‘suddenly’ appear. 
While action might still be required urgently, the perception of the causes and consequences of either 
reforming or further delaying reform would be subject to different political dynamics (see Section 
5). Rodrik (1992, 1996), for example, outlines how policy makers can act as ‘agenda setters’ in times 
of macroeconomic instability. According to Rodrik, because high inflation and macroeconomic 
instability harm the society as a whole, policymakers could take advantage of the high costs of further 
delaying reform by presenting domestic interests with a package of reform. They initiate reforms that 
specifically promise a return to stability while tying additional policies to the package. These 
additional policies may be incidental to the immediate crisis but pass through parliament in the 
shadow of the initial package.  
 
The political dynamics in delaying or accelerating the adoption of reform are influenced by the 
uncertainty regarding the post-reform environment. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue that the 
outcome of reform cannot be known ex ante, as political actors cannot determine who will win or 
lose out from a specific reform. It is only when economic conditions deteriorate sufficiently that 
interest groups accept the associated uncertainty (Laban and Sturzenegger, 1994). However, the 
specific challenges and risks politicians face due to ex ante uncertainty regarding the implications of 
their actions are substantially different depending on the reform in question (see Brooks and Kurtz, 
2007). In other words, the ‘sense of urgency’ informs reform measures differently. While 
stabilization efforts in the form of, say, fiscal reform can be implemented rather quickly, far-reaching 
structural reform might require lengthy political mediation (see Section 4.2). As they might take 
significant time to design, implement and institutionalize they are not necessarily tied to the same 
‘level of urgency’ throughout the reform process. 
 
As a consequence, the theory of the crisis hypothesis offers little guidance as to how the key concepts 
for empirical testing – crisis, reform and political mediation – can be operationalized. As the 
remainder of the chapter will discuss, the operationalization of empirical approaches regarding what 
constitutes a crisis proves elusive, in that a crisis creates the necessary social and political perception 
of the need of a specific reform.  
 
3.3. Do Crises Beget Reform? Surveying Empirical Evidence 
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This section reviews relevant empirical evidence on the crisis hypothesis. Table 3-1 provides an 
overview of 19 research papers which have specifically focused on the crisis hypothesis and gives 
information on the modelling structure, the country and time period under consideration, the 
categories of crises and reform under consideration, the specific measures implemented, and the 
findings derived. The papers have been selected on a “best evidence” basis (Slavin, 1995), by 
assessing both the papers’ quality and their relevance to the research question at hand. Given the 
extent of the literature on the political economy of reform, the central selection criterion was the 
explicit elaboration on the crisis hypothesis within the papers’ empirical model. The review thus 
excludes contributions that use crisis variables as mere control instruments. Finally, the papers had 
to be published in a peer-reviewed journal subsequent to the pioneering contribution of Drazen and 
Grilli in 1993.8 
 
Two strands of empirical literature on the crisis hypothesis have emerged. The first strand (3 out of 
19 papers) discusses the war of attrition model by Alesina and Drazen (1991) and its elaboration by 
Drazen and Grilli (1993). These models do not consider reform measures explicitly but draw 
conclusions about the occurrence of reform implicitly, following the amelioration of economic 
variables. The second strand uses regression and estimation models to test the effect of crises on 
specific types of reform. Both strands will now briefly be introduced. 
 
Bruno and Easterly (1996) were the first to empirically test the Drazen and Grilli model. They 
compare two groups of developing countries, a group that experienced high inflation and stabilized 
afterwards and a group that did not experience a high-inflation period. By analyzing the countries’ 
public sector deficit and current account deficit they show that countries in the inflation-and-
stabilization group enjoyed lower deficits after they stabilized than countries that did not experience 
a high-inflation period. They conclude that countries that experienced high inflation and 
subsequently achieved stabilization appear to have reformed their economic domain, while countries 
without such ‘crisis’ did not. They confirm the theoretical results of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and 
conclude that crises can have a ‘welfare-enhancing effect’.  
 
Drazen and Easterly (2001) use a similar methodology to Bruno and Easterly and expand the scope 
of the analysis. As well as including a given country’s inflation rate in their model, they also test the 
black-market premium, GDP growth, government deficit, and current account balances. They too 
find supporting evidence for welfare-enhancing effect of crises in the cases of inflation and black 
market premium, but fail to do so in case of GDP growth, government deficit, or current account 
balance. However, they find the hypothesis to hold only “at the most extreme values” of inflation 
and black market premium (both above 1,000 percent), rendering it somewhat irrelevant for the 
                                                     
8 An exception from these criteria has been made for the contribution of Tornell (1998), which was not published in a peer-
reviewed journal but as a working chapter at National Bureau of Economic Research. The chapter is a major contribution 
to the field of research and received widespread attention. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of relevant studies on the crisis hypothesis 
  Independent Variable / Crises Dependent Variable / Reform  
Country  
Focus and 
Time Period 
Model Focus Type Method Type Method Findings 
Abiad and Mody (2005): Financial Reform: What Shakes it? What Shapes it? 
Developed and 
Developing 
Countries (35) 
from 1973 - 
1996 
  
  
  
Relationship of 
financial reform 
and different types 
of crises  
Balance of 
Payment / 
Debt  
One of two conditions to be met: 1) a forced 
change in parity, abandonment of a pegged 
exchange rate, or an international rescue, and 
2) an index of exchange market pressure 
exceeds a critical threshold of one and a half 
standard deviations above its mean 
Financial  
Reform 
Aggregate index on: 1) Directed 
credit/reserve requirements, 2) 
Interest rate controls, 3) Entry 
barriers and/or lack of pro-
competition policies, 4) restrictive 
operational regulations, 5) degree of 
privatization in the financial sector, 
and 6) controls on international 
financial transactions 
Balance of payment / debt crises positive and 
significant for financial liberalization 
Banking crises negatively significant for 
liberalization and hence lead to tightening of 
financial regulations 
Growth and inflation crises found insignificant 
Other influences: reforms promoted by a decline 
in US interest rates, by participation in IMF 
programs (pronounced mainly in countries with 
highly repressed financial sectors) and by 
openness to trade (where initial level of 
liberalization was low) 
Banking  Crisis for “period of financial distress resulting 
in the erosion of most or all of aggregate 
banking system capital.” (p.85) 
  
  Economic  Negative GDP growth     
  Inflation  Inflation > 50% per year     
    Political  
Variables 
1) Government partisanship, 2) Government 
structure (presidential or parliamentary) 
  
    External  
Influences 
1) US Interest rates, 2) IMF involvement, 3) 
Openness to trade 
    
Agnello et al. (2015a): Do debt crises boost financial reforms? 
OECD and 
Non-OECD 
countries (no 
number) from 
1980 - 2005 
Role of different 
forms of financial 
crises for various 
aspects of 
financial reform  
  
Debt  Differentiation between external and domestic 
debt crises, indicated by default on, 
repudiation or restructuring of debt. Dummy 
indicating the beginning of the crisis (based on 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2011)  
Financial  
Reform 
Dummy Variable based on financial 
liberalization index by Abiad et al. 
(2008), 1 = if yearly change of index 
> 0.05, 0 otherwise 
Debt crises positive and significant for financial 
reform (sensitivity analysis only for external 
debt significant), as well as currency, inflation 
(no differentiation between ‘inflation crisis’ and 
‘hyperinflation episode’), and banking crises, 
with no difference between OECD and non-
OECD countries 
Typology of crises appears to be insignificant for 
the occurrence of reform. Economic 
deterioration makes financial reform more likely 
in general. 
IMF stabilization programs, the quality of 
institutions and sovereign debt restructurings 
facilitate the implementation of financial 
reforms.  
  
  Currency  Exchange rate depreciation > 15% per annum 
(based on Reinhart and Rogoff 2011) 
    
    Inflation  > 20% per annum, Hyperinflation if inflation 
rate > 500% per annum (based on Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2011) 
    
    Banking  Qualitative indication by occurrence of either 
of two points: 1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the public 
sector of one or more financial institutions; or 
2) if there are no runs, the closure merging, 
takeover, or large-scale government assistance 
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of an important financial institution (or group 
of institutions) that marks the start of a string 
of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions (based on Reinhart and Rogoff 
2011) 
  Political  
Variables 
Institutional quality   
    External  
Influences 
1) IMF involvement, 2) ‘ParisClub’ (Debt 
rescheduling program) 
    
Agnello et al. (2015b): What determines the likelihood of structural reforms? 
Advanced, 
developing 
and emerging 
(55-60) from 
1980 - 2005 
  
Regression of 
several types of 
crises on reform 
indicators 
Economic  
Debt  
 
 
Currency  
Inflation  
Banking  
Political  
Variables 
Negative real GDP growth rate 
All other definitions as in Agnello et al. (2015a) 
and based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
Indication of ‘distributional conflict’ by using 
1) Gini-coefficient and 2) total 
fractionalization index 
Financial  
Reform 
Indicators on: Domestic finance 
liberalization, banking 
liberalization, international capital 
flow liberalization, external capital 
account liberalization (see Abiad et 
al. 2008) 
External debt crises main trigger of financial, 
banking and trade reforms 
Inflation and banking crises significant for 
external capital account reform 
Banking crises induce financial reforms 
(aggregate index) 
Economic recessions trigger financial, banking 
and trade reforms, especially in OECD countries 
No other significance found for labor market and 
product market reform. Only growth crises 
found significant for trade reform 
Political variables: only Gini-coefficient 
marginally significant for the likelihood of 
financial reforms 
  Trade Reform Index on average tariff rates, 
normalized between 0 (tariff rates of 
60% or higher) and 1 (no tariff rates) 
    Labor Market 
Reform 
Weighted average of: Centralized 
collective bargaining, conscription, 
cost of hiring, hiring regulations, 
mandated cost of worker dismissal, 
minimum wage 
    Product Market 
Reform 
Index for degree of flexibility of 
agriculture, electricity and 
telecommunications. Additionally, 
for OECD countries data of 
regulatory reform in industries: 1) 
Electricity, 2) gas supply, 3) Road 
fright, 4) air passenger transport, 5) 
rail transport, 6) post, 7) 
telecommunications 
      
Alesina et al. (2006): Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy of Reform 
Developing and 
developed 
countries 
(‘large 
sample’) from 
1960 - 2003 
  
Examination of the 
war of attrition 
model to indicate 
when and why 
stabilization 
occurs by 
regressing 
Political  
Variables 
Index on: 1) executive constraints (from 1 to 7), 
2) years left in current term for executive.  
Dummy variables on: 3) Executive elections in 
a given year, 4) leftist party in power, 5) 
legislative elections in a given year, 6) direct 
presidential system, 7) electoral rule in lower 
Government 
Deficit Crisis 
Government budget deficit as a share 
of GDP above the 75th percentile, = 
4.75% 
War of attrition model consistent with the crisis 
hypothesis, as it appears to be easier to stabilize 
more decisively in times of crises than in times 
of more ‘moderate’ economic problems 
Stabilization after crises more likely under 
"strong" government, especially presidential 
systems, systems with fewer veto rights of 
  Inflation Crisis Inflation above the 75th percentile, = 
14.05% 
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indicators of 
political systems 
on crisis indicators  
house proportional, 8) party of executive holds 
absolute majority of legislative 
institutions, in periods of a unified government 
(same party holding executive and legislature), 
with ruling parties having a large majority and 
after just having entered office (honeymoon 
period). External inducements of IMF have at 
best a moderate effect  
Results are similar for both crises modelled 
Banerjee and Munger (2004): Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries 
Low- and 
middle-
income 
developing 
countries (35) 
from 1982 - 
1999 
  
  
  
Privatization 
indicated by three 
related, but 
distinct variables: 
(i) timing; (ii) 
pace; and (iii) 
intensity of 
privatization. 
Regressed on 
various political, 
economic and 
institutional 
factors 
Government 
Deficit 
Budget balance as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (excluding grants) 
Privatization Based on three indicators: 1) Timing: 
0 for the years of no privatization 
and 1 for the year of first 
privatization and thereafter; 2) Pace: 
Annual frequency of privatization 
transactions; 3) Intensity: Annual 
value of privatization proceeds  
  
  
Privatization rather crisis driven than subject to 
long-term planning. No privatization found to be 
implemented without a preceding serious 
economic crisis 
Inflation significant for timing and intensity  
GDP growth significant only for timing 
Government deficit not significant  
Institutional quality significant, but not uniform. 
Countries with poor institutions privatize sooner, 
superior institutions lead to higher pace and 
intensity 
Fractionalization delays privatization, right-wing 
governments privatize more, democratic 
societies privatize sooner but delay 
implementation, government years in office 
insignificant 
Inflation Annual inflation rate   
Economic Annual growth rate   
External  
Influences 
1) Foreign aid in percent of Gross National 
Investment, 2) Size of the public sector to 
GDP, 3) Size of public sector in the year of 
first privatization, 4) Stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
  
  Political  
Variables 
1) Government years in office, 2) Right-wing 
executive, 3) Fractionalization 4) Democracy, 
5) Institutional quality 
    
Brooks and Kurtz (2007): Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform 
Latin American 
countries (19) 
from 1985 - 
1999 
Influence of 
differing political 
contexts, 
particularly 
governmental 
partisanship, for 
liberalization 
during crisis 
Economic 
Inflation 
 
Political  
Variables 
External  
Influences 
Real per capita GDP growth rate 
Natural logarithm of inflation (only tested for 
trade reform) 
1) Government partisanship, 2) 
Fractionalization  
1) Fiscal deficits, 2) current account balance, 3) 
external debt to GDP, 4) aggregate size of 
economy (natural log of GDP in 2000 USD), 
5) level of development (GDP per capita in 
2000 USD), 6) IMF involvement 
Trade Reform See Lora and Olivera (2004), 
composite measure based on average 
tariff level and tariff dispersion 
Recessions do not trigger both trade and cap. acc. 
liberalization. They rather occur during trade 
surpluses than in response to deficits 
Right-wing executives no more likely to 
liberalize trade than leftist executives in 
fragmented legislative settings; the lower the 
fragmentation though, right-wing executives 
liberalize, leftist executives rather do not. 
Fractionalization impels reform unconditional of 
governmental partisanship 
The higher the involvement of IMF, the lower the 
level of subsequent trade liberalization, while 
having no influence on cap. acc. liberalization. 
Lager economies have lower levels of trade and 
Financial  
Reform 
Composite measure for capital 
account liberalization, based on 1) 
use of multiple exchange rates, 2) 
restriction on current and capital 
account, 3) compulsory turnover of 
export receipts 
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cap. acc. liberalization, while lower debt ratios 
are associated with higher cap. acc. openness 
Bruno and Easterly (1996): Inflations Children: Tales of Crises that Beget Reform 
Developing 
countries (55) 
from 1960 - 
1994 
Testing war of 
attrition model by 
comparing 
macroeconomic 
variables in 
inflation-and-
stabilization 
countries and no-
inflation countries 
pre- and post-
crisis 
Inflation Comparing inflation levels with lagged 
inflation levels in two groups of countries 
(high-inflation-and-stabilization and no-
inflation)  
Debt Crisis 
Current  
Account  
Crisis 
Public sector deficit to GDP 
Current account deficits to GDP 
Developing countries in the inflation-and-
stabilization group had lower current account 
and public sector deficits after crisis compared 
to countries that did not experience high 
inflation. Hence, countries that experienced high 
inflation appear to have reformed, others did not 
Confirmation of the results by Drazen and Grilli 
(1993) in concluding that crises can have a 
welfare-enhancing effect, at least at high levels 
of inflation (>1000%) 
      
Campos and Esfahani (1996): When and why do governments initiate public enterprise reform? 
Developing 
countries (24) 
from 1972 - 
1993 
  
Relationship of 
privatization 
efforts and 
economic 
downturn by 
leveraging 
estimation models 
and 24 distinct 
case studies of 
developing 
countries   
Economic Negative GDP per capita growth Privatization Public enterprise reform indicated by 
"a proclamation of new policies and 
guidelines to enhance market 
incentives for public enterprises, 
followed by an initiation of some of 
the proposed policy changes (for 
example, changes in prices, 
regulation, layoffs, divestiture, and 
opening of public enterprise 
markets)." (p.463) Proclamation and 
preliminary action needed to be done 
during the downturn plus one year in 
order to be regarded 
Economic downturns found to create conditions 
that facilitate the introduction of public 
enterprise reforms. In 80% of the case studies 
privatization was preceded by economic 
downturns 
Inconclusive results for political crises, no 
relationship could be found and hence the crisis 
hypothesis for political crises could not be 
confirmed, nor falsified 
Political Experimentation with "a few indicators", but 
none of them regarded in model 
  
Campos et al. (2010): Crises, What Crises? New Evidence on the Relative Roles of Political and Economic Crises in Begetting Reforms 
Developed, 
developing 
and transition 
countries 
(100, 
Relationship of 
economic to 
political crisis by 
regressing 
economic and 
Economic  
 
 
 
Political  
Modelled by three indicators: 1) largest single 
year fall in GDP in % in 5-y period, 2) number 
of years of currency crisis in 5-y period and 3) 
current account balance 
Labor Market 
Reform 
Different indices for different 
regions, as no coherent single series 
exist. General emphasis on labor 
laws, extended by measures of labor 
market regulations and rigidities 
Economic crises either weakly significant or 
insignificant for structural reform; more 
frequently their influence is even found to inhibit 
rather than trigger reform 
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differentiation 
in Developed, 
Africa, Asia, 
LAC, MENA 
and 
Transition) 
from 1960 - 
2000 
political crises 
parameters on 
measures of labor 
and trade 
liberalization 
Political factors modelled by three indicators: 
1) Index of social and political instability, 
indicated by number of revolutions and 
political assassinations during 5-year period, 
2) Regime durability in years as a measure for 
absence of crisis and 3) political 
fractionalization 
Trade Reform 
  
Different indices for different 
regions. Index mainly reliant on 
information about Export Marketing 
Boards and Black Market Premiums 
Political crises strongly significant with positive 
effect in case of trade reforms, and frequently 
negative and significant for labor market 
reforms. Political crises as well as political 
institutions appear to be more important trigger 
of reforms than economic ones, especially for 
trade reform 
Drazen and Easterly (2001): Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom 
Developed and 
developing 
countries (84-
169) model-
dependent 
from 
1952/1970 - 
1996 
  
  
  
  
Testing of the war 
of attrition model 
by examining the 
relationship of 
macroeconomic 
variables and its 
lagged values at 
t+5 
  
  
Inflation Two models: 1) Splitting observations into 
percentiles across countries at t-5 and 
considering median inflation in each percentile 
at t. Specifically concentrating on the 90th 
percentile and above. 2) Organizing data in 
small number of groups of inflation periods to 
trace inflation in subsequent years (40-100%, 
100-1000% and 1000% +) 
    Results support the crisis hypothesis in case of 
inflation and black market premium. Median 
inflation in countries within the highest 
percentiles at t-5 is significantly lower at t 
compared to countries that only experienced 
moderate inflation at t-5. However, the 
hypothesis holds almost only at extreme levels 
of crisis, rendering it somehow irrelevant for the 
majority of the sample 
Little to no support for hypothesis in case of GDP 
growth, no support for current account deficit 
and budget deficit 
Foreign aid appears to delay reform 
Black Market 
Premium 
See Inflation, modelled in both ways     
GDP Growth See inflation       
Government 
Deficit 
Public sector balance over GDP; See Inflation     
Current  
Account 
Balance 
See inflation     
  External  
Influences 
Foreign aid   
Galasso (2014): The Role of Partisanship During Economic Crises 
OECD 
countries (25) 
from 1975 - 
2008 
Reform responses 
by governments of 
different 
ideological 
orientation to 
economic crises  
Economic  
 
Political  
Variables 
 
External  
Influences 
Output gap below 90th percentile of sample 
average, equaling -3,4%  
1) Government partisanship, 2) number of years 
to next election, 3) number of years in office, 
4) government fractionalization 
1) EU membership (after 1999), 2) EU's single 
market program (after 1993), 3) government 
fiscal position, 4) trade openness, 5) financial 
market efficiency (stock market capitalization 
to GDP) 
Product Market 
Reform 
Index on restrictions on competition 
and private sector governance. 
Compiled of: 1) entry barriers, 2) 
public ownership (privatization), 3) 
market shares of dominant players, 
4) price controls. Industries: see 
Agnello et al. (2015b)  
Economic crises related to fewer privatizations 
but more financial regulation. No relation of 
crises to product and labor market reform. 
During crises, political party responses differ 
from their usual political orientation in ‘good’ 
times. Right-wing parties promote financial 
market regulation instead of liberalization, 
center parties liberalize product markets and 
retrench UB, left-wing parties privatize. 
Fractionalized governments associated with 
Labor Market 
Reform 
Index by two indicators: 1) degree of 
employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and 2) unemployment benefit 
replacement rate (UB) 
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  Financial  
Reform 
Aggregate index on financial policy 
change: 1) credit controls and 
excessively high reserve 
requirements, 2) interest rate 
controls, 3) entry barriers, 4) state 
ownership in the banking sector, 5) 
policies on securities markets, 6) 
prudential regulations and 
supervision of the banking sector, 7) 
restrictions on capital accounts, see 
Abiad et al. (2008)  
fewer privatizations and higher regulation of 
product market reform 
Years to next election, years of government in 
office and stock market cap. insignificant. EU 
members have greater liberalization of product 
markets and higher UB replacement rates. 
European single market membership leads to 
higher product market liberalization and 
privatization 
Lora and Olivera (2004): What Makes Reforms Likely? Political Economy Determinants of Reforms in Latin America 
Latin American 
countries (20) 
from 1985 - 
1995 
  
  
Comparison of 
influence of 
various political 
economy 
determinants for 
the likelihood of 
reform 
  
Economic  
 
 
 
Inflation  
1) Gap between real income per capita at the 
beginning of the period and its previous 
maximum level (since 1970) and 2) Growth in 
the years of recession 
1) Log of inflation when > 30%, 2) inflation tax 
(log(1+inflation rate)*M1/GDP (standard 
liquidity ratio)) and 3) volatility of inflation 
(standard deviation of the monthly variations 
of the consumer price index) 
Trade Reform 
 
Tax Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial  
Reform 
Index on: 1) Average tariffs (incl. 
surcharges) and 2) tariff dispersion 
Index on: 1) Max. marginal income 
tax rate on corporations, 2) max. 
marginal income tax rate on 
individuals, 3) basic VAT rate, and 
4) productivity of VAT (ratio 
between the basic rate and actual 
collection in % of GDP) 
Index on: 1) freedom of interest rates 
on deposits, 2) freedom of interest 
rates on loans, 3) real level of 
reserves of bank deposits and 4) 
quality of banking and finance 
oversight (subjective scale) 
Gap of income per capita with respect to previous 
peak appears to be the ‘best measure’ of crisis 
and is significant for: trade reform, privatization, 
the overall index, and labor reform (in order of 
beta coefficient, although beta is small compared 
to overall reform index). GDP growth in years of 
recession only significant for tax reform 
Inflation significant for tax and, to a lesser extent, 
labor market reform (only volatility of inflation) 
Reforms, especially fiscal ones, appear to be more 
likely at the beginning of government periods 
(honeymoon period). None of the other political 
variables appear to be of significance 
  
  Government 
Deficit  
Political  
Variables 
Consolidated public sector balance when 
deficits > 3% of GDP 
1) Political fragmentation (indicated by 
effective number of parties in parliament and 
government party representation) and 2) 
Intensity of distributional conflicts (indicated 
by Gini coefficient and its change over a 5-
year period) 
  
    Privatization Sums accumulated from 
privatizations since 1988, including 
sales and other property transfers, as 
proportion of average public 
investment between 1985 and 1987 
      Labor Market 
Reform 
Flexibility of legislation by 
‘objective’ criteria on a discrete 0-2 
scale based on 5 aspects: 1) hiring, 
2) costs of dismissal after one year of 
work, 3) costs of dismissal after ten 
years of work, 4) overtime pay, and 
5) social security contributions 
Hallerberg and Scartascini (2015): When Do Governments Improve Fiscal Institutions? Lessons from Financial Crisis and Fiscal Reform in Latin America 
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Latin American 
countries (17) 
from 1990 - 
2005 
  
  
Connection of 
fiscal institutional 
reform and two 
forms of financial 
crises against the 
backdrop of the 
common pool 
problem 
Debt  Dummy variable for period from initial debt 
default to debt restructuring 
Financial  
Reform 
Dummy variable, indicating the 
incidence of one of three kinds of 
reforms: 1) a numerical rule 
establishes ex ante constraints on 
debts, deficits, or expenditures (or 
all three), 2) a procedural rule 
specifies the norms and prerogatives 
of actors in the budget process, 3) a 
transparency rule makes it easier to 
follow what the government is doing 
on the budget 
Debt crises significantly increase the probability 
for financial reforms 
Banking crises are negative significant to fiscal 
reforms, thus lowering the probability of reform 
in times of crises 
No significant dependence to the involvement of 
the IMF and other political variables. 
Banking  Dummy variable that "extends from beginning 
to the end of a given crisis" (p. 54) 
  
Political  
Variables 
1) Presidential election year, 2) United 
government (one party controls all houses of 
congress), 3) Ideology of president 
  
  External  
Influences 
IMF involvement     
Høj et al. (2006): An Empirical Investigation of Political Economy Factors Behind Structural Reforms in OECD Countries 
OECD 
countries (21) 
from 1975 - 
2003 
  
Examination of 
various political 
economy 
determinants' 
influence on labor 
and product 
market reforms 
Economic  Output gap > 4% in a given year and country (at 
different time lags) 
Labor Market 
Reform 
Indicators on: Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL), 
Unemployment Benefit (UB), Tax 
Wedges on Labor Income, Implicit 
Tax rates on Older Age Work 
Income 
Large increase in unemployment increases EPL 
and UB for long-term unemployed 
Economic crises reduce government intervention 
in air transport and postal services, but increase 
it in gas and rail sectors. Generally, product 
market reform more likely in times of economic 
upwind 
'Mature governments' tend to reform more, leftist 
governments reform less 
Reforms in trading partner countries tend to 
strengthen domestic product market reforms, 
while their effects on labor market reforms are 
more ambiguous; international factors generally 
positive significant 
Employment  Increase in unemployment rate by more than 
two times its standard deviation in the overall 
sample 
Political 
Variables 
1) Government Partisanship (left-of-center 
government), 2) Time in office ('Mature 
Government' dummy for office time >2y) 
Product Market 
Reform 
Indicators on: state control, barriers to 
entry, market structure and state 
involvement; Industries: see Agnello 
et al. (2015b)  
 
External 
Influences 
1) Structural policy indicator in main trading 
partner, 2) Int. tariff barriers, 3) EU 
membership, 4) EU single market program, 5) 
Financial market policy indicator 
Pitlik and Wirth (2003): Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test 
Developed and 
developing 
countries 
(123) from 
1970 - 1999 
  
  
Impact of growth 
and inflation 
crises on 
economic 
liberalization 
efforts in three 
scenarios of 
economic 
conditions  
  
Economic  Consideration of 5-year periods by allocating 
points according to types of GDP growth: 2 for 
<-1%, 1 for -1-0%, and 0 for >0%. Added up 
over the period, >5 points make a severe crisis, 
3-5 points make a medium crisis, <3 make up 
no crisis 
Liberalization Economic Freedom of the World 
Index by the Fraser Institute. 
Comprising of: 1) government size, 
calculated by government 
consumption and transfers and 
subsidies; 2) reliance on markets 
(government enterprises, regulation, 
tax burdens and price controls); 3) 
price stability; 4) freedom to use 
alternative currencies; 5) rule of law 
and secure property rights; 6) free 
trade; and 7) reliance on markets for 
capital allocation 
Economic growth triggers liberalization efforts in 
a U-shaped relationship. Most liberalization 
reform efforts undertaken in times of deep 
growth crises, while times of medium crises are 
least related to reform. More reform is 
undertaken in times without a crisis 
Inflation crises significant for liberalization 
Degree of democracy and political constraints 
significant for liberalization. No significant 
findings for fractionalization and the political 
system 
Inflation  See "Economic": 0 points for <10% inflation, 1 
for <40%, 2 for <100%, 3 for >100%; deep 
crisis at >10 points, medium crisis 2-10 points, 
no crisis at <2 points 
  
  Political  
Variables 
1) Fractionalization, 2) Democratization, 3) 
Political constraints for executive, 4) Political 
system (autocratic vs. democratic) 
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Roberts and Saeed (2012): Privatizations around the world: Economic or Political Determinants? 
Developed, 
developing 
and transition 
countries (50) 
from 1988 - 
2006 
  
  
Testing of various 
determinants that 
are supposed to 
facilitate 
privatization 
  
Economic Annual GDP growth rate  Privatization Consideration of all privatization 
deals that exceed US$1 million. 
Listing both in terms of number of 
deals and amount of revenue 
generated per year 
  
Economic conditions with limited impact on 
privatizations which rather occur in prosperous 
times, than being crisis driven. Only in case of 
developed countries lower inflation and higher 
economic growth lead to more privatization 
More privatizations under right-wing 
governments, except in transition economies. 
Honeymoon in office only significant for 
transition economies 
Current account balance insignificant; financial 
development by contrast generally creates the 
environment to intensify privatization  
Inflation Annual inflation rate   
Government 
Deficit 
Government budget balance for a given year, in 
national currency in % of GDP 
  
Political  
Variables 
1) Government orientation, 2) government 
years in office (honeymoon), 3) Institutional 
quality (law and order index) 
  
 External  
Influences 
1) Current account balance (to GDP), 2) 
financial development (stock market cap. to 
GDP), 3) economic freedom index 
    
Tornell (1998): Reform from within 
Developed and 
developing 
countries 
(108) from 
~1970 - 1995 
  
  
Comparison of the 
likelihood of trade 
reform in case of 
occurrence of 
economic and 
political crisis 
Inflation  Inflation > 40% and having increased > 125% 
with respect to the previous year 
Trade reform Reform in year t in either of two 
cases: 1) Removal of trade barriers 
before t, or 2) increase of trade / 
GDP increased by more than 7% 
relative to previous year 
  
Occurrence of reform much more likely if 
economic crises are accompanied by political 
crises. Conditional on joint occurrence of 
economic and political crisis, likelihood of 
reform is 60%, while it is 27% in case of 
economic crisis alone 
Economic  Income per capita in current USD decreases 
more than 18% relative to previous year 
  
Political  Index on "political change", consisting of 9 
different indicators of political authority 
patterns. "Drastic political change" occurs if 
index changes by more than 3 points with 
respect to the previous year 
  
Waelti (2015): Financial crisis begets financial reform? The origin of the crisis matters 
Developing and 
developed 
countries (72) 
from 1980 - 
2005 
  
Distinction of 
origins of crisis, 
particularly 
externally and 
domestically 
induced crises. 
Regression on 
measures of 
financial 
liberalization 
Economic  Occurrence of 1) sudden stops (sudden stop in 
gross financial inflows from foreign investors) 
or 2) sudden flights (sudden increase in gross 
financial outflows) 
Financial  
Reform 
Financial liberalization index, based 
on Abiad and Mody (2005), Abiad et 
al. (2008) 
Different origins of crisis do not affect the 
aggregate liberalization index, but individual 
dimensions differently. Sudden flights are 
significant for capital account restrictions, 
sudden stops for banking regulation and 
supervision 
Only few variables significant for reform, 
particularly government partisanship and IMF 
involvement for "state ownership" and "interest 
rate controls". IMF involvement furthermore 
significant for "entry barriers" 
Political  
Variables 
1) New government first year in office 
(honeymoon), 2) Government partisanship, 3) 
Democracy Index 
    
  External  
Influences 
1) IMF involvement, 2) Globalization Index     
Wiese (2014): What triggers reforms in OECD countries? Improved reform measurement and evidence from the healthcare sector 
OECD 
countries (23) 
1) Development of 
a methodology to 
Employment  Unemployment rate above 9.57%, equaling the 
sample mean plus the standard deviation 
Health Care 
Reform 
De-facto privatization of financing in 
the health care sector; measuring 
Unemployment rate and debt crises positive 
significant for health care privatization. 
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from 1960 - 
2010 
  
  
identify economic 
reforms using de 
jure evidence 
2) Testing the crisis 
hypothesis to 
identify triggers of 
health care 
financing reforms 
Debt  Interest rate on long-term government debt > 
11.42%, equaling the sample mean plus the 
standard deviation  
  statistically significant policy 
induced shift from public to private 
sector financing of healthcare 
services 
  
  
Annual recession positive and significant for 
health care privatization, but not in raw form 
(growth rate) 
None of the political factors investigated appear 
to be significant for health care reform 
  
Growth  Negative annual accumulated economic growth    
  Political  
Variables 
1) Government partisanship, 2) 
Fractionalization, 3) Government time in 
office 
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majority of their sample. Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) find support for the war of attrition 
model in cases of government budget deficits and inflation. They find stabilization more likely to 
occur in times of serious crises (rather than during periods of relatively moderate economic 
difficulties), after a new government has just entered office, and in countries with a ‘strong’ 
government (either a presidential system or a large ruling party majority) that faces few binding 
institutional constraints. 
 
The second strand of research (16 out of 19 papers) disentangles the effects of different forms of 
crisis on reform measures. Table 3-2 provides an overview of the relationships between categories 
of crisis and reform identified by each paper. While the relatively small sample size does not lend 
itself to quantitative-statistical analyses, we opt for qualitative categorical analysis, by which several 
salient features across the studies in question can be identified. 
 
Across the studies analyzed here, empirical results prove to be inconclusive for a number of the most 
intensely discussed crisis-reform relationships, such as the link of high inflation to financial reform 
and economic crises to trade liberalization. The results for inflation and economic crises in general 
are of particular interest, since much of the theoretical literature employs high inflation as an indicator 
of crisis. While Abiad and Mody (2005) find the effect of inflation crises to be insignificant, Agnello 
et al. (2015a, 2015b) both find inflation crises to trigger financial reform. While all contributions 
make use of the same data for indicating financial reform, the thresholds indicating inflation crises 
differ, with the former utilizing an inflation rate of 50% per annum and the latter a 20% inflation 
rate. As for economic crises and financial reform, Abiad and Mody (2005) find economic crises (in 
terms of negative GDP growth) to be insignificant, in contrast to Waelti (2015), Agnello et al. 
(2015b) and Galasso (2014). These studies employ different measures for economic crises but all 
make use of the same dataset for reform. However, the relative measures employed by Lora and 
Olivera (2004) and Tornell (1998) yield significant indicators for reform in 6 of 7 cases (see Section 
4.1 for further discussion). 
 
Concerning the varying outcomes of currency and inflation crises (Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b), the 
high correlation between the two variables gives cause for concern. The measures in question (both 
currency and inflation crises) refer to a dataset by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) which identifies 
currency crises by means of an exchange rate depreciation of more than 15% per annum and inflation 
crises by means of a threshold of 20% inflation per annum. As Reinhart and Rogoff note, the 
correlation between the two variables is high and “currency clashes and inflation crises go hand in 
hand” (p. 1678). As discussed further below, the differing outcomes between currency and inflation 
crises might then be indicative of the difficulty to make use of the variables in question appropriately.  
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The influence of banking and debt crises on financial reform appears to be the only one that enjoys 
consensus across empirical studies. Four papers investigate this relationship, all of which find a 
significant relationship between the two. However, three of these papers use the same dataset to 
indicate financial reform (Abiad and Mody, 2005; Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b). What is more, the 
nature of the established relationships is not uniform. While Agnello et al. (2015a) find that fiscal 
pressure and constrained governmental resources trigger, or at least do not inhibit, the occurrence of 
reform, Hallerberg and Scartascini (2015) find debt and banking crises to be negatively related to 
financial reforms as "fiscal pressure to find more money quickly restricts the government’s ability to 
initiate fiscal reforms." (p. 71)  
 
Evidence on the effect of government deficit crises, tested in three papers and yielding seven 
estimates, is uniformly insignificant. This may be indicative of to the “debt intolerance syndrome”, 
defined as the extreme duress emerging economies experience even at debt to GDP ratios which are 
considered as manageable by the standards of advanced countries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). 
 
Subsequently, emerging economies tend to default at comparably low debt to GDP ratios. The 
insignificant results for government deficit indicates that it does not appear to be the accumulation 
of debt per se which is significant for reform. Rather, weak institutional structures prevent 
governments from undertaking structural reforms to maintain market confidence and, with it, 
manageable interest rates. Only when governments eventually default and provoke a debt or banking 
crisis does the effect of debt accumulation appear to become relevant for reform. However, there 
exists no explicit empirical investigation of this phenomenon to our knowledge. 
 
Privatization, labor and product market reforms give rise to contradictory results. Agnello et al. 
(2015b), Galasso (2014), Høj, Galasso, Nicoletti, and Dang (2006) and Campos et al. (2010) find the 
effect of economic crises on labor market reform insignificant, whereas Lora and Olivera (2004) find 
that a large drop in income per capita facilitates the adoption of labor market reform within the Latin 
American context. In the case of product market reform, both Agnello et al. (2015b), and Galasso 
(2014) fail to identify any significant crisis measure, while Høj et al. (2006) conclude that economic 
conditions are indeed significant for the adoption of product market reform, but in a positive 
direction. They seem to occur in times of economic prosperity rather than in times of crisis. 
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  Table 3-2: Overview of established relationships between crisis and reform measures in empirical models on the crisis hypothesis 
Crises Inflation Currency Economic Banking Debt Government  
Deficit 
Employment Political 
Reform + - + - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Financial  Agnello 
(2015a), 
Agnello 
(2015b) 
Abiad (2005), 
Lora (2004) 
Agnello 
(2015a) 
Agnello 
(2015b) 
Agnello 
(2015b), 
Galasso 
(2014), 
Waelti (2015) 
Abiad (2005), 
Brooks 
(2007),  
Lora (2004),  
Abiad (2005), 
Agnello 
(2015a), 
Agnello 
(2015b),  
Hallerberg 
(2015) 
 
Abiad 
(2005)***, 
Agnello 
(2015a), 
Agnello 
(2015b),  
Hallerberg 
(2015) 
 
  Lora (2004) 
  
  
 
Labor Market Lora (2004) Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
 Lora (2004) Agnello 
(2015b), 
Campos 
(2010), 
Galasso 
(2014),  
Høj (2006) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Lora (2004) Høj (2006) 
 
Campos 
(2010) 
 
Product  
Market 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
Høj (2006) Agnello 
(2015b),  
Galasso 
(2014) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  
 
  Høj (2006)    
Economic  
Liberalization 
Pitlik (2003) 
 
  
 
Pitlik (2003) 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
Privatization Banjeree 
(2004),  
Roberts 
(2012)** 
Lora (2004)   
 
Banjeree* 
(2004), 
Campos 
(1996),  
Galasso 
(2014),  
Lora (2004) 
Roberts 
(2012) 
  
 
  
 
  Banjeree 
(2004),  
Lora (2004), 
Roberts 
(2012) 
  
 
  
 
Trade Agnello 
(2015b),  
Brooks 
(2007), 
Tornell 
(1998) 
Lora (2004)   Agnello 
(2015b) 
Agnello 
(2015b),  
Lora (2004), 
Tornell 
(1998) 
Brooks 
(2007), 
Campos 
(2010) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Agnello 
(2015b) 
  Lora (2004)   
 
Campos 
(2010),  
Tornell 
(1998) 
 
Tax Lora (2004) 
 
  
 
Lora (2004) 
 
  
 
  
 
  Lora (2004)   
 
  
 
Health Care   
 
  
 
Wiese (2014) 
 
  
 
Wiese (2014) 
 
  
 
 Wiese (2014) 
   
Legend: ‘+’: significant relationship; ‘-‘: insignificant relationship; ‘*’: Only timing; ‘**’: Relation negative and only for developed countries; ‘***’: Classified as “Balance-of-Payment Crisis” in paper; Parameter 
of “Economic Crises” comprises indicators on GDP growth, output gap, income per capita. Debt Crises referring to outright debt default, an international rescue, or interest rates on long-term gov’ bonds. Gov’ Deficit 
Crises referring to negative gov’ budget balance. Name of first author displayed only to conserve space. 
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Roberts and Saeed (2012) draw a similar conclusion in the case of privatization. While economic 
conditions appear to have a limited influence, if any, privatization seems more likely to be fulfilled 
in prosperous times than to be triggered by crises. Galasso (2014) also finds privatization less likely 
to occur while a country is experiencing an economic crisis. However, in an analysis of 24 distinct 
case studies, Campos and Esfahani (1996) find that in some 80% of the cases privatizations were 
preceded by economic downturns (not necessarily crises). Banerjee and Munger (2004) too find that 
none of the privatization initiatives they investigate up to 1999 were implemented without having 
been driven by a serious economic crisis. They find inflation in particular to have a significant effect 
on timing and intensity of privatization, which they conclude to be much more crisis-driven rather 
than attributable to long-term economic planning. In a similar vein, Lora and Olivera (2004) find 
privatization to be triggered by a drop in income per capita.  
 
The remainder of the chapter presents a discussion of methodological issues that inform the outcomes 
and interpretation of empirical testing of the crisis hypothesis. We argue that conceptual 
compromises relating to the identification of crisis in terms of fixed thresholds as well as the use of 
indices to operationalize reform contribute to the inconclusive results in the papers reviewed. 
Moreover, the specific political and institutional setting for reform imposes distinct political 
challenges for different reform agendas. This makes a meaningful delineation of factors for political 
mediation in large cross-country datasets difficult. 
 
3.4. Methodological Operationalization of the Crisis Hypothesis – Compromises and 
Limitations 
 
This section discusses conceptual compromises in the operationalization of the crisis hypothesis. 
These compromises affect the core of the hypothesis, namely the perception of what constitutes 
crisis, reform and how the associated costs and benefits are perceived within the process of political 
mediation. The section argues that the way in which crises and reforms are characterized largely 
determines the operationalization and, consequently, the meaningfulness of results and 
interpretations. 
 
The difficulties inherent in empirical testing of the hypothesis crisis are neatly illustrated by the 
debate surrounding the study of Abiad and Mody (2005). Using a dataset comprising of 35 countries 
from 1973 to 1996, Abiad and Mody investigate which types of crises induce governments to 
undertake financial sector reform by using an ordered logit regression technique. The types of crises 
they investigate include balance of payment and banking crises, recessions and high inflation. To 
indicate financial liberalization, they introduce an index comprising of six parameters, including 
interest rate controls and operational regulations. Their findings indicate that while balance of 
payments crises hasten reform, banking crises set liberalization back. However, Huang (2009) 
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challenges the robustness of the Abiad and Mody empirical modelling specification. He incorporates 
a new explanatory variable, ‘institutional quality’, into the analysis which he finds to have a 
significant negative effect on liberalization. Moreover, he introduces a common correlated effect 
pooled regression approach which allows for the possibility of error dependence across countries and 
concludes that a number of the findings by Abiad and Mody are not robust to error dependence across 
time and space. Zandberg, de Haan, and Elhorst (2012) in turn challenge the robustness of Huang’s 
approach. By replicating the analysis with an updated and expanded data base (62 countries from 
1975 to 2005), they find the effect of ‘institutional quality’ to diminish and become statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Identification of Crises  
 
Table 3-3 displays the range of crisis categories and their distribution within the papers under 
consideration. The overview distinguishes between indication by fixed thresholds and the utilization 
of raw data. The categories of crises refer to the classification deployed in Table 3-1 and 3-2 above. 
The majority of studies refer to crises classified in terms of financial and fiscal measures (such as 
inflation, and government debt), or negative GDP growth as an indicator for economic crises (27 out 
of a total of 34). Only eight measures provide alternative definitions of crisis: two instances each of 
political and employment crisis, as well as four instances of economic crises, which are indicated by 
a large output gap (Høj et al., 2006; Galasso, 2014) and by a drop in real income per capita (Lora 
and Olivera, 2004; Tornell, 1998).  
 
Table 3-3: Overview of crisis indicators and their measurement method in empirical models on the crisis 
hypothesis 
Crises Total Economic Inflation Banking Debt 
Gov. 
Deficit 
Employm
ent 
Political 
Threshold 32 10 8 4 5 1 2 2 
Raw Data 12 4 5 0 0 3 0 0 
Total 44 14 13 4 5 4 2 2 
 
Measuring crises in terms of fixed thresholds of the deterioration of economic variables is a 
widespread practice in the literature on economic crises in general (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; 
Scheemaekere et al., 2015). As Table 3 indicates, it has found its way into most empirical 
examinations of the crisis hypothesis as well. The basic challenge for the indication of crisis by fixed 
thresholds is to decide what level of deterioration constitutes a ‘crisis’.  
 
Identifying crises via fixed thresholds has intuitive appeal as it suggests that crises share common 
features. However, this assumption only holds if the underlying variables responsible for the crisis 
were driven by an objective and invariant probability distribution (Scheemaekere, Oosterlinck and 
Szafarz, 2015). Moreover, measurement by thresholds is prone to be tailored to fit recent crisis 
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episodes and respective discourses (ibid.). As mentioned above, Agnello et al. (2015a, 2015b), for 
instance, follow Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) in defining an inflation crisis episode as a period marked 
by an inflation rate of more than 20% per year, while Abiad and Mody (2005) refer to a threshold of 
50%. There is little guidance to assess which level of inflation would be more correct to identify a 
crisis. And while robustness checks can address this problem they can do so only to a certain extent. 
Such distinctions lack theoretical derivation Scheemaekere et al. (2015) and entail the implicit 
assumption that there exists a point after which a bad situation cannot deteriorate even further in that 
it would change the political response to the crisis.  
 
As discussed in section 3-2, the point at which the deterioration of a state variable is perceived a 
crisis varies among countries, regions, and times. The interpretation of economic crises in terms of 
its roots, intensity and possible resolutions is – at least to some extent – in the ‘eye of the beholder’ 
and “significantly shaped by the way key political actors interpret and react to these economic 
challenges” (Pop-Eleches, 2008, p. 1204). As a consequence, any statement that a given set of 
conditions became ‘bad enough’ in that they force political actors to act on reform is normative, 
leaving crisis measurement by thresholds exposed to subjectivity and difficult to employ in empirical 
analyses. 
 
Threshold-based definitions of crises then touch upon a conceptual tenet of the crisis hypothesis by 
implying a somehow uniform perception across countries of a specific situation that reaches a certain 
degree of “unacceptableness” within groups of social and political actors. Fixed thresholds, by virtue 
of focusing on only one ‘true’ parameter of a crisis, ignore “other key issues such as citizens' 
perception of and tolerance for economic hardships, which can vary across countries and times” 
(Corrales, 1998, p. 618). It is the perception within a given political, socioeconomic and cultural 
context that, initially, determines whether or not a situation is ‘sufficiently severe’ to warrant the 
label of crisis and, subsequently, translates this crisis recognition into the perception for the need of 
reform. Placing the emphasis on perceptions leads to a very different approach to defining a crisis: 
instead of asking ‘when are economic conditions bad enough’, it might be more expedient to ask 
‘what determines the perception of economic hardship to be severe enough’ to cause policies to be 
perceived as having failed and being in need of change. 
 
An alternative to fixed thresholds would be to use relative measures to indicate the change from 
previous levels of the variable in question. However, of the 19 empirical papers considered in this 
study, only two use relative measures rather than fixed thresholds to proxy crises (Lora and Olivera, 
2004; Tornell, 1998). For Tornell, crises are marked by a sudden deterioration of macroeconomic 
and political variables and hence refer to a shock-situation rather than a continuous deterioration of 
state variables. An inflation crisis is marked by an increase of 125% with respect to the previous year 
for an inflation rate higher than 40% per year. Economic crises occur when the income per capita 
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decreases by more than 18% relative to the previous year. Political crises occur if the alteration of an 
index that measures political change year on year exceeds a certain threshold. Lora and Olivera 
indicate economic crises using the gap between real income per capita at the beginning of a current 
period and its previous maximum level after 1970. While they proxy other types of crises by fixed 
thresholds, like inflation and government deficit crises, they find the relative measure to be the ‘best 
measure’ for crises and to trigger a range of reforms. These findings suggest the application of 
relative thresholds to be promising for future empirical models. 
 
What is more, an identification of crises which seeks to emphasize varying perceptions of both the 
crisis itself and the need for reform across countries requires the consideration of regional and 
temporal idiosyncrasies of a given sample. While such perceptions may vary due to development 
status and geographical region, they can also differ significantly within individual countries of a 
given region (Krueger, 1993). Of the empirical studies in this area, however, only Campos et al., 
(2010) explicitly distinguish between regions in their modelling approach. They investigate the 
effects of both economic and political crises by pooling their data across regions (100 countries from 
1960 to 2000, differentiating between developed, African, Asian, Latin American, MENA, and 
transition countries). Their results display considerable heterogeneity across these regions. They 
conclude “that the common procedure of pooling across countries in different regions may not be 
justified” (p.1687), which they find to be particularly relevant for the case of political crises. Other 
papers distinguish between “developed” and “developing”, or OECD and non-OECD countries. Only 
three papers take a regional focus by explicitly investigating Latin American countries (Brooks and 
Kurtz, 2007; Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2015; Lora and Olivera, 2004).  
 
Indication of Reform  
 
The categorization of Naim (1995) provides a useful framework to assess the range of reform 
indicators utilized within the empirical studies under consideration here. Naim’s classification 
distinguishes between two “stages” of reform. Stage 1 reforms refer to an amendment of more basic 
aspects of economic regulation, for which the effort to design and implement is comparably low. 
Such reforms can take the form of trade liberalization, fiscal adjustment and liberalization, or 
exchange controls. “Stage 2” reforms, in contrast, address significant institutional changes and 
intervene deeply into existing social structures. They require more institutional resources, a longer 
implementation period and are likely to create broader and more intense social resistance. Such 
reforms include, for example, labor or health care reforms (ibid.). 
 
Table 3-4 displays an overview of the range of reform measures used in the papers under 
consideration here. The table shows that empirical studies predominantly focus on stage 1 reforms 
in the form of financial or trade reform. Industrial policies do not appear to have been investigated, 
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although such policies are frequently used to tackle economic crises, particularly recessions (OECD, 
2012).  
 
Table 3-4: Overview of reform indicators in empirical models on the crisis hypothesis 
Reform Total 
Financi
al 
Privatiz
ation 
Labor 
Market 
Trade 
Econ.  
Liberali
zation 
Product 
Market 
Health 
Care 
Tax 
Measures 28 8 4 5 5 1 3 1 1 
Of which are 
indices 
23 8 0 5 5 1 3 0 1 
 
As in the case of crisis measurement, the methodology of reform measurement warrants further 
scrutiny in order to assess its implication for empirical testing of the crisis hypothesis. The remainder 
of this section discusses, firstly, the epistemology of reform indices to elucidate their interpretation 
in empirical modeling. The discussion points, secondly, to the time dimension of a reform process 
by highlighting the methodological challenge to account for both reform reversals and the correct 
affiliation of a reform to a specific crisis in the form of periodical averages. 
 
Application of Reform Indices – Assessing What’s Measured 
 
Indication and assessment of reform is a difficult exercise. Comparability across countries is 
particularly challenging since reforms reflect the specific institutional background and legal system 
of a country (see Acemoglu et al., 2005). In order to enable meaningful cross-country comparison of 
reform, reform indices found widespread acceptance in the literature (see Campos and Horváth, 
2012; Wiese, 2014). Indices do not indicate reform directly by their incidence, but comprise a set of 
predefined indicators on the regulatory environment of a specific policy area. Reforms are 
approximated by the change of these indicators. For example, financial sector regulations can be 
depicted by the credit controls a country imposes, the regulation of the banking sector, or the 
restrictions on capital accounts (see Abiad and Mody, 2005). A score is subsequently assigned to 
each of the indicators to assess their relative level of regulation or liberalization, so that a change in 
a score can be interpreted as a policy change. 
 
Despite their usefulness for cross-country comparisons, indices nevertheless tend to impede reliable 
assessments of reform determinants and processes (Campos and Horváth, 2012). A meta-analysis by 
Babecký and Campos (2011) illustrates the challenging application of reform indices. By reviewing 
46 empirical studies on the impact of structural reforms on economic growth they find the t-values 
of more than 500 coefficients to follow a normal distribution with mean zero. One possible 
explanation they put forward is measurement error within the reform indicators, as “the existing 
measures are mostly subjective, difficult to replicate and tend not to capture reform reversals.” 
(p.153)  
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Wiese (2014) addresses this issue and develops a methodology to avoid reliance on indices by 
distinguishing between de jure and de facto reform. He uses structural break filters to identify 
significant shifts in the financing of a specific sector from public to private and validates identified 
breaks by de jure evidence of reform. This procedure ensures that the identified structural breaks 
represent de facto reform, as they exert a statistically significant influence on economic data and are 
induced by actual policy changes. Only the joint-occurrence of structural breaks in economic data 
and a legislative action is considered a reform in his analysis. He applies the methodology to the case 
of health care privatization and finds high unemployment and debt crises to be significant triggers 
for reform of health care financing.  
 
Apart from health-care reform in the contribution of Wiese, only the measurement of privatization 
does not avail of indices (Banerjee and Munger, 2004; Campos and Esfahani, 1996; Galasso, 2014; 
Lora and Olivera, 2004; Roberts and Saeed, 2012). All other reform measures within the papers 
reviewed indicate reform in terms of indices and either rely on aggregate measures that assess the 
general regulatory environment in relation to other countries (for example Abiad and Mody, 2005; 
Agnello et al., 2015a; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003; Waelti, 2015) or the effective change in a regulative 
environment (for example Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2015; Tornell, 1998). 
 
The difficulty in applying reform indices for the crisis hypothesis stems from their conceptual 
underpinning. A reform is characterized by 1) a positive change in the respective index and 2) not 
being reversed within a given number of years after the initial reform (see, for example, the Financial 
Liberalization Index by Abiad and Mody or the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney, 
Lawson and Hall, 2015). However, this characterization of reform entails three challenges for 
empirical testing. Firstly, the researcher is required to make a normative statement about the nature 
and type of reform that is taken into account by describing reform as “effective for/against 
liberalization”. Secondly, some indices involve subjective judgement on the basis of observations 
from actors within a respective economy. Such indication constitutes a measure of perception rather 
than of actual change, which makes the measurement susceptible to exaggerate the implication of 
reform. Observers pay close attention to an environmental change when it occurs and might expect 
the impact of a reform to be greater than that which actually occurs (Kaufmann et al. 2011).  
 
Lastly, a conceptual issue inherent in indices concerns the interpretation of empirical results. As 
discussed above, indices do not reflect instances of actual reform, but instead indicate effective 
change in a regulatory environment according to a set of fixed criteria. That way, the categories in 
which the criteria of an index are measured form a ‘grid’ that is applied to a certain policy area. As 
a common challenge of measurement bias, such a grid of categories is implicitly selective as to which 
reforms it includes. Reforms which reside within a given policy area, but would not directly fall 
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within the specified categories or adhere to pre-set criteria would potentially fall through the grid. 
This form of measurement bias however does not only restrict the scope of an analysis to those 
identifiable reform measures. It also risks insufficiently capturing the diversity and complexity of 
reform initiatives and packages for the specific relationship that is investigated, since reforms are 
tailored answers to specific economic and political challenges. For instance, the effect of economic 
crises for reform is mainly tested in terms of product market reform, financial reform, or 
liberalization (see Table 3-2). However, a country’s policy response to an economic crisis could 
potentially include additional measures, such as industrial policies, as an acknowledged measure to 
relieve crisis effects via government support for specific industries (Wade, 2010; OECD, 2012; 
Mazzucato, 2013). As industrial policies can be diverse in nature, it is not immediately clear to what 
extent they would be reflected in indices for economic regulation, such as product market reform or 
liberalization. They might hence partly ‘fall through the grid’ and subsequently leave a model with 
an incomplete reflection of the full political “reform answer” to a crisis. 
 
These challenges are not problematic per se for empirical modelling but rather reflect the perspective 
taken by the researcher. However, they undermine the central component of the hypothesis, namely 
that reform follows crisis. Caution needs to be applied in order to avoid using the term reform 
interchangeably with specific aspects of economic regulation, such as liberalization or product 
market reform, as it conflates distinct phenomena. 
 
The Dilemma of Periodical Averages – Accounting for Both Reversals and Correct Attribution of 
Reform 
 
In order to prevent reform reversals from influencing the outcome of empirical analyses, the use of 
periodical averages of reform measures has become commonplace (for example Blanco and Grier, 
2009; Campos et al., 2010; de Haan et al., 2009; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003). Periodical averages indicate 
the effective change of an index within a fixed period of time, often a five-year timespan. As the 
crisis hypothesis requires the consideration of three separate events, periodical averages introduce 
the methodological difficulty to find the appropriate time window. These events are, firstly, the 
occurrence of the crisis, secondly, the de jure issuing of a specific reform measure, and, lastly, the 
de facto institutional manifestation. Only when successfully implemented and sustained does reform 
eventually become measurable. There is usually a considerable time lag between each of these events 
as institutions can be quite rigid (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) and as crises do not lend 
themselves to a designated set of policy proposals. Time is needed to evaluate options, draft proposals 
and convince political actors and interest groups of the need for change. As Drazen (2009) points 
out, over time interest groups gather more information about the relative political strengths of their 
counterparts, forcing weaker groups to make concessions. It is the duration of a crisis that prompts 
political actors to re-evaluate their position in terms of opposing or accepting reform. 
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As discussed above, the timespans between the events vary according to the type of reform that is 
being implemented. Stage 1 reform can be implemented rather quickly, while stage 2 reforms require 
a lot more institutional resources and hence time. Especially governments with constrained resources 
are thought to concentrate on stabilization measures that unfold their impact in the short term, while 
saving more resource intensive reform for better times. Indeed, crises might tend to delay rather than 
spur structural (stage 2) reform, a pattern that, for example, the OECD observes for structural reform 
after the 2008 crisis (OECD, 2012, p. 19). Pitlik and Wirth (2003) confirm this relationship 
empirically by finding a U-shaped relationship between growth crises and economic liberalization in 
the time dimension. They investigate reform activity contingent on three degrees of “severity” of a 
crisis and find that most reform efforts are undertaken in times of deep growth crises (recessions), 
followed by crisis-free periods. They find the least reform activity to be apparent in times of 
“medium” crisis. 
 
Selecting an appropriate time-span for the construction of periodical averages therefore gives rise to 
a dilemma. While longer periods increase the likelihood to fully capture long-termed structural (stage 
2) reforms that might respond to a crisis but require lengthy implementation, they reduce the 
likelihood that a reform is correctly attributed to a specific crisis event. Moreover, similar to the case 
of crisis measurement, the probability distribution across countries of which reform occurs at what 
point in time is not necessarily equal, since the perceptions of what constitutes an appropriate 
response to crisis varies among factors like available institutional resources, cultural attitudes, 
contagion effects, the ideology and experience of a government, the development status of the 
country, and regime type (see next section). Operationalizing these dependencies in empirical 
modelling requires reflection on how the political mediation of reform during crisis works. 
 
Political Mediation of Reform During Crises 
 
As discussed in section 3.2, the cause for delay in the adoption of reform can be understood as the 
conflict over the distribution of the cost of reform among social interest groups, which necessitates 
deteriorating economic conditions to be resolved. The resolution of such conflict, then, can be 
interpreted as the political mediation which enables reform (see Lora and Olivera, 2004; Williamson, 
1994). A crisis measure that is found to trigger reform in an empirical setup says, by itself, little about 
the determinants of political mediation. Understanding the causality between crisis and reform thus 
requires understanding the political mediation between them. 
 
There exists a variety of theoretical explanations that aim at ascertaining which political factors 
impact the likelihood of reform during economic crises (see Williamson and Haggard (1994) for a 
comprehensive discussion). For example, a country’s participation in IMF programs is thought to 
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facilitate the adoption of reform, in particular economic and financial liberalization, as a government 
can shift the blame for unpopular reform on the IMF (for example Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2011). 
Also, a government which just entered office is expected to face relatively fewer constraints to initiate 
reform as it enjoys greater legitimacy than its predecessor (commonly referred to as “honeymoon 
period”9, see Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Haggard and Webb, 1994). A higher degree of 
institutional quality (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) and the right-wing partisanship of a 
government (Pop-Eleches, 2008) are thought to facilitate reform, specifically liberalization as well. 
On the other hand, a high degree of fractionalization (also referred to as ‘fragmentation’) of a 
country’s parliament is expected to inhibit the adoption of reform as this makes a coalition rule more 
likely and increases the difficulty of making compromises (Haggard and Webb, 1994). 
 
Table 3-5 displays the political parameters employed in the literature that are thought to mediate the 
reform process during crises. Of the 19 papers reviewed, 14 utilize political variables, mostly for the 
fractionalization of the parliament, and the time period in which the government in question is in 
office. Two studies explicitly include a dimension of political crisis in their models (Tornell, 1998; 
Campos, Hsiao and Nugent, 2010), which both find to have significant influence on the occurrence 
of reform. Campos and Esfahani (1996) fail to establish a significant relationship between variables 
for political crisis and privatization due to the difficulty “to identify periods of political downturn” 
(p. 457). And while the partisanship of the political leadership has received much attention, the 
background of the political leadership has not been featured in these empirical studies as a potential 
influencing factor for policy responses. This is notable since the background of political leaders has 
been found to be a significant factor for, for instance, the level of a country’s budget deficit (Hayo 
and Neumeier, 2016), the willingness to adopt reforms, specifically liberalization (Dreher et al., 
2009), and its preferences with regard to monetary policy (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007). 
Investigating whether the background of the political leadership makes reform more or less likely in 
times of crisis might open up a promising area of research.  
 
The range of theoretical explanations for political mediation make empirical modelling of political 
mediation for reform during crises complex. The results emanating from the literature under 
consideration here illustrate this difficulty. The overview displays the inconclusive results arising 
from some of the most widely used variables, namely IMF involvement, government partisanship, a 
new government in office, and the fractionalization of a parliament. Some results for IMF 
involvement, for example, depart from much of the established literature by yielding an insignificant, 
or only weakly significant relationship between IMF programs and reform (Alesina et al., 2006; 
                                                     
9 The honeymoon hypothesis states that governments face relatively fewer constraints to implement reform at 
the beginning of their term in office as they enjoy higher credibility and legitimacy than their predecessor 
(Haggard and Webb, 1994). Moreover, as Pinea (1994) suggests, reforms make things worse before they 
improve them. Reformist governments hence want to launch reform processes early in their legislature to be 
able to take corrective measures during their term in office. 
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Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2015; Lora and Olivera, 2004). Brooks and Kurtz (2007) and Drazen and 
Easterly (2001) even find the relationship to be inverse, the former finding higher levels of IMF 
involvement to lead to lower levels of trade liberalization for the case of Latin American countries, 
the latter finding foreign aid to delay reform.  
 
The remainder of this section scrutinizes the operationalization of political mediation for the crisis 
hypothesis. The section concludes with a discussion of aspects that facilitate an accurate 
characterization of political mediation for empirical analysis.  
 
Identifying the Trigger for Reform: Economic Crises or Political Instability? 
 
Economic crises tend to induce political instability which affects a governments’ ability to reform. 
More precisely, they can create political conditions in which resistance to necessary reform by non-
cooperative, opportunistic behavior of social and political interest groups eventually delays rather 
than facilitates the adaptation of reforms (Alesina et al., 2006; Corrales, 1998; Edwards and Steiner, 
2000; Hugh-Jones, 2014; Williamson and Haggard, 1994). Sachs (1994) neatly captures this 
phenomenon: “You cannot think straight in the midst of hyperinflation.” (p. 507) 
 
Political instability, then, introduces an intermediate step into the causal connection of crises and 
reform which requires consideration in empirical modelling. Gasiorowskj (1995) finds the 
occurrence of economic crises, particularly inflation crises, to trigger democratic breakdown and to 
facilitate democratic transition, albeit with time-varying effects. In contrast, political instability 
(rather than outright regime change) has not been found to be influenced by macroeconomic 
variables, as Blanco and Grier (2009) conclude by examining Latin American countries from 1971 
to 2000. Bussiere and Mulder (2000) find political instability to have a strong impact on economic 
vulnerability, particularly for countries with weak economic fundamentals and low reserves. 
Economic vulnerability increases in the time during and subsequent to an election, as well as when 
the outcome of an election produces an unstable government. A similar conclusion is drawn by Gallo, 
Stegmann, and Steagall (2006) in stating that financial crises are more likely to be induced by 
political and institutional problems rather than economic ones. Investigating the example of 
Argentina following the 2001 crisis, they argue that the breakdown of “democratic institutions, 
government transparency, regulatory oversight or the rule of law [increases] the likelihood that 
politicians will implement unsustainable economic policies” (p. 193). Political instability thus 
appears to become more likely when the delay in reaching a consensus on reform aggravates an 
underlying economic crisis.  
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Table 3-5: Overview of political and institutional measures in empirical models on the crisis hypothesis 
 
IMF  
Involvement 
Institutional 
Quality 
Government 
Partisanship 
Gini  
Coefficient 
Parliamentary 
Fractionalization 
(Fragmentation) 
Time in Office 
(Honeymoon 
Period) 
Democracy 
Index 
Political  
Constraints for  
Executive Other 
Abiad and Mody (2005) +  -      - 
Agnello et al. (2015a) + +        
Agnello et al. (2015b)    + -     
Alesina et al. (2006) (-)    + +  + -; +; +; + 
Banerjee and Munger (2004)  + +  + - +   
Brooks and Kurtz (2007) -  +  +     
Galasso (2014)   +  + -    
Lora and Olivera (2004) -   - -     
Hallerberg and Scartascini (2015) -  -   -   - 
Høj et al. (2006)   (+)   +    
Pitlik and Wirth (2003)     -  + + - 
Roberts and Saeed (2012)    + +    
(-)      
Waelti (2015) +  +   - -   
Wiese (2014)    -  - -    
Legend: ‘+’: Significant relationship; ‘-‘: Insignificant relationship; ‘( )’: conditional results 
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Heightened political instability during economic crises might then alter the means by which reform 
is introduced and sustained in response to crises. In consequence, not reflecting political instability 
in empirical modelling hampers the delineation of two distinct causal effects, namely whether it is a 
crisis itself that prompts politicians to implement reform, or whether it is the effect of political 
instability in the shape of a new government coming to power. Alesina et al. (1996), for example, 
find that a government, which is already unstable and has experienced recent changes, faces an 
increased likelihood of further governmental change thereafter. When political instability tends to 
rise during economic crises, then, the likelihood increases of a new government entering office 
during or shortly after a crisis period. If a measure for crises is therefore found to beget reform it 
might not be the crisis itself that forces political actors to submit to proposed reforms. Instead, a new 
reformist government might have come into power within the same time-period that averages reform 
without the researcher reflecting it in her/his empirical model.  
 
In such setting, a new government may be viewed as the vehicle, as the form of political mediation 
under which post-crisis reform occurs. However, not considering governmental change in empirical 
analysis conflates two distinct arguments when interpreting the underlying causes for reform. In the 
game-theoretic models introduced in Section 2, reform occurs because interest groups realize that 
continued inertia will be costlier for them than conceding to bear a disproportionate cost of reform. 
The cost of inertia rises due to economic deterioration (as for example in Alesina and Drazen, 1991), 
and/or the fear of political disenfranchisement (as for example in Ranciere and Tornell, 2015), caused 
by the fear of a possible future reshuffling of power among interest groups. However, the honeymoon 
hypothesis is focused on the idea that power among interest groups has already been reshuffled, in 
that resistance to a new government has been reduced. Moreover, the honeymoon hypothesis does 
not necessarily involve deteriorating economic conditions. Thus, not reflecting political instability in 
empirical analysis hampers the ability of empirical analysis to ascertain the actual underlying cause 
for reform. 
 
The empirical results of Campos et al. (2010) and Tornell (1998) can be interpreted as supporting 
such conceptual considerations. Campos et al. find that political crises can be more powerful than 
economic ones in realigning political forces and reducing resistance to reform. Their measure for 
political crisis includes three determinants, firstly, an index of social and political stability by 
accounting for the number of revolutions and political assassinations, secondly, the regime durability 
as a measure for the absence of crisis, and thirdly, the degree of political fractionalization. They find 
political crises to be a more important trigger of structural reforms than economic ones, while the 
latter ones appear to rather inhibit structural reforms instead of facilitating them. Tornell constructs 
an index consisting of nine measures of political authority patterns that indicate the degree of 
autocracy or democracy in a country. He finds the joint occurrence of political and economic crises 
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to have a significantly higher probability (60%) to induce reform than the occurrence of economic 
crises alone (27%).  
 
As in the case of crisis measurement, the establishment of comparable measures for political crisis 
is challenging, as differing perceptions of acceptable levels of political instability vary among 
countries, regions, or regime type. A measure of political crisis can be operationalized in many 
different ways. And indeed, there seems to be no consensus in the literature to address this challenge, 
which might have contributed to the scarce utilization of political crisis measures in the empirical 
literature on the crisis hypothesis (see Campos and Esfahani, 1996; Campos et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, the results of Tornell and Campos et al. highlight the importance of making the link 
between economic crisis and political instability a central component of empirical analysis.  
 
Modelling Political Mediation – Identification of Relevant Parameters 
 
Understanding how best to identify and interpret relevant parameters for political mediation requires 
an assessment of what political mediation during crises entails. Political mediation is determined by 
the political risks and uncertainties associated with a reform, which in turn depends on its (perceived) 
short and long term costs (see Brooks and Kurtz, 2007; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). The perception 
of what reform implies in terms of economic and political costs is then influenced by contextual 
determinants, such as the national and international economic environment, the type of crisis and 
reform, regional contagion effects, and the specific qualities of domestic institutions (Brooks and 
Kurtz, 2007). This context-dependency may lead to political factors, such as government partisanship 
or the fractionalization of a parliament, to have country-specific effects. These effects vary 
particularly across the development status of a country and its institutional background and 
potentially alter the manner in which political mediation for reform is thought to work in crisis-free 
times (ibid., Pop-Eleches, 2008). Such changing patterns may contribute to explaining the 
inconclusive results for political variables in Table 3-5. Setting up empirical modelling for the crisis 
hypothesis then may benefit from specifically reflecting the institutional, political and economic 
context of the countries or regions in question. 
 
A widely discussed and contentious political factor is the partisanship of a government, which neatly 
exemplifies how the broader economic context affects the manner in which political factors influence 
policy responses during crises. The political partisanship describes the ideological orientation of a 
government, generally in terms of being left-wing (socialist), right-wing (conservative), or centrist, 
as within the widely used Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini, 2016). 
Pop-Eleches (2008) argues that policy responses to crises reflect a government’s partisan 
interpretation of a crisis. The partisan interpretation of a crisis in terms of its roots and possible 
solutions in turn depends largely on the nature of the crisis and the broader regional and international 
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environment. Pop-Eleches finds that “certain types of crises, such as liquidity shortfalls, elicit similar 
[policy] responses across the ideological spectrum and regional contexts”, while others, such as debt 
crises, have a regional dependency and are “more prone to divergent ideological interpretations.” (p. 
1179)  
 
The influence of the partisanship of the government, then, becomes a contentious determinant of 
reform. Under ‘normal’ circumstances and in a ‘crisis-free’ economic environment, right-wing 
parties are found to be more prone to adopt policy in favor of liberalization (at least in a non-
fractionalized setting) (Brooks and Kurtz, 2007), and privatization (Banerjee and Munger, 2004; 
Roberts and Saeed, 2012). Left-wing parties are thought to be more likely to adopt unconventional 
alternatives to liberalization measures, as they have deeper connections to organized labor which 
makes them more susceptible to short-term economic backlashes. During crises, however, Galasso 
(2014) finds political responses to depart from the established positions political groups take in 
‘crisis-free’ times. While he finds left-wing parties to privatize more (as they might learn about the 
true cost of non-competitive regulation only during crisis and have more credibility to sell it to the 
electorate), right-wing parties in a more fractionalized setting are found to promote financial market 
regulation instead of liberalization (in an attempt to avoid being blamed as ultra-liberal and to suffer 
electoral backlashes). That way, the inclusion of a variable representing government partisanship in 
a large cross-country dataset might introduce causal heterogeneity due to the dependence on the 
regional context (see Pop-Eleches, 2008). In turn, as the manner in which government partisanship 
influences post-crisis reform can vary across regions, the investigation of a specific regional context, 
either singular or in a comparative approach, facilitates empirical analysis to elicit the underlying 
determinants for political mediation. 
 
A further determinant influencing political mediation is the time-dynamic of environmental 
influences, such as contagion effects and the support of a specific school of policy ideals. The most 
prominent school of thought in this regard might have been the Washington Consensus, whose policy 
recommendations over time influenced the acceptance of economic liberalization among political 
and social actors in developing countries (Rodrik, 2006). In Latin America, for example, the 1980s 
debt crisis has been regarded as a ‘watershed’ in the support and adoption of economic liberalization 
over protectionist policy (for example Edwards, 1995). Seen in this light, the measurement of 
liberalization efforts in Latin America prior to that timeframe can be regarded as somewhat 
irrelevant. Hence, the time-span within which a given region is analyzed requires careful 
consideration in order to account for time-dynamic effects relevant to specific policy developments. 
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3.5. Concluding Remarks and Vistas of Future Research 
 
This chapter argues that well-crafted empirical analysis of the crisis hypothesis can enhance our 
understanding of how economic crises influence political dynamics in bringing about reform. 
Although the hypothesis has reached a status of “conventional wisdom” in the eyes of many 
(Tommasi and Velasco, 1996, p. 197), the underlying mechanism that links crisis and reform still 
remains to be fully understood. We emphasize the role of social perceptions of both crises and the 
costs of subsequent reform in determining how political mediation of reform during crises hinders 
or promotes the adoption of reform. Such social perceptions consequently require reflection in the 
operationalization of the key concepts of the hypothesis, namely crisis, reform and the political 
mediation of reform during crisis.  
 
In scrutinizing the operationalization of the hypothesis, we argue that it is most notably the 
identification of crises by fixed thresholds that undermines a central conceptual element of the 
hypothesis: social perception. It is the perception of the need of policy change among social interest 
groups that triggers reform, not merely the incidence of crisis (see Harberger, 1993). Fixed thresholds 
imply that there is a point after which a bad situation cannot deteriorate further in that it changes the 
political response that follows. However, this assumption is difficult to justify in heterogeneous 
cross-country datasets, as perceptions of what constitutes a crisis may be conditional on a given 
nation’s institutional and cultural background. What is more, constructing indicators of reform based 
on periodical averages, which indicate the effective change of an index on reform within a fixed 
period of time, introduces a dilemma in terms of accounting for both reform reversals and the 
attribution of reforms to a specific crisis. Finally, taking into account the political factors that 
characterize prevalent political instability and political mediation would allow for the identification 
of the underlying causes of reform in response to crises. Political mediation of reform is moreover 
influenced by the broader economic and institutional context. As discussed above via the example of 
governmental partisanship, such contextual determinants potentially alter the manner in which 
political mediation for reform is thought to work in crisis-free times. 
 
The survey of empirical evidence presented in this chapter supports the findings of recent literature 
that the type of crisis has a distinct impact on the type of reform that follows (Hallerberg and 
Scartascini, 2015; Waelti, 2015; Wiese, 2014). In particular, banking and debt crises appear to trigger 
the incidence of financial reform, while government deficit crises do not. Our analysis finds the 
empirical evidence for many of the most widely discussed crisis-reform links (such as inflation crises 
to financial reform) to be inconclusive and, therefore, to be weak in terms of predictive power.  
 
In the light of the discussion in this chapter, the question of whether and how crises induce reform 
appears to offer a range of promising vistas for future research. The 2008 financial crisis vividly 
 54 
illustrates both its contemporary relevance and the challenges that lie ahead in fully characterizing 
the mechanism that links crisis and reform. For example, industrial policies as a means to alleviate 
economic crises, particularly recessions, have received increased attention in recent years (see 
Aggarwal and Evenett, 2012; OECD, 2012; Rodrik, 2004; Wade, 2010). However, whether or not 
crises effectively spur industrial policies remains to be empirically investigated.  
 
Moreover, the theoretical make-up of the crisis hypothesis has proven difficult to apply in the 2008 
crisis context. Drazen (2009) argues that the interest groups involved in financial market lobbying 
might not have become weaker during the 2008 crisis, but stronger. Their expert knowledge of how 
to resolve the crisis would have been indispensable for policy makers to draft policy responses, which 
secured and strengthened their political influence. This consideration, however, runs counter to the 
theoretical models that underpin the hypothesis. These models, such as the war of attrition model by 
Alesina and Drazen, assume that the influence of interest groups opposing reform prior to a crisis, as 
the financial lobby did in the United States (see Roubini and Mihm, 2011), need to be weakened in 
order to enable reform. Further empirical and conceptual work might usefully seek to reconcile 
theory and observations in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis (see Drazen, 2009).  
 
The crisis hypothesis’ central tenet is based on extensive discussion of past crises-waves, particularly 
the Latin American debt-crises of the 1980s and early 90s (for example Edwards and Steiner, 2000; 
Edwards, 1995; Lora, 2001; Nelson, 1990; Teichman, 1997; Williamson, 1994). In the light of the 
valuable insights these contributions have provided, we advocate that future empirical analyses 
further develop this contextual approach based on exploring the experiences of specific world-
regions. In particular, the application of the hypothesis within comparative regional approaches (see 
Basedau and Köllner, 2007) appears to be well suited to analyzing the crisis hypothesis. Comparative 
approaches facilitate a more detailed consideration of the political and institutional setting in the 
specific cultural, regional, and temporal context of the countries/regions in question (see Pop-
Eleches, 2008). That way, they enable a more appropriate identification of crises and reform that 
takes into account social perceptions of both economic hardship and the cost of reform.  
 
As I argue in more detail in chapter 6 of this thesis, constructivist interpretations of crises are 
potentially better suited than rationalist approaches to reflect such differing perceptions of economic 
hardship. In order to address the complexity of the political mediation of reform during crisis, 
qualitative or mixed method approaches (Starr, 2014), as well as case study evidence, might prove 
valuable in understanding the mechanisms that link crises and reform. The next two chapters will 
outline an alternative methodological approach to indicate reform based on legislation data, which 
enables a more nuanced investigation of political collaboration.  
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4. POLIYMAKING IN DATA POOR COUNTRIES – 
MEASURING THE LEBANESE POLITICAL AGENDA IN A 
NEW DATA SET 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Development economists and practitioners rely on an accurate understanding of policymaking 
processes in the drafting of policy recommendations and reform programs. As the preceding chapters 
discussed, there exist methodological challenges in the utilization of extant indices on reform which 
impede research efforts on policymaking. Moreover, many developing countries either collect or 
provide few comprehensive and comparable data sets on policymaking processes, which hampers 
assessments of the functioning and priorities of governmental institutions. Insights into the workings 
of the governments in countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are particularly limited 
despite the increased attention of scholars and practitioners following the Arab uprisings in 2011, 
which highlighted the pressing nature of governance issues in the region (OECD, 2013; World Bank, 
2015; ESCWA, 2017; Mahmalat and Sumpf, 2018).  
 
This chapter remedies this gap with a novel data set on legislative activity, designed to provide 
insights into patterns of political attention. It introduces a novel data set on legislative activity in 
Lebanon, which covers all important primary and secondary legislation between 1950 and 2016 
issued by the Lebanese Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and ministries. The main advantage of 
this data is its availability: legislation must be made public in official governmental journals or 
similar outlets to become legally binding. This data is hence similarly available in, and the analytical 
approach adaptable to the context of other countries, including countries of the MENA region. That 
way, the creation of this data set ties in with the increasing scholarly attention on policymaking 
processes in the MENA region over the past decade. The data set is available upon request from the 
author. Moreover, it addresses the methodological challenges associated with reform indices 
identified before and opens avenues for a more in-depth exploration of political collaboration in the 
subsequent chapter.  
 
The analysis in this chapter takes legislation as a measure of political attention and uses agenda-
setting theory to identify issues that dominate governments’ legislative agenda (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2004, 2005; Jennings et al., 2011; John, Bevan and Jennings, 2011). The underlying 
intuition follows the attention-driven model of policy choice (Jones, 2001). Policymakers and 
bureaucrats are confronted with a constant stream of information about a wide variety of topics, from 
security and immigration to education and the economy (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). This 
abundance of information requires prioritization in order to allow policymakers to concentrate and 
respond to the most pressing and important issues. The priorities a government identifies determine 
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its political agenda, according to which it issues legislation (McCombs and Zhu, 1995; Kingdon, 
2003; Peter and de Vreese, 2003; Jones and Baumgartner, 2004).  
 
A political agenda, then, is the set of issues that receive serious attention from policymakers at any 
given time (Kingdon, 2003, p. 3). The main concept in this definition is the “attention” policymakers 
pay, which puts an issue on the agenda when policymakers prioritize an issue and elevate its 
importance relative to others. Defining and constructing a measure of attention is, therefore, the key 
methodological challenge to assess political priorities over time.  
 
The chapter follows the approach first outlined by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) to indicate attention 
by measuring the occurrence of issues in policy texts and documents. The number of references to 
issues in these texts serves as an indicator of the importance of an issue for a governments’ agenda. 
This analysis takes both primary legislation (laws) and secondary legislation (decrees, resolutions, 
and other items) as a measure of political attention and discusses several advantages and limitations 
of this approach.  
 
This paper contributes to the study of agenda-setting by addressing one of its key methodological 
challenges: Since each legislative text deals with only one issue, the coding happens at the document 
level. This procedure assigns one issue category to each legislative text, regardless of its type or 
scope. For example, a law that introduces a comprehensive change in a tax code, as well as a 
resolution that provides a simple trade license for a specific firm or product, would both equally 
count as one observation in two different policy areas. That way, however, the coding cannot 
introduce conceptual distinctions between documents of major importance. The tax law has most 
likely demanded a significantly higher degree of attention from policymakers on different levels of 
government than the issuance of the trade license has. The challenge, therefore, is to introduce a 
conceptual distinction between observations that have a minor or major importance for the study of 
attention, which would otherwise have equal weight within a data set.  
 
A widely cited reference to address this issue is the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and 
Wilkerson, 2017), which provides a database of bills introduced into the United States House and 
Senate. Their database offers a filter for “important” bills, which excludes those bills that relate to 
issues of minor importance, such as the transfer of lands or renaming of buildings. While making a 
major contribution, the authors of the Congressional Bills Project note that this approach might not 
be sufficient to identify all documents of minor importance across all policy areas. Moreover, their 
methodology applies to the context of the United States and must be adapted to the legal context of 
other countries. 
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The data set introduced in the present paper addresses this challenge by taking a different approach 
than that taken by Adler and Wilkerson (2017). It filters out texts of minor importance and includes 
only those legislative texts whose ‘legal value’ was confirmed by legal experts and therefore bear 
political and legal relevance. Of all primary and secondary legislation published in the official 
governmental journal, the Lebanese Official Gazette, the data set includes those texts that lawyers 
and legal practitioners deem to be of relevance for legal practice (see section 4.3). This approach 
reduces selection bias by shifting the task of identifying important legislative texts from the 
researcher to legal experts. In this way, the filtering goes beyond the application of fixed 
identification criteria, excludes irrelevant legislative texts equally across all policy areas and includes 
only those texts that are of relevance for the study of political attention. 
 
Lebanon has been confronted with a particularly diverse array of pressing issues in recent decades, 
including civil war (1975-1989), financial crises and hyperinflation (1987-1994), looming debt crises 
(2000-2006), political instability (2005, 2008), and the repercussions of the Syrian crisis (2011-
2018). Much of the literature analyzes the political responses to these challenges from a perspective 
of sectarianism and fractionalization as the Lebanese polity is organized in a consociational power-
sharing agreement (Makdisi and Marktanner, 2009; Salamey, 2014; Salloukh et al., 2015; Karam, 
2017). This arrangement includes a large number of formal and informal veto players, which tends 
to inhibit legislation pertaining to nationwide issues (Mahmalat and Curran, 2019). However, as this 
chapter will show, there exists a significant variation of legislative activity over time and across 
policy areas.  
 
The analysis offers – for the first time – a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of political agenda-
setting in Lebanon. Lebanese legislative institutions provide very little data on policymaking 
processes, such as voting records or meeting agendas of committees, either due to missing statistical 
data collection or lack of transparency, which prevented the consolidation of available data in the 
past (LCPS, 2018). Much of the literature on the Lebanese political economy therefore relies on 
descriptive analyses and qualitative approaches (Gaspard, 2004; Makdisi, 2004; Dibeh, 2005; 
Salamey, 2014; Salloukh et al., 2015; Hermez, 2017). The paper and data set complement efforts to 
gain insights into the workings of Lebanese governmental institutions and contribute to our 
understanding of the political economy in Lebanon. 
 
The chapter illustrates the use and content of the data set by presenting four examples: 1) agenda 
diversity across all major policy areas, 2) patterns of political attention after the end of the civil war 
in 1990 until 2016, 3) the political agenda before and after the Paris I-III donor conferences, and 4) 
comparison of the political agenda in times of political “gridlock” (Clinton and Lapinski, 2006), 2007 
and 2014. The analysis pays particular attention to legislation related to developmental issues in the 
policy areas education, health, environment, transport, industry, electricity, and water. 
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Two findings are highlighted in the discussion. First, legislative activity varies greatly among policy 
areas and over time. Even in times during which institutional capacities were severely impaired, such 
as the final years of the civil war (1975-1989), or in periods of political gridlock, during which either 
a caretaker Government was in place or governmental institutions could not convene, Lebanese 
policymakers enacted a number of important legislations.  
 
Second, the Lebanese legislative agenda has been dominated by issues related to finance, the 
economy, and property and real estate, while developmental issues have been relatively 
underrepresented. The results tie into analyses on the Lebanese political economy of reform which 
posit that economic and social policy in Lebanon is dominated by an ideology of “laissez-faire” 
(Gaspard, 2004; Traboulsi, 2007). Based on this ideology, the Lebanese Government maintains a 
“small state” by outsourcing important governmental services to the private sector in order to avoid 
unequal treatment among sectarian communities. Despite multifaceted developmental challenges 
(Garrote Sanchez, 2018), attention to developmental issues in the education, electricity, environment, 
health, industry, transportation, and water sectors is not only comparably low but decreases as agenda 
diversity declines. Legislation pertaining to issues of international affairs, finance, the economy, 
property, and real estate gained in attention over time and made up 87 percent of all important 
legislative documents issued by the Parliament and Council of Ministers in 2016. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 4.2 introduces the theory of agenda-setting. Section 4.3 
describes the data set and discusses the advantages and limitations of using legislation data as a 
measure of political attention. Section 4.4 illustrates the use of the data set by applying it to four 
examples. Section 4.5 concludes by outlining approaches for future research.  
 
4.2. Agenda-Setting and Issue Diversity  
 
Agenda-setting describes the process by which governments distribute their attention across issues. 
Following attention-driven models of policy choice, it is attention, rather than resources, which is 
scarce for processing the abundance of information in the policymaking process (Jones, 2001). As a 
common feature of all polities, policymakers have finite amounts of time and resources available to 
consider and process information. Agenda-setting, then, describes the process by which a 
government distributes its attention across issues. In other words, a political agenda is a governments’ 
priority list. 
 
The number of topics a government puts on its agenda determines its diversity. Agenda diversity 
describes the extent to which a government “shares its attention between various issues competing 
for the finite space available on the agenda” (Jennings et al., 2011, p. 1004). In a diverse agenda, a 
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government shares its attention between a broad range of issues and offers opportunities for 
representing the interests of a wider set of political groups. In a narrow agenda, a government 
confines its attention to very few issues. As the attention to a particular issue might divert attention 
from other domains, every policy choice impacts the diversity of the political agenda as a whole 
(Jennings et al., 2011).  
 
Agenda diversity also reflects the capacity of the government to attend to multiple issues and interests 
at the same time: the higher the diversity, the more institutional resources (such as time, lawyers and 
economists) a government allocates to a larger number of issues. If the diversity is low, resources are 
concentrated on the core functions of a government (which pertain to defense, international affairs, 
the economy, government operations, and the rule of law) (John, 2006; Jennings et al., 2011). While 
short-run increases in attention can cause sudden spikes in legislative activity in response to a certain 
issue (such as attention towards migration issues in the face of a refugee crisis), a government’s 
agenda diversity should absorb shocks over time and maintain a long-run equilibrium (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
 
Giving Meaning to Legislation Data  
 
Considering the origin of a legislative text adds to the assessment of the political dynamics that shape 
an agenda. Firstly, legislation texts originating from different institutions, such as laws from the 
parliament and decrees from a president, involve a different set of actors and resources (such as 
lawyers and economists) (Kingdon, 2003; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Ziblatt, 2008). Secondly, 
governmental institutions vary in their capacities to share attention across issues. Higher layers of 
government, such as prime ministers, presidents or supreme courts, process fewer issues serially than 
line ministries and other institutions that provide mechanisms for the parallel processing of multiple 
issues (Jones, 1994; Kingdon, 2003). Analyzing a specific set of institutions thereby enables a 
researcher to draw conclusions about specific sets of processes, bureaucrats and policymakers. 
 
In order to gain further insight into the political dynamics that shape an agenda, legislation needs to 
be understood as a multi-layered concept based on the requirements it takes to enact it. These 
requirements differ according to the voting requirements, institutional resources (such as lawyers and 
economists), as well as the number and nature of political actors and veto players involved in the 
policymaking process (Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). They increase the 
institutional friction to enact a given piece of legislation the higher its rank in a country’s legal 
hierarchy (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 2015, pp. 19–45). The institutional friction 
of a given legislation depends on the decision costs involved, which rise when its elaboration and 
approval requires the attention and consent of a larger number of actors. In the case of Lebanon, there 
are three major types of legislative output: laws, decrees, and resolutions (table 4-1).  
 60 
 
Table 4-1: Simplified description of Lebanese legal code (Sources: Lebanese Constitution, 
Dictionnaire du droit privé, and Glossaire de Vie Publique.) 
Rank 
Type of  
Legislation 
Description Issuing Body 
Institutional 
Friction 
1 Law 
A supreme, general and impersonal 
legal rule, following the Parliament’s 
deliberation and initiative. No law can 
be enacted if it has not been passed by 
the Parliament.  
Parliament High 
2 Decree 
Administrative orders taken by the 
President of the Republic, or the 
Council of Ministers according to the 
powers allocated by the Constitution 
and the Laws. No parliamentary 
approval necessary but limited in scope 
by applying the law. 
Council of 
Ministers, 
President 
Moderate 
3 Resolution 
Issuance of the Executive power, i.e., 
the Ministers or the administrative 
authorities, to which constitutional laws 
conferred regulatory power. Limited 
legal scope within the realm of existing 
legal frameworks. 
Ministers Low 
 
These types of legislation differ in their scope of application. Laws require parliamentary approval 
and establish a generally applicable and impersonal rule. Decrees constitute administrative orders 
and decisions issued by either the Council of Ministers or the President. The scope of decrees is 
limited to the application of the law, rather than the establishment of independent, impersonal, and 
general rules.10 Resolutions are decisions taken by ministers within existing legal frameworks and 
generally do not require the formal approval of the Parliament or the Council of Ministers.  
 
The institutional friction to enact legislation increases with the number of political actors across 
parties and institutional resources that are involved in elaborating and approving a legislative text. 
Laws exhibit the highest institutional friction as these require most attention by lawyers and related 
staff as well as a majority vote of members of parliament and thereby a broad consensus among 
political parties. Decrees only need the Council of Ministers’ or President’s approval and therefore 
generally entail more moderate friction. Resolutions exhibit the lowest friction and are issued by 
ministers generally without formal voting procedures. That way, legislation that involves a high 
degree of consensus among political parties, such as laws, have a higher likelihood of being blocked 
                                                     
10 Exceptions to this rule are legislative decrees, which have the status of ordinary laws. These decrees are issued by the 
Council of Ministers after having been granted the authority to do so by the parliament in rare and exceptional 
circumstances. Such decrees, however, have not been used since the late 1960’s and are coded as decrees in this data set.  
 61 
by veto players. Resolutions, on the other hand, can be enacted even in the absence of consensus 
among parties or the blockage of governmental institutions, such as the parliament.  
 
4.3. Measuring Political Agendas with Legislation Data 
 
The data set introduced in this paper is based on the Lebanese Official Gazette. The Gazette is a 
journal “issued by the ‘Official Gazette Department’ of the General Directorate of the Council of 
Ministers” and includes “the legislative and regulatory texts that govern the affairs of the country.”11 
Thus, the Gazette is the official journal of the Lebanese Government where all primary and secondary 
legislative texts need to be published to take effect and become legally binding.  
 
The data set has been retrieved from Al-Mustachar, a Lebanese law firm who provides an online 
archive for legislative documents.12 Al-Mustachar employs a team of legal experts who developed a 
methodology to review the weekly publications of the Official Gazette. Based on a review of the 
legislation in the Gazette, it first transcribes and then republishes those legislative texts that these 
experts identify to be of relevance for the daily work of legal practitioners, such as lawmakers, 
judges, and lawyers. These experts include independent judges that base their decisions of which 
legislative texts to include into the archive on a texts’ “legal value,” that is, whether the text can be 
referenced in appeals and court cases. The review process filters out legislative texts that are usually 
irrelevant for appeals or court cases, such as laws that correct spelling mistakes, naturalizations of 
citizens, registrations of organizations, or the acceptance of donations and in-kind contributions. That 
way, the archive assumes an important function for practitioners by reducing the volume and 
complexity of the weekly Official Gazette publications to only those texts that are relevant for legal 
practice. Among legal practitioners of all professions both within courts and commercial law firms, 
the archive is a widely accepted and utilized reference.13 This renders bias in the selection of texts 
unlikely as systematic neglect is easily verifiable by competitors and would threaten the reputation 
of the institution as a whole.14  
 
This data set leverages the filter for legislation of “legal value” as it filters out mundane legislation 
that binds very little administrative, financial, and political resources. This approach has a crucial 
                                                     
11 See the official webpages of the Lebanese Government and parliament: 
http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=31, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/lebanon.php 
[accessed October 2017]. 
12 The archive can be accessed under: https://almustachar.com/ [accessed May 2018] 
13 While there are several firms that provide online archives for legislative documents, Al-Mustachar is the only one who 
provides filtering for relevant legislation. Al-Mustachar does not publish data on the number of subscriptions, however, the 
major role of their online archive in Lebanon has been verified by the author in several interviews and discussions with the 
CEO and employees from Al-Mustachar as well as other legal experts, such as CEO’s and lawyers from competing law 
firms, researchers from Lebanese University’s Faculty of Law and Political and Administrative Sciences, as well as experts 
from think thanks on legal and policy issues, in particular The Legal Agenda, and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.  
14 The author verified the content of the archive by reviewing the archive provided by the Official Gazette Department of 
the Lebanese Council of Ministers itself and tested dozens of samples for their accurate reflection in the archive of Al-
Mustachar. 
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advantage for the study of political attention: the criteria for the identification of what makes 
legislation relevant applies to all policy areas equally and is consistent over time. Since experts define 
the criteria for exclusion and inclusion of texts, the filtering does not risk being biased by limitations 
of legal knowledge or normative assessments of the researcher. 
 
Advantages and Limitations  
 
Legislation data is not the only method to measure political agendas. However, the approach has 
several advantages over alternative data collection strategies, such as text analyses of executive 
speeches, interviews, or surveys. First, using a standardized coding scheme to categorize the 
legislation makes the agenda comparable over time, across topics and institutional origins, such as a 
Parliament, Council of Ministers, or ministries (Alexandrova et al., 2014). Thereby, it enables a 
researcher to construct political agendas in retrospect and to ‘zoom in’ on specific topics and times. 
The attention to specific issues, such as to the environment or reconstruction, can be traced over time 
and compared across governments.  
 
Second, the approach enables an analysis of the relative attention across all issues on the political 
agenda, independent from election times and any institutional calendar. Interviews, surveys, and 
executive speeches are much less conducive in this regard. Respondents to interviews or surveys are 
usually unable to estimate attention outside their own area of expertise and activity (Alexandrova et 
al., 2014). What is more, executive speeches do not necessarily reflect the priorities a government 
eventually pursues. Lastly, by combining the data with other sources, such as macroeconomic or 
qualitative data, the data set enables an analysis of the conditions under which certain topics become 
priorities (Jones, Sulkin and Larsen, 2003), or under which the characteristics of a setup of actors, 
such as their degree of fractionalization or polarization, impedes or facilitates policymaking 
(Mahmalat and Curran, 2019).  
 
Nevertheless, the approach has limitations. Firstly, the data set only reflects legislation that 
eventually made it into the Gazette and has been successfully agreed and voted upon. The data does 
not reflect meeting agendas of political institutions, that is, it does not reflect what the policymakers 
discussed in the first place and how much time and resources they devoted to addressing specific 
issues. Secondly, as the data reflects the outcome of a political bargain over legislation rather than 
the process of doing so, the data set cannot indicate the policy positions of actors during the 
negotiations. Lastly, an assessment of the implementation of the legislation – once enacted – requires 
additional data sources.  
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Data Set Properties 
 
In total, the data set includes 15,112 observations over 67 years from 1950 to 2016. As each document 
deals with a single issue, the coding is done on the document level so that each legislative text, such 
as a law, a decree, or resolution, constitutes one observation (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The 
data set distinguishes between 33 policy areas of legislation. These areas are defined by the Official 
Gazette department and structure the printed version of the Gazette. These policy areas pertain to the 
prerogatives of ministries and other authorized legislative entities, such as the Central Bank of 
Lebanon, in that a text falls into a specific policy area when it is signed by a respective minister or 
authority. The allocation of texts to policy areas hence follows a criterion that defines the document 
itself, i.e., the principal minister who developed and signed a document, rather than being subject to 
manual assessments based on codebooks.  
 
While the composition of ministries changed over time, the categorization offered by Al Mustachar 
remained the same and maintained the structure and policy areas that the Gazette adopted post-
independence (1943). When newer versions of the Gazette adapted to changes in the structure of 
legislative authorities, experts from Al Mustachar manually allocated affected documents to the 
relevant policy areas. For example, “public finance” and “banks and financial institutions” are policy 
areas that, today, both fall under the prerogatives of the Ministry of Finance but can be clearly 
distinguished based on the subject matter. This way, the allocation of texts among policy areas is 
consistent and comparable over time. The delineation of texts allocated to policy areas in this and 
related cases of change in the structure of the Gazette were all reviewed and checked for consistency 
by the author.   
 
The data set provides for each observation the reference number, the type of legislation (i.e., law, 
decree, or resolution), the date of publication, and the title. Table 2 displays summary statistics. The 
number of observations per policy area varies from 0 for all areas in at least one year to 218, the 
global maximum in the area “property and acquisitions.” “Press and Publications” receives the least 
attention with a maximum of two legislative texts over the whole period per year. Most legislation 
has been enacted in the area “property and real estate” (1921) followed by “tax and customs” (1669) 
and “international treaties” (1530). On average, the Lebanese Parliament enacted 28.5 important 
laws, the Council of Ministers and President 94.5 decrees, and the ministries 74.8 resolutions per 
year. 
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Table 4-2: Categories and summary statistics of legislation within the data set on the Lebanese 
Official Gazette, 1950–2016, Source: Authors’ calculations 
Category Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
Agriculture 611 9.1 15.5 0 76 
Tourism and Heritage 440 6.6 6.0 0 26 
Labour and Social Security 207 3.1 5.0 0 19 
Transportation, Cargo & Traffic  400 6.0 4.2 0 16 
Water and Electricity 190 2.8 3.6 0 21 
Industry and Oil 119 1.8 2.6 0 9 
Trade and Economy 451 6.7 9.3 0 60 
Tax and Customs 1669 24.9 38.3 0 175 
Foreign Affairs 66 1.0 1.6 0 8 
International Treaties and Organizations 1530 22.8 28.0 0 91 
Banque du Liban (Circulars) 1223 18.3 18.2 0 94 
Banks and Financial Institutions 561 8.4 10.4 0 56 
Public Finance 248 3.7 6.6 0 48 
Constitutional Law 186 2.8 2.6 0 11 
Correspondence and Communications  399 6.0 8.7 0 38 
Municipalities and Mayors 472 7.0 12.3 0 60 
Coordination of Ministries 689 10.3 12.2 0 56 
Public Institutions 562 8.4 7.5 0 27 
Personal Affairs and Sects 204 3.0 3.1 0 14 
Media and Advertisement 51 0.8 1.4 0 9 
Property and Real Estate 1921 28.7 45.3 0 218 
Environment and Public Health 401 6.0 6.9 0 26 
Education and Culture 899 13.4 13.4 0 89 
Culture Sports and Arts 112 1.7 2.1 0 9 
NGOs, Cooperatives and Housing 138 2.1 2.6 0 14 
National Defence and Security 502 7.5 17.5 0 144 
Social Affairs 53 0.8 1.1 0 4 
Internal Affairs 65 1.0 1.4 0 7 
Press and Publications 18 0.3 0.5 0 2 
The Judiciary  206 3.1 3.3 0 14 
Sanctions and Penalties 61 0.9 1.0 0 5 
Obligations and Contracts 49 0.7 0.9 0 4 
Unions and Professions 409 6.1 9.0 0 46 
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Figure 4-1 shows the evolution of laws, decrees, and resolutions from 1950 until 2016 in total 
numbers per year. Legislative activity was severely undermined during the civil war (1975 to 1989), 
resulting in near collapse in 1976 and 1989 where only 12 and 24 important legislative texts were 
published. After 1990, legislative activity increased significantly and reached a local maximum in 
2007 (690 legislative texts) and global maximum in 2016 (912 legislative texts). While the number 
of decrees and resolutions rose steadily after 1989, the number of laws enacted experienced a marked 
decline starting from the early-2000s: the decade from 2006 to 2016 witnessed four years in which 
less than 20 important laws passed the parliament. From 2011 to 2016, the parliament passed, on 
average, as many important laws as it did in the early 1990s after the end of the civil war.  
 
Figure 4-1: Types of Lebanese legislation passed from 1950 to 2016 
 
 
The quantity of legislative texts published is highly and positively correlated with measures of state 
capacity, which is commonly defined as the capacity of the state to implement its objectives 
(Skocpol, 1985; Hendrix, 2010). Legislative activity, the process of putting political will into effect 
de jure, is the necessary (albeit not sufficient) first step in the implementation of such objectives. The 
elaboration, processing and implementation of legislative texts requires institutional resources in the 
form of technology, specialists, and expertise (Ziblatt, 2008). Increases in legislative activity 
therefore require higher capacities of its legislative institutions to elaborate these texts and their 
associated documents, especially in higher levels of government, such as Parliament and Council of 
Ministers (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 2015). As figure 4-2 shows, legislative 
activity in Lebanon is significantly and positively correlated with the ratio of tax revenues to GDP 
(Pearson correlation coefficient .63, p<.01), a widely used indicator for measuring state capacity 
(Hendrix, 2010). Future research should explore the mechanisms that connect legislative activity and 
state capacity by, for example, investigating to which extent the quantity and content of legislative 
texts elaborated by ministries can serve as an indicator of their individual institutional capacities. 
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Figure 4-2: Association of tax revenue to GDP ratio and total legislative activity, Source: IMF 
Statistical Database, Lebanese Ministry of Finance, author’s calculation  
 
4.4. The Lebanese Political Agenda 
 
The data set can be used for different types of analyses (Alexandrova et al., 2014). For example, it 
allows a researcher to analyze the temporal dynamics of political attention across issues. Moreover, 
the data enables a detailed analysis of specific issues and topics. This section presents four examples 
to illustrate the use and content of the data set: 
▪ Agenda diversity across all 33 major policy areas; 
▪ Political attention after the end of the civil war in 1990 until 2016; 
▪ Political agenda before and after the so-called Paris I-III donor conferences; 
▪ A comparison of the political agenda in times of political gridlock in 2007 and 2013. 
While these examples are largely descriptive, they can be combined with other data sources and serve 
as a basis for more detailed explanatory analysis. For example, the data can be used to examine the 
effects of macroeconomic developments or electoral cycles on agenda priorities and diversity. What 
is more, as the data includes the titles of each legislative text, it can be used for various types of 
quantitative or qualitative analyses, such as spatial analyses of policy developments over time in real 
estate or the establishment of trade unions, to name two examples.  
 
Lebanon’s Agenda Diversity  
 
As introduced above, agenda diversity provides a measure for the degree of dispersion of attention 
across policy areas on a governments’ agenda. In doing so, agenda diversity indicates the capacity 
of the legislator to pay attention to multiple issues at the same time. A diverse agenda is one in which 
the attention of the legislator is shared among multiple issues and vice versa.  
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This section introduces a measure for agenda diversity based on entropy scores. The measure used 
here is “Shannon’s H” (Shannon, 1948), a measure adapted from information theory (Jennings et al., 
2011). Shannon’s H constitutes a probabilistic measure of the spread of observations across a defined 
number of policy areas. The measure is calculated as the logarithm of the sum of probabilities of all 
possible states of a system. Applied to agenda diversity, the score has a low value when the attention 
of the legislator is concentrated on a single topic. If the attention of the legislator is widely dispersed 
over a wide array of issues, the entropy score is high. Shannon’s H is calculated as follows:  
 
𝐻 = (−1)∑𝑝(𝑥𝑖)ln⁡(𝑝(𝑥𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
The entropy score H is calculated as the negative sum for all issue areas of the likelihood p(x) that 
an observation (here a legislative text published in the Gazette) falls into a specific policy area i, 
multiplied by the natural log of the same likelihood.15  
 
Figure 4-3 shows how the diversity of the Lebanese agenda varied over time. While the average 
diversity (2.74) remains almost constant over time, several spikes mark the agenda. Lebanon 
experienced a particularly narrow agenda in 1976, after the outbreak of the civil war (1975 to 1989), 
where few legislative texts were issued, most of which focused on issues related to financial policy 
areas (only 12 important pieces of legislation could be issued in total). Similarly, the diversity score 
drops during the later period of the civil war in the late 1980s during which Lebanon experienced 
high degrees of political violence and polarization. The period of reconstruction in the early 90s 
experienced a surge of legislation in a variety of topics. In 2016, however, after 27 years of physical 
and institutional reconstruction since the end of the civil war, Lebanon’s agenda diversity does not 
exceed its long-run equilibrium.  
 
  
                                                     
15 As 𝑙𝑛(0) is not defined, 0 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(0) = 0 is defined for all issue areas in which no legislation 
has been published in a given year.  
 68 
Figure 4-3: Lebanon's Agenda Diversity (Shannon’s H) from 1950 to 2016, Source: authors’ 
calculation 
 
The diversity decreases in the early 2000s, which coincides with a shift in priorities towards financial 
and macroeconomic issues that, among others, aimed at containing the threat of a debt crisis 
(Makdisi, 2004). This shift in attention coincides with a decrease of legislation that addresses 
developmental issues, here referred to as issues in the policy areas of education, electricity, 
environment, health, industry, transport, and water. As Figure 4-4 shows, lower degrees of agenda 
diversity are associated with slightly lower attention to developmental policy areas (left graph, 
Pearson correlation coefficient 0.16) and significantly higher attention to financial and economic 
policy areas (right graph, Pearson correlation coefficient -0.25, p<.05). 
 
Figure 4-4: Left: Agenda diversity to developmental legislative categories (in % of total legislation 
per year); Right: Agenda diversity to monetary and financial categories, 1950 to 2016 (in % of total 
legislation per year), Source: Authors’ calculation 
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The Political Agenda After the Civil War (1990 until 2016) 
 
The higher degree of political attention towards macroeconomic and financial issues rather than 
developmental ones remained salient after the end of the civil war (1989). Figure 4-5 shows the 
average spread in legislation across policy areas after 1990. International affairs, taxation, monetary 
issues, and property and real estate enjoy disproportionate higher levels of attention per year than the 
remaining policy areas. The high degree of attention to issues related to the core functions of the 
Government, in particular to international affairs and the coordination of ministries, is not a 
specificity to Lebanon but rather a bias inherent in all political systems (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005; Jennings et al., 2011). What is more pronounced, however, is the focus on issues related to 
taxation and customs, property and real estate, and the relative underrepresentation of any policy 
areas related to broader aspects of development, such as transport, environment, electricity, water, 
health, or education. The whiskers in the graph reflect spikes in attention by indicating the minimum 
and maximum amount of legislation in a year of the sample.  
 
In the period 1990 to 2016, the governmental agenda shifts. Figure 4-6 displays the distribution of 
laws and decrees across major issue areas over time. These types of legislation exhibit the highest 
institutional friction and require majority vote within the Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
 
Most political attention on the level of the Parliament and Council of Ministers was consumed by 
international affairs, followed by monetary issues, macroeconomy, and finance. While issues related 
to international affairs and defense consumed about 19 percent of the attention of the Council of 
Ministers and parliament between 2000 and 2005, they made up almost half of the agenda in 2016. 
Legislation addressing economic issues, taxation and finance decreased from 31 percent to about 18 
percent, while developmental issues were at their lowest levels after the civil war with only 4 percent 
of all legislation. Instead, legislation pertaining to property and real estate increased in importance 
on the governmental agenda from about 4 percent after the end of the civil war and the beginning of 
the reconstruction period to 36 percent of the governmental agenda in 2010. In the latest decade 
(2006 to 2016), more than every third legislative text issued by the Council of Ministers or the 
parliament addressed issues related to property and real estate.  
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Figure 4-5: Political Agenda in average total legislation per year, 1990 until 2016 
 
Note: The vertical bars in each box represent the median, and the enclosed boxes represent the 2nd 
and 3rd quartiles. The whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum values.  
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Figure 4-6: Share of laws and decrees in developmental categories to total laws and decrees, 1990 
to 2016 
 
The Policy Response to Donor Conferences, Paris I-III 
 
The years of the early 2000s were marked by significant financial distress. In order to stem the 
financial burden of reconstruction after the civil war, Lebanon resorted to a financing model based 
on external creditors, which led to very high degrees of external indebtedness (Makdisi, 2004; Credit 
Libanais, 2016). In an effort to prevent a financial crisis, three donor conferences were held in Paris 
(2000, 2001, and 2007) during which an international community pledged financial assistance. Each 
of the assistance packages was tied to a reform program that aimed to strengthen the revenue base 
and to consolidate governmental expenditures (Salamey, 2014; Atallah, Mahmalat and Zoughreib, 
2018). 
 
Figure 4-7 displays the share of all legislation in monetary, financial, and macroeconomic issue areas 
to total legislation from 2000 to 2003 and 2006 to 2009. The figure shows that the Lebanese 
Government in the early 2000s under then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was mostly concerned with 
strengthening and regulating the revenue base by concentrating on issues related to taxation and 
customs. In 2001, more than 30 percent of the total governmental agenda was consumed by issues 
related to taxation and customs. Moreover, the political agenda focused on regulating banks and 
financial institutions, a sector which is a major contribution to the Lebanese economy (Barakat, 
2015). Yet, soon after the initial demands of the reform agendas for Paris I and II seem to have been 
met, the focus on taxation and financial institutions decreased from 40 percent to less than 20 percent 
of the political agenda. The reduced attention on financial policy areas was accompanied by an 
increase in agenda diversity from 2.4 in 2002 to 2.9 in 2008.  
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A weaker but similar pattern can be discerned during and after the 2007 Paris III conference. 
Legislation in policy areas related to taxation and customs ceased in importance after the conference. 
However, the government slightly increased its attention to other issue areas, such as the economy, 
trade, and industry. What is more, the Lebanese central bank, the Banque du Liban, increased its 
output of circulars relating to monetary issues in relation to total legislative activity. Based on the 
data, further in-depth evaluations can assess the extent to which donor demands could influence 
legislative activity and thereby the success or failure of a reform agenda.  
 
Figure 4-7: Share of legislation in policy areas related to finance and economy, in percent of total 
legislation, 2000 to 2003 and 2006 to 2009 
 
Political Attention During Times of ‘Gridlock’ – Comparing 2007 to 2013 
 
Political ‘gridlock’ is a recurring phenomenon in Lebanese politics (Nader, 2014; Salamey, 2014). 
Lebanon experienced several periods of gridlock in which political polarization over contentious 
issues reached such an extent that certain governmental institutions were not set to convene for 
extended periods of time. For example, in late 2006 two parties, Amal and Hezbollah, withdrew their 
ministers from the unity government at the time over disputes related to executive legislation 
(Salamey, 2014). As the speaker of the house happened to lead the Amal party, the party could block 
further meetings of the Parliament by refusing to call it to convene. During the whole year of 2007, 
no important laws could be enacted. On another prominent occasion starting from 2011, Lebanese 
politics experienced a marked surge in polarization over the political response to the Syrian crisis. 
As a consequence, political instability increased, and several governments succeeded each other in 
short intervals. During 2013, the Parliament only passed two important laws due to political rifts to 
form a new national unity government.  
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Figure 4-8 shows that political paralysis impacted the legislative agenda in the two periods 
differently. While no important laws could be passed in 2007, total legislative activity did not 
decrease as governmental decrees partially offset the missing output of laws. In contrast, the period 
from 2013 to 2016 experienced a sharp contraction of legislative activity, which this time also 
affected the work of the Council of Ministers. The inauguration of a government in early 2014 (The 
Monthly, 2017) led to a slight revival of legislative activity. 
 
Figure 4-8: Comparison of times of gridlock, number of laws and decrees 2006 to 2008 and 2012 to 
2014, Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
While all policy areas were affected by the contraction of legislative activity in 2013, agenda 
diversity was affected differently during 2013 compared to 2007. Figure 4-9 shows that issues related 
to finance, economic issues and property and real estate maintained their relative importance for the 
political agenda in 2013. In 2007, instead, the Council of Ministers in particular could spread its 
attention across a higher number of issues, such as developmental policy areas (transport, education, 
health, industry, water, electricity, or the environment), external affairs and defense and social affairs. 
These patterns require further exploration in order to explain the structural conditions that make 
governments change patterns of political attention despite similar conditions of institutional impasse.  
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Figure  4-9: Political priorities during times of legislative gridlock, left: 2007, right: 2013, Source: 
Authors’ calculation 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how legislation data can offer important insights into the patterns of political 
attention in countries whose legislative institutions provide little data on their workings. The chapter 
has introduced a new data set on legislative activity in Lebanon, which contains all important primary 
and secondary legislation between 1950 and 2016.  The approach of constructing the data set adds to 
the study of political attention by proposing a method to identify ‘important’ legislation based on the 
review of experts, rather than selection criteria identified by the researcher. As legislation data needs 
to be made public to take effect regardless of a given type of polity, similar data sets can be 
established for other countries. The theoretical considerations are transferrable by adjusting the 
framework to the legislative framework of a given country. The creation of this data set ties in with 
recent scholarly attention to governance issues in countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(Nabli, 2007; Bishara, 2011; Sumpf, Araji and Crompton, 2016). 
 
After having discussed the strengths and limitations of the approach of taking legislative texts as a 
measure of political attention, the chapter described the construction of the data set and analyzed 
several examples to illustrate its use and content. The results add to extant literature on the political 
economy in Lebanon by offering a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the Lebanese political 
agenda. The analysis illustrates how the country’s agenda focused on issues related to 
macroeconomics, finance, and real estate rather than on developmental policy areas related to 
education, electricity, health, industry, transportation, and water. These developmental policy areas 
receive comparably little attention, which is further reduced when agenda diversity decreases. 
Instead, the government increased its focus on issues related to property and real estate over time. 
What is more, comparing the political agendas during periods of governmental ‘gridlock,’ in which 
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legislative institutions such as the Parliament could not convene, reveals how political agendas differ 
despite similar conditions of institutional impasse.  
 
The data set opens up several avenues for future research of potential importance for development 
practitioners. As the relationship between the capacities of governmental institutions and legislative 
activity increased in scholarly attention (Baek, 2019), legislation data enables further in-depth 
exploration into the mechanisms by which increases in institutional capacities interact with higher 
amounts of important legislation. Further research is also warranted to discern the effects that 
polarization and fractionalization have on legislative activity in different governmental institutions 
and across policy areas. 
 
The current coding scheme of the data set enables various applications. However, extensions and 
adaptations are welcome to fit the data to different research interests. For example, policy specialists 
may want to introduce further detail by increasing the number of subtopics or include a geographical 
dimension in policy areas pertaining to, for example, physical infrastructure or the establishment of 
trade unions. What is more, the data set can be adapted to suit the coding scheme of the Comparative 
Agendas Project in order to make the Lebanese legislative agenda directly comparable to other 
countries (John, 2006).  
 
It is hoped that the systematic study of the Lebanese political agenda will advance our understanding 
of the political economy of Lebanon and other developing countries with limited data on 
policymaking processes. Such analyses might lead to a more evidence-based evaluation of 
performance and responsiveness of legislative institutions, such as the effectiveness of donor aid in 
response to reform programs and capacity building in governmental institutions. 
 
Moreover, the data enables a more nuanced characterization of the policymaking process in empirical 
analyses, for example by distinguishing between the issuing institution or the properties of a 
legislative text. The next chapter will utilize this dataset for developing and testing a theory of 
political collaboration and to further address the central research question of this thesis, which is to 
identify the determinants that facilitate or hinder collaboration on reform.  
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5. FRACTIONALIZATION AND REFORM – A FRAMEWORK 
OF POLITICAL COLLABORATION WITH APPLICATION 
TO LEBANON 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter leverages the conceptual and methodological work of the preceding chapters to develop 
a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of political collaboration on reform. By utilizing 
the dataset introduced in chapter 4, this chapter takes the instance of variation in legislative activity 
cited in the introduction of this thesis as the central motivation to explore the reasons for such 
differing outcomes of political collaboration. It addresses the underlying research question of this 
thesis by arguing that the characteristics of a legislative project itself determines the likelihood of 
being passed.  
 
In Lebanon, a high degree of fractionalization in political representation determines political 
exchange and curtails legislative activity (LCPS, 2018). In 2015, for example, despite conditions of 
economic and fiscal hardship that have set macroeconomic indicators on an unsustainable path 
(World Bank, 2016a), political actors failed to approve important reform, such as a mandatory budget 
law. However, in November of the same year, the same political actors, operating in the same 
configuration of political power, approved law No. 44, a controversial reform aimed at “fighting 
money laundering and terrorist financing.”16  
 
Numerous accounts can be cited as to why some of these bills passed while others did not, which are 
mostly personalistic or related to Lebanon’s fractionalized consociational democracy (see Leenders, 
2012; Salamey, 2014; Salloukh et al., 2015 for recent reviews). However, differing outcomes of 
collaboration on reform despite a similar configuration of political power are commonplace in 
Lebanon and other developing countries (Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Corrales, 1998; Galasso, 
2014). Extant theoretical approaches tend to model the delay or adoption of reform with distributional 
conflict as a function of the degree to which a country is fractionalized (see Khemani, 2017, for a 
review). While these models offer explanations for why reform gets delayed, they offer few insights 
into why actors encounter a varying degree of difficulty to collaborate on reform depending on the 
issue they are dealing with.  
 
                                                     
16 The purpose of the law was to ensure the stability of the financial sector by complying with fresh United States 
regulations and sanctions aimed at curtailing economic and financial activities of organizations related to terrorist groups 
as well as drug and weapons smuggling. The law was controversial as it incurred potential distributional consequences on 
politically powerful groups financed by rents from related activities. Available at: 
http://www.bdl.gov.lb/files/laws/Law44_en[3].pdf [accessed 25/07/2019] 
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This chapter develops a conceptual framework to explain observable variation in legislative output 
across time and policy areas. We leverage the framework to explore the mechanisms through which 
fractionalization affects political collaboration. We argue that the properties of a reform project 
determine the extent to which fractionalization affects political collaboration on reform: the higher 
the institutional requirements of a reform are, i.e., the number and nature of political actors and 
institutions involved in accrediting the legislation, and the broader its impact, i.e. the number of 
groups that are affected, the more fractionalization can impede political collaboration.  
 
We depart from previous research in two important ways. First, because political bargaining 
ultimately takes place in governmental institutions, we analyze the impact of fractionalization on 
political collaboration at a governmental level. We thereby extend the scope of recent empirical 
work, which analyzes the effects of fractionalization for a country as a whole, and not government 
itself. While much of this research focuses on the impact of ethnic diversity (Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly, 1999; Ashraf and Galor, 2013), ethnic inequality (Kyriacou, 2013; Alesina, Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou, 2016), and cross-cleavages (Finseraas and Jakobsson, 2012) on political and 
economic outcomes, our contribution follows recent research in highlighting the impact of 
fractionalization within governmental institutions (Beach and Jones, 2017). 
 
Second, we depart from extant literature on the political economy of reform by using legislation itself 
as a dependent variable, rather than aggregate reform indices or the amount or quality of public 
goods. Traditional reform indices mostly reflect changes in the regulatory environment of a given 
country and thereby risk conflating distinct causal connections that link collaboration and regulatory 
change (Babecký and Campos, 2011; Campos and Horváth, 2012). Similarly, analyzing the 
provisioning of public goods inherently restricts the analysis on a specific set of policy areas, such 
as education or health care. By treating reform as a multi-layered concept, we achieve a fuller 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation, namely political collaboration and reform.  
 
We derive our core concepts from political transactions theory (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; Stein et 
al., 2006; Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2013). To achieve reform, political actors need to engage 
in political collaboration, which requires political transactions in the form of intertemporal 
agreements. These transactions are intertemporal in nature in the sense that political concessions 
today are exchanged in return for concessions tomorrow. The central argument of political 
transactions theory is that the functioning of political institutions impacts upon the capacity of 
political actors to engage in political transactions and, hence, the quality of policies. Because the 
concept of political transactions applies to democratic regimes independent of the structure of a 
polity, we employ it as a theoretical framework in this chapter.  
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Moreover, we refer to fractionalization as the number of politically significant social groups with 
veto powers in the process of collaboration (Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). Extant 
studies on the political economy of reform find higher degrees of fractionalization to decrease the 
likelihood of reform in specific policy areas, such as trade or privatization (Banerjee and Munger, 
2004; Brooks and Kurtz, 2007; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008; Galasso, 2014), and the ‘level’ of reform 
(Tsebelis, 1999; Torenvlied and Haarhuis, 2008). As many of these findings are results of panel-data 
regression analyses, however, they tend to leave transmission channels that could explain individual 
reform episodes underdetermined (Scheemaekere, Oosterlinck and Szafarz, 2015; Mahmalat and 
Curran, 2018).  
 
This study addresses this shortcoming by applying our framework to the case of Lebanon.17 The 
country is a particularly relevant case to study as political interactions are largely determined by a 
high degree of fractionalization among sectarian communities (Makdisi and Marktanner, 2009) and 
has a track record of both protracted reform and low legislative output.18 We present evidence in a 
mixed-methods approach in two steps. First, based on a novel database of legislative activity, we 
show the relevance of our framework to the study of political collaboration. We exploit a natural 
experiment that occurred in 2005: the so-called Cedar Revolution, which ended Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon. The revolution led to the sudden, in its timing unexpected (re)appearance of 
significant political parties on the political spectrum that had formerly been outlawed or oppressed. 
In that way, the revolution is an example of an exogenous shock that led to a sudden, rather than 
gradual, reconfiguration of political power. The effects of the revolution reduced the production of 
legislation with high requirements and broad impact, while it left legislative activity with lower 
requirements relatively unaffected (Section 3). 
 
In a second step, we use the framework to identify mechanisms that link the properties of reform 
projects to political collaboration (Section 4). The analysis is based on 32 guideline-based semi-
structured expert-interviews with parliamentarians, ex-ministers, and government and party officials 
of all major political factions represented in the Lebanese parliament. We identify two mechanisms. 
First, uncertainty about time horizons of key actors reduces the incidence of legislation for which the 
duration of the collaboration game overstretches those of political actors in office. Second, a higher 
number of political actors requires more mutual trust to make intertemporal agreements credible in 
the absence of impartial enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                     
17 Analyzing just one country is, of course, only a step towards a comprehensive comparative approach. However, case 
studies are found to be a suitable means to explore heretofore unobserved causal mechanisms between variables “because 
they are not limited to the variables or measures of complex concepts that appear in preexisting datasets” (Gerring, 2007; 
Weller and Barnes, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, the chapter aims at providing a conceptual basis for the application to future 
empirical work on a comparative basis.  
18 For example, the average number of laws passed per year from 1990 until 2009 in Lebanon was 56.3 compared to 186.3 
for a set of European countries. Source: Authors’ calculation based on data of the “Comparative Agenda Project” and the 
Lebanese Official Gazette. Countries included: Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain. Available at: 
comparativeagendas.net 
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Our findings contribute to existing literature in two important ways. First, our results help to make 
sense of ambiguous empirical evidence on the extent to which fractionalization affects the likelihood 
of reform. Following war-of-attrition models (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) and veto-player theory 
(Tsebelis, 2002), this literature argues that higher degrees of fractionalization in government settings 
protract reform over distributional conflict and the reduction of the win-set of the status quo. 
However, empirical evidence fails to confirm these arguments coherently in studies on different 
reform areas, such as product market reform, liberalization, or privatization (Mahmalat and Curran, 
2018). The analysis in this chapter suggests that fractionalization impacts collaboration depending 
on the degree of mutual trust required to make intertemporal commitments credible. In environments 
without impartial enforcement mechanisms, trust gains in relevance the more players are affected by 
a reform project and take part in the collaboration game. As different policy areas impact different 
sets and numbers of social groups, trust among actors varies in importance for collaboration.  
 
Second, our findings elaborate on research that contends that governmental cycles influence the 
likelihood of reform (Pinea, 1994; Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 
2006; Høj et al., 2006; Tompson and Price, 2009). The central argument of this strand of research is 
that governments are more likely to undertake reform just after having taken office. This literature 
suggests two channels. First, governments enjoy higher legitimacy just after having taken office 
which allows them to enact more contentious reform. Second, governments want to pass contentious 
reform early in their legislature to allow the reform to take effect in an effort to avoid electoral 
backlashes. Our analysis offers a refinement of these mechanisms. The time-horizons of political 
actors affect collaboration depending on the requirements of a reform project. As reform increases 
in requirements and complexity, the elaboration and bargaining time is extended and the more likely 
it is that reform take longer to pass than a ministers’ term in office. Short or uncertain time-horizons 
lead to friction losses as incentives increase to avert that other parties that follow suit reap any 
benefits of their efforts.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section two develops the conceptual 
framework. Section three presents evidence of its applicability. Based on the framework, section four 
identifies mechanisms by which fractionalization impedes collaboration. Section five concludes.  
 
5.2. The Framework  
 
This section sets out the conceptual building blocks of our framework of collaboration on reform as 
illustrated in Figure 5-1. We discuss four analytical concepts of policymaking and their connection 
to the phenomenon under consideration, that is, political collaboration. We are ultimately concerned 
with the type of legislation which constitutes our dependent variable, such as laws or decrees (1). We 
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view legislation as the outcome of political collaboration in the form of intertemporal political 
agreements. Political collaboration, in turn, is conditioned by the functioning of political institutions 
(the “rules” of the collaboration game) (2), the setting of social groups (their political polarization 
and fractionalization) (3), and the properties of a reform project (a projects’ institutional requirements 
and breadth of impact) (4). While the setup of social groups and the properties of a legislative project 
interact with the functioning of institutions, we argue that they constitute separate analytical 
dimensions. Last, we derive hypotheses which we test in subsequent sections. 
 
Figure 5-1: The framework 
 
Political Collaboration and Reform 
 
In an attempt to capture the complexity of the concept of reform, this study follows political 
transactions theory to define political collaboration and reform (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). The 
central concept of this theory is political transactions, which involve mutual agreements over 
political concessions that are intertemporal in nature and commonly involve the exchange of “current 
actions or resources (such as votes) […] for promises of future actions or resources (they are inter-
temporal transactions)” (Stein et al., 2006, pp. 17, emphasis added in original). In what follows, we 
refer to political collaboration as the exchange of intertemporal political transactions in the process 
of bargaining over legislation. Collaboration can be understood as the succession of political 
interactions by which legislation is processed: from the initial necessity assessment to drafting a bill, 
discussing and voting in respective institutions, and the eventual publication in official journals.  
 
Following this logic, legislation refers to the entirety of documents that enter legal force by 
representing the outcome of an exchange of political transactions. We define reform as ‘high-profile’ 
legislation which establishes or amends impersonal rules and significantly change the regulatory 
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framework of a country. Notably, this definition departs from the Spiller and Tommasi framework 
as it does not refer to the concept and elaboration of polices – in their function of setting guidelines 
for the elaboration of legislation – but focuses on legislation in its function to amend institutional 
frameworks. As we will argue, this definition enables a conceptual differentiation between policy 
areas and its institutional origins of a reform in empirical models. Empirical analysis, then, can infer 
more differentiated conclusions on the mechanisms by which the given socio-economic 
configuration of a polity impacts political collaboration, and thereby the occurrence of reform.  
  
Political Institutions and Political Collaboration 
 
Political transactions theory defines a set of determinants of an institutional environment that 
facilitates the ability of political actors to engage in intertemporal agreements (see Spiller and 
Tommasi, 2003, pp. 288–291). First, the number of key political actors with veto powers should be 
small. The larger the number of veto players, the smaller the win-set of the status quo, that is, the 
realm of solutions acceptable to all players (see also Tsebelis, 2002). Second, political actors need to 
have strong intertemporal linkages. Frequent replacements of key political actors undermine the 
ability to engage in credible intertemporal agreements. Third, political moves should be easily 
observable. Collaboration is harder to sustain if actions of actors are difficult to verify or predict. 
Fourth, there should be strong and impartial enforcement mechanisms, such as an independent 
judiciary or bureaucracy to which certain tasks can be delegated. Fifth, key political exchanges 
should take place in formal rather than informal arenas in which the properties one to four are 
satisfied. These arenas, such as parliamentary institutions, offer an environment that makes 
agreements easier to observe and enforce. Sixth, the short-run payoff from deviating from 
collaboration should not be too high. The payoffs-structure of collaboration should provide 
incentives to sustain collaboration.  
 
However, as the political transactions argument designates the quality of policies as its dependent 
variable, it does not specify how the specific type of legislation can affect political collaboration, i.e. 
whether it constitutes a law, decree, or otherwise. As we will discuss below, different types of 
legislation change the nature of the bargaining game as they involve different institutional processes, 
actors and incentives.  
 
Fractionalization and Political Collaboration 
 
A fractionalized or polarized polity reflects the difficulties actors encounter to make concessions 
beyond group boundaries (Easterly and Levine, 1997; van Staveren and Pervaiz, 2017). In a 
governmental context, fractionalization commonly refers to the “probability that two deputies picked 
at random from among the government parties will be of different parties” (Cruz, Keefer and 
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Scartascini, 2016, p. 12).19 We refer to fractionalization as the number of social groups with veto-
powers in the process of political collaboration.20 
 
The literature identifies several mechanisms by which fractionalization within a governing body can 
affect collaboration. Fractionalization tends to impact political and economic outcomes due to 
differing preferences among groups (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Putnam, 2007; Ashraf and 
Galor, 2013). The more cleavages among groups overlap with political organizations, then, the more 
fractionalization can reduce trust among actors (Finseraas and Jakobsson, 2012) and increase conflict 
(Selway, 2011). Accordingly, Beach and Jones (2017) find that increased fractionalization of 
governmental bodies – US American city councils in their case – reduces spending on public goods.  
 
Veto-player theory provides another link. A higher number of veto players – an actor whose 
agreement is needed to change policy – reduces the win-set of the status quo and lowers the likelihood 
of ‘political change’ (Tsebelis, 1999, 2002) and the “level” of reform (Torenvlied and Haarhuis, 
2008). What is more, the competencies and capacities of politicians are likely to decrease in 
fractionalized polities, particularly in consociational ones, which impedes the quality of political 
engagement (Samuels, 1999; Banerjee and Pande, 2007). Lastly, more fractionalized countries 
exhibit lower levels of trust among political actors (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Chakravarty 
and Fonseca, 2014; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg, 2017). In the logic of intertemporal 
transactions, trust (or the lack thereof) influences actors’ perceptions of other actors’ future objective 
function. In consequence, lack of trust makes it more difficult to engage in intertemporal agreements 
since commitments become less credible. 
 
The more homogenous groups are, the more can fractionalization lead to polarization. Higher degrees 
of polarization are found to increase the chances for conflict and political instability (Esteban, 
Mayoral and Ray, 2012), delay reform (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 
2006), lower the occurrence of ‘significant’ reform (Howell et al., 2000; Clinton and Lapinski, 2006), 
and law production (Mccarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006, pp. 176–183). 
 
Properties of Reform Projects and Political Collaboration  
 
                                                     
19 In empirical models, fractionalization measures ethnic diversity based on a Herfindahl index: 
𝐹 = 1 −∑𝜋𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
⁡, 
where 𝜋𝑖 is the proportion of group i and n the total number of groups in a country. The degree of fractionalization, F, can 
therefore be interpreted as the probability that two random draws of individuals within a country are from the same political 
group (Papyrakis and Mo, 2014). 
20 It is important to note here that the concept of fractionalization refers to any identification criterion that gains in political 
meaning, including ethnicity or religion (Cammett, 2014). As discussed below, fractionalization in the Lebanese case refers 
to sectarian-based political identities. 
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The above discussion raises important questions about variation in legislative activity: Why does 
fractionalization hinder reform efforts in some policy areas, while collaboration in others remains 
unaffected? Which conditions determine the relative legislative activity of governmental institutions, 
such as the parliament, or a council of ministers? Which types of reform are possible in the face of 
increased fractionalization, and which are blocked?  
 
With a view to answering these questions, this section discusses how the properties of a reform 
project – the “objects of collaboration” – condition collaboration. To that end, we review how a 
country’s legal code defines the type of legislation, such as laws, decrees, or resolutions. We identify 
two properties of a legislative project that condition political collaboration: its institutional 
requirements and breadth of impact. Institutional requirements refer to the number and nature of 
political actors and institutions that are involved in accrediting the legislation under consideration. 
Breadth of impact is defined as the number of and degree to which a legislation affects different 
social groups.  
 
Institutional Requirements 
 
Reform originating from different governmental institutions, such as a parliament or a council of 
ministers, expose political collaboration to distinct rules and constraints (Kingdon, 2003; Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005). Legislative institutions on higher levels, such as the parliament, impose a higher 
degree of institutional friction on legislative projects (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 
2015). That is because the decision costs to come to an agreement increase in higher levels of 
government as these involve more veto-players and mandatory procedures, such as voting.  
 
Different types of legislation, then, exhibit varying institutional requirements, i.e. the degree of 
institutional friction a legislative proposal needs to overcome in order to be adopted. These 
requirements increase for legislation that needs to pass higher levels of government, such as laws, or 
constitutional amendments. The nature of these governmental levels is defined by the legislative 
hierarchy as outlined within a country’s legal code. The higher the hierarchical position of a 
legislative proposal, the higher – on average – the institutional requirements for collaboration.  
 
To illustrate the relationship between institutional requirements and the legal code, we briefly refer 
to the example of the Lebanese legal code – an example which informs the empirical analysis in 
Sections 3 and 4. However, the concept is easily adaptable to the legislative context in other 
countries. Table 5-1 shows a simplified hierarchy of the Lebanese legal code, which is modeled after 
the French legal code.  
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Table 5-1: Hierarchy of legislation according to the French civil law code, as adapted within the case of 
Lebanon. Sources: Lebanese Constitution, Dictionnaire du droit privé, and Glossaire de Vie Publique. 
Rank 
Type of  
Legislation 
Description Issuing Body 
Institutional 
Requirements 
1 Law 
A supreme, general and impersonal 
legal rule, following the Parliament’s 
deliberation and initiative. No law can 
be enacted if it has not been passed by 
the Parliament.  
Parliament High 
2 Decree 
Administrative orders taken by the 
President of the Republic, or the 
Council of Ministers according to the 
powers allocated by the Constitution 
and the Laws. No parliamentary 
approval necessary but limited in 
scope by applying the law. 
Council of 
Ministers, 
President 
Moderate 
3 Resolution 
Issuance of the Executive power, i.e., 
the Ministers or the administrative 
authorities, to which constitutional 
laws conferred regulatory power. 
Limited legal scope within the realm 
of existing legal frameworks. 
Ministers Low 
 
Laws set the legal framework for all legislation further down the hierarchy and have – on average – 
the highest institutional requirements. They involve the largest set of political actors, as they need to 
be elaborated in commissions, crafted by lawyers and experts, discussed by all parties in the 
parliament, and so on. At the lower end of the complexity spectrum, decrees and resolutions serve 
the purpose of applying the law on an administrative basis and potentially involve the lowest number 
of actors. Such legislation is issued by ministries which are usually governed by party members or 
affiliates that enjoy administrative authority over the legislation a ministry provides.  
 
Breadth of Impact of Reform 
 
Mutual trust plays an important role for collaboration in fractionalized polities due to the 
intertemporal nature of political exchange. In polities with weak legislatures, and we argue that 
Lebanon is such a case, political exchange takes place in alternative settings that are less formal, 
more uncertain and harder to enforce as credible enforcement mechanisms, such as an independent 
judiciary, are absent (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2013). Political 
actors’ ability to engage in such transactions depends on their ability to accurately forecast the 
likelihood that other players will abide by their commitments.  
 
The credibility of commitments is likely to vary with the breadth of the impact of a policy issue. The 
broader the impact of a reform proposal in terms of its effect for a larger number of groups, ceteris 
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paribus, calculations about future preferences increase in complexity and information asymmetries 
are harder to overcome (Laban and Sturzenegger, 1994; Acemoglu, 2003). If the impact of reform is 
sufficiently narrow or balanced and allows for reliable predictions of future preferences of other 
groups, collaboration on reform becomes less susceptible to the lack of trust. Local environmental 
projects, for example, are reforms for which lack of trust is less of an issue for collaboration, as the 
distribution of costs and benefits is clearly defined. In contrast, if the impact of reform is broad, such 
as for tax reforms, a large number of groups is affected which complicates the assessment of the 
implications of reform.  
 
Implications for Political Collaboration on Reform 
 
The above discussion enables us to refine how fractionalization can impact collaboration on reform. 
A higher level of fractionalization in governmental institutions increases the institutional friction in 
governmental institutions. As the legislative process in higher-ranking levels of government 
necessitates agreement among a higher number of potential veto players, in particular in unity 
governments and power sharing arrangements, an increase in fractionalization should affect the 
collaboration on legislation with high-requirements more than legislation further down in the legal 
hierarchy.  
 
What is more, a multitude of actors with veto powers decreases the win-set of the status quo of a 
reform project. Higher fractionalization should therefore deter collaboration on reform with a broad 
impact as it increases the number of veto players with an incentive to exercise their veto powers. 
This should reduce the likelihood of reforms that establish impersonal, general rules, such as laws, 
which apply to multiple or all social groups in a country or have distributional consequences that are 
more difficult to predict. 
 
5.3. The Effects of a Revolution on High-Profile Legislation 
 
To verify the applicability of the framework, we exploit a natural experiment that occurred in 
Lebanon in early 2005, the Cedar Revolution (Bosco, 2009). The revolution led to a sudden increase 
in fractionalization and represents a case of an exogenous shock that led to a sudden reconfiguration 
of political power. In the logic of intertemporal agreements, the shock was exogenous in the sense 
that actors could not ex ante base their mutual agreements before 2005 on the expectation of a sudden 
change in the configuration of political power. While Lebanon’s governance structure of communal 
power sharing remained unchanged, political agreements had to be made on a broader political 
consensus.  
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This section shows that the events in 2005 had a significant negative impact on the provision of high-
profile legislation. The next section investigates mechanisms by which this happened.  
 
Historical Background and Identification 
 
Following military involvement during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1989), Syria maintained a 
military presence with direct political influence in Lebanon until 2005. During that period, the Syrian 
government served as an important arbiter in Lebanese politics: whenever a dispute between the 
major political veto-players over legislation threatened to lead to gridlock, the Syrian government 
intervened to resolve conflict (El-Husseini, 2012). Moreover, the Syrian government prevented 
several parties, which fought against them during the civil war, from partaking formally in the 
political arena. 
 
In February 2005, ex-prime minister and critic of the Syrian presence Rafiq Hariri, was assassinated 
by a car bomb in Beirut, an attack for which large parts of the international community and the 
Lebanese population held the Syrian government responsible. The events that followed led to the so-
called Cedar Revolution which resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon by April 
2005.21  
 
The Syrian withdrawal increased the fractionalization within governmental institutions and increased 
the number of veto players. Two political parties reappeared in the political arena that have been 
forbidden during the Syrian presence, specifically the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic 
Movement. These two parties henceforth played a major role in Lebanese politics. They gained 
parliamentary representation and won 6 and 15 of 128 parliamentary seats in the 2005 general 
elections that were held in May and June after the revolution.22 More importantly, however, their 
political leadership was allowed to return from exile or was released from prison, which increased 
the number of communal leaders, or oligarchs, that maintain veto-powers in decision making at the 
elite level.23 No other extraordinary institutional or constitutional amendment has been introduced in 
this period. 
 
The Dataset 
 
                                                     
21 Second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559, 
available at: https://undocs.org/S/2005/673, [accessed 7/12/2018] 
22 See the official webpages of the Lebanese Government, http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=31, [accessed 
October 2017]. 
23 See section 4 of this paper and Mahmalat and Chaitani (2019) as well as Salamey (2014) for more detailed information 
on this point.  
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We use a novel comprehensive database on legislative activity in Lebanon since 1950.24 The data is 
based on the Lebanese Official Gazette, the official government journal that publishes all relevant 
legislative texts enacted by any governmental body in order to take effect and become legally 
binding.25 Each legislative text, from laws to decrees or circulars, constitutes one observation.  
 
The dataset is retrieved from Al-Mustachar, a private provider of an online archive of legislation 
data,26 and is organized as follows. In total, the dataset includes 15,112 observations (i.e., legislative 
texts) over 67 years from 1950 until 2016. The database distinguishes between 33 policy areas of 
legislation and provides for each observation the reference number, the type of legislation (i.e., law, 
decree, resolution, circular, or other), the date of publication, and the title. Table 5-2 displays 
summary statistics.  
 
Table 5-2: Categories and summary statistics of legislation within the database on the Official Gazette 
Category Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Agriculture 611 9.1 15.5 0 76 
Tourism and Heritage 440 6.6 6.0 0 26 
Labour and Social Security 207 3.1 5.0 0 19 
Transportation, Cargo & Traffic  400 6.0 4.2 0 16 
Water and Electricity 190 2.8 3.6 0 21 
Industry and Oil 119 1.8 2.6 0 9 
Trade and Economy 451 6.7 9.3 0 60 
Tax and Customs 1669 24.9 38.3 0 175 
Foreign Affairs 66 1.0 1.6 0 8 
International Treaties and Organizations 1530 22.8 28.0 0 91 
Banque du Liban (Circulars) 1223 18.3 18.2 0 94 
Banks and Financial Institutions 561 8.4 10.4 0 56 
Public Finance 248 3.7 6.6 0 48 
Constitutional Law 186 2.8 2.6 0 11 
Correspondence and Communications  399 6.0 8.7 0 38 
Municipalities and Mayors 472 7.0 12.3 0 60 
Coordination of Ministries 689 10.3 12.2 0 56 
Public Institutions 562 8.4 7.5 0 27 
Personal Affairs and Sects 204 3.0 3.1 0 14 
Media and Advertisement 51 0.8 1.4 0 9 
Property and Real Estate 1921 28.7 45.3 0 218 
Environment and Public Health 401 6.0 6.9 0 26 
                                                     
24 See Mahmalat (2019) for a detailed discussion of the dataset 
25 See the official webpages of the Lebanese Government and parliament, 
http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=31, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/lebanon.php, 
[accessed October 2017]. 
26 The archive can be accessed under: https://almustachar.com/ [accessed May 2018], data set available upon request from 
the author. 
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Education and Culture 899 13.4 13.4 0 89 
Culture, Sports and Arts 112 1.7 2.1 0 9 
NGO’s, Cooperatives and Housing 138 2.1 2.6 0 14 
National Defence and Security 502 7.5 17.5 0 144 
Social Affairs 53 0.8 1.1 0 4 
Internal Affairs 65 1.0 1.4 0 7 
Press and Publications 18 0.3 0.5 0 2 
The Judiciary  206 3.1 3.3 0 14 
Sanctions and Penalties 61 0.9 1.0 0 5 
Obligations and Contracts 49 0.7 0.9 0 4 
Unions and Professions 409 6.1 9.0 0 46 
 
The Dependent Variable – Introducing a Measure for High-Profile Reform  
 
We test our hypotheses by examining the effect of the 2005 Cedar Revolution on legislative 
outcomes. We use a measure of high-profile legislation as our dependent variable. To indicate high-
profile legislation, we reviewed the content of all laws between 1990 and 2016 in order to identify 
policy areas that comprise high-profile legislation. The choice of policy areas is based on the 
assumption that laws published in these categories represent high profile reform and required a 
political bargain that involved the approval of most, if not all political parties and veto players. We 
follow the recommendations by Clinton and Lapinski (2006), and others to validate the choice of, in 
their words, “significant” legislation with third sources: we consulted legislative experts, politicians, 
and extant literature on the work of parliament (LCPS, 2018) to identify high-profile legislative 
categories. Based on these considerations, we create a variable that comprises of legislation within 
the following policy areas: banks and financial institutions, environment and health, industry and oil, 
public finance and water and electricity. We conduct robustness checks with alternative 
specifications.  
 
Hypothesis and Model Specification 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we hypothesize that higher degrees of fractionalization 
should reduce the amount of high-profile legislation, while they leave collaboration in lower layers 
of government relatively less affected. The framework hence predicts that parliamentary activity 
(laws) in the identified policy areas should decline more than governmental (decrees) or ministerial 
activity (resolutions) in the same policy areas.  
 
We leverage a differences-in-differences model in order to test this hypothesis and analyze the impact 
of the sudden change in political fractionalization that the Cedar Revolution induced. We use our 
measure for the number of high-profile legislation as a dependent variable. To test the predictions of 
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the framework, we take laws as the treatment group and both decrees and resolutions of the same 
policy areas as control group.  
 
Difference-in-differences models rest upon the assumption that the data generation processes for the 
control and treatment groups follow similar trends before the treatment (Morgan and Winship, 2014). 
To scrutinize this parallel-trend assumption, Figure 5-2 compares legislative activity in the identified 
high-profile issue categories between laws and decrees from 1990 until 2016. The graph indicates 
that 2005 constituted a disruption in the trajectory of the data generating process for laws, while it 
left the trend for decrees unaffected. Before 2005, both laws and decrees increased almost in parallel 
which reflects a revival in administrative capacity after the civil war. After 2005, the average level 
of high-profile laws dropped and has stagnated thereafter while the number of decrees continued to 
increase.  
 
Figure 5-2: Absolute number of high-profile laws and decrees from 1990 until 2016. 
 
We use a negative binominal estimation rather than a Poisson regression since the dependent variable 
shows signs of over-dispersion, i.e., the variance far exceeds its mean (table 5-3).  
 
Table 5-3: Summary statistics of the dependent variable 
Policy Area Mean Variance N 
1 2.31 7.35 54 
2 1.96 21.77 54 
3 1.87 11.09 54 
4 1.68 1.95 54 
5 0.62 1.48 54 
    
Total 1.69 8.92 270 
Note: Issue categories for both laws and decrees from 1990 to 2016 
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We estimate the following equation 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = ⁡𝛼 + ⁡𝛾𝑅𝑡 + 𝜆𝐿𝑐 + 𝛿(𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑐) + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
 
where 𝑌𝑐𝑡 is a count variable and depicts the number of laws in policy area c and time, t. 𝑅𝑡 is a 
dummy variable for the post-treatment years and takes the value of 1 for years greater 2004. 𝐿𝑐 is a 
dummy variable for legislation in the treatment group (laws) in policy area, c. (𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑐) represents 
the differences-in-differences estimator, DiD. All specifications are run by using robust standard 
errors. 
 
Results 
 
Table 5-4 shows regression results. The differences-in-differences estimator DiD is significantly and 
negatively related to the number of high-profile laws in all model specifications. Model 1 uses the 
number of decrees in high-profile categories as control group, while model 2 takes the number of 
resolutions. Model 3 uses the sum of decrees and resolutions as control group. The effects of the 
2005 revolution reduced the passage of high-profile legislation per year by more than one vis-à-vis 
lower-profile legislation in the same policy area. 
 
Table 5-4: Regression results 
 Models 
Independent 
Variable 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Dummy post- 
Revolution 
0.76 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.76 0.15 0.85 
 (3.35)** (2.10)* (3.13)** (2.11)* (3.36)** (0.79) (3.57)** 
Dummy 
Laws 
-0.47 -1.15 -1.56 -1.15 -0.47 -1.06 -0.81 
 (2.36)* (4.43)** (7.08)** (4.71)** (2.00)* (5.14)** (3.32)** 
DiD -1.23 -0.97 -1.06 -0.97 -1.23 -0.69 -1.38 
 (3.89)** (2.99)** (3.66)** (2.56)* (3.43)** (2.14)* (3.70)** 
constant 0.51 1.19 1.60 2.80 2.12 2.87 2.62 
 (4.03)** (5.68)** (10.16)** (17.50)** (13.30)** (21.56)** (16.01)** 
N 270 270 270 54 54 54 54 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; t-statistics in parentheses; dependent variable for model I-V: number of laws in policy 
areas banks and financial institutions, environment and health, industry and oil, public finance and water and 
electricity; dependent variable in models IV and VII: sum of laws environment and health, education and culture, 
industry and oil, water and electricity, and transport and cargo. As models iv-vii use the sums of the areas regarded, 
rather yearly observations of each category, number of observations is 27 (years) for both treatment and control 
group. 
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To test the robustness of our results, we run two types of robustness checks. Models 4 and 5 take the 
sum of all categories as a control group in decrees and resolutions, not only the legislation passed in 
the categories identified above as belonging to “high-profile.”  Furthermore, we create an alternative 
measure for high-profile reform categories. The alternative variable specification includes all policy 
areas that refer to non-generic categories pertaining to public goods provision. These categories 
include environment and health, education and culture, industry and oil, water and electricity, and 
transport and cargo. We exclude financial categories to account for the possibility that financial 
conditions after 2005 would have relieved the pressure on the government to react via legislation in 
these categories. We test them in models 6 and 7 by using decrees and resolutions in these categories 
as control groups. The differences-in-differences estimator is again negatively and significantly 
related to the number of laws passed in high-profile categories.  
 
The results confirm the hypothesis outlined above. The sudden reconfiguration of political power in 
2005 had a significant impact on collaboration for legislation with high institutional requirements 
and with broad impact. At the same time, collaboration on legislation that was less exposed to the 
effects of increased fractionalization was relatively unaffected.  
 
5.4. Mechanisms  
 
After having verified the connection between our core concepts, our conceptual framework allows 
us to identify mechanisms that explain how fractionalization affects collaboration on reform in 
Lebanon. The analysis is based on a series of 32 semi-structured expert-interviews with Lebanese 
parliamentarians, ministers, and party officials of all factions represented in the Lebanese parliament. 
The interview framework and coding scheme were designed to elicit the mechanisms by which 
fractionalization influences political collaboration on reform. Details about methodology, interview 
framework, as well as interviewee selection are provided in section 5.6 at the end of this chapter.  
 
The first subsection reviews salient characteristics of the Lebanese polity to describe the functioning 
of its political institutions. The second subsection discusses possible mechanisms, while the 
subsections thereafter identify the relevant ones based on the interviews. 
 
Central Features of Lebanese Political Institutions  
 
The Republic of Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy in a sect-based consociational power-sharing 
arrangement with limited presidential executive authority (see Salamey 2014; Salloukh et al. 2015; 
Hermez 2017 for recent reviews). The country’s constitution recognizes 18 religious sectarian 
groups, whose political representation is organized in dedicated political parties. The leadership of 
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these parties, or oligarchs, comprises the economic and political elite of the country and maintains 
power by distributing clientelist rents to their constituencies (Leenders, 2012; Cammett, 2014, 2015; 
Diwan and Haidar, 2019). Access to valuable economic and political functions of the state among 
these oligarchs after 2005 roughly reflects the underlying distribution of socio-economic power of 
their constituencies (Mahmalat and Chaitani, 2019). That way, these oligarchs maintain veto powers 
and important decisions must be taken by mutual consent of most if not all communities. Political 
collaboration is determined by the competition between these oligarchs, which is largely informal 
and takes place in arenas outside of political institutions in which impartial enforcement mechanisms 
are absent.27   
 
In formal arenas too, political collaboration depends on transactions between a large number of 
political actors. Due to the high number of parties represented in the parliament,28 no single party is 
strong enough to establish a government by itself. This makes coalitional arrangements the rule and 
unity governments frequent (The Monthly, 2017) and thereby necessitates constant interaction 
among actors from most parties.29  
 
Possible Effects of the Revolution on Collaboration 
 
The revolution reconfigured political power and thereby impacted political collaboration. There are 
several mechanisms by which this could have happened, two of which we verify in our analysis. 
First, a greater representation of political parties and the absence of a political hegemon can lead to 
an increase in democratic accountability. Electoral incentives could become of higher relevance to 
structure political life. However, given that the structure of political exchange in a sectarian power 
sharing arrangement did not change, the extent to which parties relate to electoral incentives did not 
significantly increase after 200530 and did not figure in the narrative of any interviewee despite 
explicit references in the questionnaire. 
 
Second, the events led to major political polarization along the lines of foreign policy positions: most 
political parties grouped into the so-called “March 8” and “March 14” alliances. These two blocs 
were formed before the 2005 general elections that took place after the revolution and remained 
                                                     
27 This system of mutual consent becomes most salient in the workings of the so-called “Troika,” consisting of the President, 
the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House who ought to be of Maronite Christian, Sunni and Shi’a faith. Unanimity 
among these actors is required to pass legislation (Makdisi, 2004; El-Husseini, 2012).  
28 22 parties or blocs in the 2009-2018 parliamentary cycle 
29 The seven biggest parties are: Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanese Forces, Kataeb (all majority Christian supporters), 
Future Movement (majority Sunni Muslim supporters), Amal and Hezbollah (majority Shi’a supporters), the Progressive 
Socialist Party (majority Druze supporters).  
30 Voters exhibit a high degree of loyalty to a party: more than 90 per cent of voters voted for the same party in the 2009 
and 2018 parliamentary elections (Mourad and Sanchez, 2019). Accordingly, the “democratic accountability” measure of 
the Political Risk Services Group (PRS), indicating the degree of responsiveness of governments to citizens’ demands, 
increased from 2 in 1990 to 5 in 2004 and remained stable on 5 thereafter.  
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politically relevant until the general elections 2018.31 However, unity governments occurred 
frequently after 2005 and policy positions and preferences vary widely within parties (LCPS, 2018). 
As verified in the interviews, such divergence diminishes the importance of polarization between 
parties on collaboration. Moreover, polarization by sectarian affiliation did not significantly change 
patterns of collaboration as political parties frequently engaged in cross-sectarian “alliances” to 
preserve their strategic interests (Karam, 2017). 
 
Third, the sudden increase in fractionalization has contributed to increased political instability in the 
absence of effective enforcement mechanisms of political contracts. While the duration of 
governments remained almost constant before and after 2005 at about 1.5 years, the post-2005 era 
experienced a number of ‘political gridlocks.’32 As our analysis confirms, political instability reduces 
the confidence in intertemporal commitments as it shortens the time-horizons of key actors.   
 
Lastly, an increased fractionalization in terms of number of political parties can complicate the 
exercise of forecasting the objective functions of other players in political bargain. Accordingly, the 
trust of actors that others will keep their intertemporal commitments can decrease. Our analysis 
confirms channels three and four: collaboration on high-profile legislation is impeded when (1) a 
higher degree of trust is required to make intertemporal commitments credible and (2) the time 
horizons of the collaboration game extend beyond those of political actors.  
 
Mutual Trust  
 
This section argues that collaboration in environments of higher fractionalization requires higher 
degrees of mutual trust. The weakness of state institutions in Lebanon results in a lack of political 
competition along stable ideological platforms (see also La Ferrara and Bates, 2001; Cammett, 2014) 
and pushes political collaboration into informal arenas in which enforcement mechanisms are absent. 
In such environments, mutual trust between political actors becomes the key factor that determines 
their capacity to engage in transactions that are intertemporal. As a consequence, collaboration on 
reform with a broad impact, i.e., reform that affects many groups, gets impeded as the objective 
functions of other players become more difficult to predict. This requires a higher degree of trust 
among political actors that promises for intertemporal agreements are kept.  
 
“There are no political parties” 
 
                                                     
31 While they remained major political platforms during the 2018 general elections, they ceased in their relevance to 
structure political life after 2015/2016 and amended the political narrative that gave them political meaning. 
32 While the average period to form a government was 6 days from 1989 to 2005, this time increased to 100 days from 
2005 to 2016. Accordingly, the measure “government stability” of PRS, assessing “both of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office”, decreased from an average of 7.8 in 1990 until 2004 to 
an average of 6.3 from 2005 to 2016.  
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The weakness of Lebanese political institutions influences political collaboration in two important 
ways. First, parties maintain an important role in public service provisioning based on which parties 
cater to constituencies in return for votes (Cammett, 2014). Every institutional change tends to be 
perceived as a potential threat that challenges both the fragile balance of power and distribution of 
economic rents (Interviews, A27, A29). As one Member of Parliament stated while explaining why 
identity largely determines political collaboration until today: “The problem in Lebanon is the 
psychological reconstruction, particularly after the civil war … The Lebanese aren’t ready yet. 
Reconciliation has not been achieved.” (Interviews, A3) A former ministerial advisor put it more 
succinctly: “There are no political parties in Lebanon.” (Interviews, A28) 
 
As a consequence, the ideology of actors fails to structure their party affiliation (LCPS, 2018). Very 
different personal political positions within the same party prevent the establishment of coherent 
party positions along stable ideological platforms. Such incoherencies make future preferences less 
predictable and thereby complicates political collaboration. 
 
“Out of Shape” Lawmakers 
 
Legislators and related institutions in Lebanon have an exceptionally low capacity to prepare and 
process legislative proposals with high requirements (LCPS, 2018). The number of laws drafted and 
enacted by domestic legislators is low and results from several institutional deficiencies. Any bill 
must be discussed within parliamentary commissions and referred by these to the parliament after 
consensus has been reached. These commissions, however, constitute severe bottlenecks in the 
output flow of legislation (Interviews, A1, A2, A3, A5, A6, A7). For example, after 1989 the 
parliament convened on average only four times per year and therefore necessitated that a high 
number of laws be passed within each session (Moukheiber, 2013). In the words of a parliamentarian 
in elaborating on the difficulties to engage in discussions about budgetary and taxation issues: “This 
parliament has not debated any tax or any financial budget issue for the past twelve years. So, you're 
out of shape! […] That's a parliament that's supposed to run a marathon, and it's been in a wheelchair 
for the past twelve years.” (Interviews, A5) 
 
As a consequence, the legislature tends to fail to keep pace with legislative demand and governmental 
institutions often fail to process requests for input, which diminishes trust in the accuracy of their 
work (Interviews, A31). The general sense of incapacity is exemplified by a Member of Parliament 
on the question of the extent to which threats of economic crisis are reflected in the everyday work 
of political actors: “Forget all of that, whether it’s valid or not. But you’ve got a bunch of people that 
are left in the dark, alone, with no assistance whatsoever, on issues of economics, on issues of tax, 
other than their friends and relatives.” (Interviews, A5)  
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Importance of Mutual Trust  
 
The low capacity of legislators and the unpredictability of policy positions due to high 
fractionalization undermines mutual trust necessary to engage in political collaboration with a broad 
impact. Numerous accounts lamented over instances in which agreements have been reneged on and 
direct exchange over policy issues was avoided as soon as the exchanges become complex (“The 
minister kept running away!” Interviews, A8, A1, A4, A5). Collaboration on reform projects appears 
to be more successful when the impact on all groups involved is sufficiently predictable in that they 
can calculate the cost and benefits for all parties involved (Interviews, A6, A8) and state resources 
can be allocated equally across groups (Interviews, A27, A29).33 In elaborating on a reform project 
in which collaboration was particularly successful, a Member of Parliament explains why a reform 
project focused on local environment could be implemented in collaboration with a wide range of 
actors: “[…] the many facets of the project – whether it’s water, or health, or environment – were 
extremely important issues that helped us to bypass political differences, because the topic was very 
focused.“ (Interviews, A1) 
 
Short-Time Horizons of Key Executives  
 
This section argues that collaboration on legislation with high institutional requirements is more 
difficult the shorter the time horizons of key actors are. Political instability decreases the confidence 
in the duration of a government. Key political actors, therefore, face uncertain time horizons in terms 
of the intertemporal commitments they can agree on. Because political exchange is complex and 
unstructured due to the many actors involved, actors are more likely to exercise veto power or block 
the work of institutions over which they prevail as they cannot predict distributional consequences. 
This impacts high requirement reform that necessitates intertemporal commitments that extend 
beyond their or their opponents’ term in office.  
 
“Zero Economic Vision” 
 
As discussed above, Lebanon suffers from high political instability with frequent government 
changes. In the twenty-seven years since the end of the civil war 1989 until 2016, there have been 
17 governments with a total of 453 individual ministerial positions.34 After 2005, some of these 
governments only had a caretaker function. These frequent government changes lead to extensive 
friction losses. For example, institutional knowledge gets lost as actors engage in conscious efforts 
to prevent successor governments from other parties to reap the political and economic benefits of 
ongoing work: key experts, studies and proposals are simply withdrawn from ministerial offices 
                                                     
33 See also Salti and Chaaban (2010). 
34 Authors’ calculations, The Monthly (2017). 
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which extends longs the time for incoming staff to become effective (Interviews, A23). As a Member 
of Parliament states: “But, the problem is that everyone wants to find a solution at the expense of the 
others.” (Interviews, A3) 
 
Such impaired transitions of power hamper long-term planning, and the executive is commonly 
accused of having “zero economic vision” and few strategic plans (Interviews, A19, 20, 21, 28). The 
absence of long-term planning disincentivizes initiatives aimed at implementing reform with high 
requirements, which take a relatively longer time to be developed and are likely to be stymied or 
abandoned by successor governments. Limited exchange across ministries exacerbates the lack of 
coordinated effort, leading to the emergence of different agendas across ministries and extensive 
friction losses (Interviews, A30).  
 
“Abusive Authorities” 
 
As the capacities of parliamentary commissions both in terms of technical expertise and manpower 
are low, complex reform can take up to a decade to be completed. This gives rise to bottlenecks in 
terms of the technical elaboration of legislative texts (Interviews, A5, A6): the work of the 
commissions tends not to be supported by sufficiently qualified staff that elaborates legislation on 
behalf of the Members of Parliament (Interviews, A5). Moreover, the sectarian composition of 
governmental institutions tends to lower bureaucratic quality due to clientelist structures. For 
example, hiring processes of civil servants are based on few objective criteria or competency-based 
job descriptions (Interviews, A30). Lastly, parliamentary work in commissions tends to be carried 
out with less discipline than needed and on occasions meetings even fail to reach quorum, as rules to 
punish absentees are “practically never” applied (Interviews, A2, A6). 
 
As a result, political exchange is perceived as unstructured, especially in unity governments which 
maximize the numbers of players involved in bargaining (Interviews, A30). The interplay of different 
veto players becomes complex to the extent that political actors commonly refer to the collaboration 
game as “the system.” As an interviewee states, in an attempt to explain their anti-collaborative 
behavior in certain areas of service provisioning: “The system forces us to think like this” as it would 
not permit free expression of ideology (Interviews, A14, A15). 
 
Such unorganized and opaque political exchange gives rise to opportunistic behavior. Actors are 
more inclined to pull the ‘emergency brake’ in the form of their veto when the distributional 
consequences of a reform project are not sufficiently clear or balanced. This impacts collaboration 
on reform of high requirements with higher divergence of policy preferences and which involve more 
potential veto players. In practical terms, certain actors, such as the heads of parliamentary 
commissions, exploit their “abusive authority” which is capable of blocking any bill that does not 
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find their consent: They amend the agenda to the extent that it induces an effective paralysis in the 
institutions over which they preside (Interviews, A5).  
 
Importance of Time-Horizons  
 
The uncertainty about the time-horizons of key actors impedes collaboration on legislation with high 
requirements. This uncertainty reduces the incentives of key actors to collaborate on reform that 
extend beyond their own term in office and would, therefore, require intertemporal agreements that 
are unlikely to be kept (Interviews, A4, A6, A8). Legislation with high requirements is therefore 
exposed to changing political environments and more likely to be reversed or discontinued. The sense 
of avoidance of responsibility for concrete action is exemplified by the words of a parliamentarian 
in response to the question of how the party would tackle the challenges of financial impasse: “Well, 
I think ... when ... the president of the party, Dr. Geagea, was nominated for presidency, almost three 
years ago, there was a plan. There was a very clear policy statement that included policies in every 
single sector. Now, in order to tackle the Lebanese economic problems, it cannot be a linear way of 
thinking, it must be a systemic way of thinking.” (Interviews, A1) 
 
5.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analyzed the effects of fractionalization on political collaboration on reform in 
Lebanon and thereby addressed the central research question of this thesis. We have provided a 
conceptual framework that sheds light on the determinants that facilitate or hinder political 
collaboration, based on the properties of a reform project. The theory outlined and methodological 
approach used in the paper reflects the conceptual and methodological discussion in earlier chapters 
in that it leverages a more nuanced understanding of political collaboration. We argue that these 
properties of a reform project determine the extent to which fractionalization affects political 
collaboration on reform. The framework helps to fill a gap in the literature on the political economy 
of reform by identifying transmission channels by which fractionalization impacts political 
collaboration on reform (Gören, 2014; Papyrakis and Mo, 2014).  
 
While our analysis provides case study evidence and does not intend to generalize the findings 
beyond the case of Lebanon, our framework provides the basis for comprehensive comparative 
approaches. Towards that end, future research should elaborate and refine the institutional 
requirements across different legal codes and different political settings. We believe that our 
framework provides a means to further explore the underlying political dynamics of political 
collaboration on reform in divided societies, in particular power-sharing arrangements, which are a 
frequently discussed option to appease conflict (ESCWA, 2017).  
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5.6. Additional Methodological Notes: Interview Evidence  
 
This section provides an overview of the makeup of the interview evidence, the sampling strategy, 
the sample, and the interview framework. This study draws on accounts of thirty-two expert-
interviews with high ranking political actors of all factions in the parliament, within a guideline 
based, semi-structured interview approach. The interview transcripts are available upon request. The 
interview sample is designed to capture the viewpoints and narratives of all major factions 
represented in the Lebanese parliament. Reflecting and merging the narratives about specific 
contentious political issues of all parties involved facilitates an analysis detached from the subjective 
ideological realm of the interviewee. The interview framework, therefore, focuses on specific 
instances of reform currently discussed in the parliamentary debate.  
 
The interviews are based on guidelines with open-ended questions to allow for the free association 
of the interviewees towards the motives discussed (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, 2008; Mason, 
2002). The interviews are coded and analyzed following the Rubin and Rubin (2005) method of 
predefined coding structures. The approach requires a definition of the key concepts and themes as 
well as the relationship between them, based on literature reviews and the elaboration of hypotheses 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 206). The Rubin and Rubin approach is suitable for the analysis since 
the research questions, hypotheses, and the theoretical framework was laid out before the 
commencement of the research process.  
 
Interview Sample  
 
The sampling strategy focuses on political actors in their role as active Members of Parliament, 
former Ministers of State, government officials or high-ranking party members, and reflects the 
viewpoints of all major political parties. The participants have been chosen according to party 
affiliation and exposure to, or membership of, the budgetary or economic committee in the 
parliament. By focusing on political actors on economic and budgetary issues, the sampling ensured 
that participants could answer questions on financial and socioeconomic issues as their core field of 
expertise and daily work. What is more, participants of economic and budgetary committees are the 
actors most likely to comprehend the extent to which economic conditions pose a threat to the current 
economic order. Lastly and as to be discussed below, the process of introducing laws should originate 
from initiatives of Members of Parliament that introduce legislative proposals into parliamentary 
committees. Since parliamentarians often cannot craft legislation themselves, the interview sampling 
includes members of economic and financial councils of political parties, as well as economists and 
researchers from ministries and international organizations that support the process of legal drafting.  
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The central goal of the selection process of interview participants was to obtain the viewpoints of all 
major factions represented within the parliament and government. That way, we control for 
ideological and organizational differences in attitudes towards collaboration among parties. The 
sampling process allows one to establish a coherent picture of each participants’ and party’s 
narratives to define the “problem” under consideration (such as economic crisis, income inequality, 
fractionalization), the problems’ respective origins, and the proposed solutions. All interviews have 
been conducted between February 2017 and March 2018 in Beirut. Table 5-5 provides an overview 
of interview participants.  
 
Table 5-5: Overview of interviewee affiliation 
Name Function Party / Organization 
A1 Member of Parliament  Lebanese Forces 
A2 Member of Parliament  Lebanese Forces 
A3 Member of Parliament, Ex-Minister Future Movement 
A4 Member of Parliament  Future Movement 
A5 Member of Parliament  Free Patriotic Movement 
A6 Member of Parliament  Kataeb 
A7 Member of Parliament  Kataeb 
A8 Member of Parliament Amal 
A9 Ex-Minister of Labor, Telecommunication Independent 
A10 Ex-Minister of Economy and Trade  Independent  
A11 Ex-Minister on Culture, Information Independent  
A12 Member of Economic and Social Council Lebanese Forces 
A13 Head of Economic and Social Council  Kataeb 
A14 Former Head of Party Hunchak 
A15 Head of Committee on Foreign Affairs  Hunchak 
A16 Member of Committee on Foreign Affairs  Tachnaq 
A17 Head of Committee on Foreign Affairs  Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 
A18 Leadership Economic Research Council  Hezbollah 
A19 Economist World Bank  
A20 Economist World Bank  
A21 Economist Ministry of Finance, World Bank 
A22 Economist Institut Bassil Fuleihan  
A23 Economist, Researcher Ministry of Social Affairs 
A24 Economist, Researcher International Crisis Group 
A25 Professor of Political Science American University of Beirut 
A26 Economist, Researcher  American University of Beirut 
A27 Professor of Economics American University of Beirut 
A28 Economist Independent  
A29 Leadership, Financial Operations Department Banque du Liban 
A30 Division Head 
Office of the Minister of State for 
Administrative Reform (OMSAR) 
A31 Economist Ministry of Economy 
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A32 Former Secretary-General 
Lebanese Association Democratic 
Elections (LADE) 
 
Interview Framework 
 
Figure 6 provides an overview of the interview framework. Fields shaded in dark gray represent the 
phenomena of interest, namely the phenomenon of differing perceptions of the same set of economic 
challenges, and the phenomenon of collaboration among political parties. 
 
Figure 3: Interview framework for expert-interviews (own illustration) 
 
 
The interview framework is structured in four themes. The first theme elicits the narratives and 
perceptions of the challenges related to economic downturn or financial pressure. Participants were 
asked to explain how they assess the severity of the economic and budgetary pressures, what they 
identify to be causes, and which solutions the interviewees personally and, in particular, their party 
offers to resolve related problems. Lastly, the interviewees were asked to consider the extent to which 
perceived economic and financial pressures influence their work and potentially facilitate political 
collaboration. 
 
The second theme focuses on the influence of a party’s constituency. In particular, the interviewees 
were asked to reflect on the extent to which characteristics of their supporter base influence their 
assessment of specific policy proposals. A tax hike proposal served as a focal point of discussion 
about the fairness of redistributional measures. Reflecting on the needs of a party’s supporter base, 
in particular with regard to the relative impact of a policy proposal such as the tax hike proposal, 
then, enables an assessment of the extent to which a party takes relative income inequality into 
account for their decisions on collaboration. 
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In the third theme, interviewees were asked to reflect on the impact of fractionalization, that is, the 
high number of parties involved in negotiations, and political polarization. There are two reasons 
why these concepts were discussed within the same theme, although their theoretically different 
transmission channels could have suggested otherwise: a) the question design avoided suggestion as 
to the origins of polarization; b) interviewees were likely to conflate the two in the same answer. The 
interviewees, therefore, could indicate in which instances a high number of negotiating partners 
hinders collaboration, and in which instances these can be overcome. The same applies to the concept 
of polarization, which the interviewees were asked to define. That way, the interviewees could 
indicate to what extent geostrategic, sectarian, or other ideological polarization influences the 
mechanism by which fractionalization and polarization influence collaboration.  
 
Lastly, the fourth theme focused on general patterns of collaboration within the parliament and the 
committees, in which an interviewee was a member. That way, previous answers could be reflected 
and contextualized with examples given by the interviewees.  
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6. OUTSTANDING CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN RESEARCH ON 
THE CRISIS HYPOTHESIS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the notion that crises induce policy change has come to be regarded as a 
‘conventional wisdom’ in the literature on the political economy of reform (Tommasi and Velasco, 
1996, p. 197; Drazen, 2000). However, both theoretical models and empirical studies have struggled 
to pinpoint the distinct causal connections that link these two concepts (Mahmalat and Curran, 2018). 
The interpretation of quantitative models tends to draw linear causal relationships between periods 
of crises and reform, which might not withstand more detailed scrutiny (Corrales, 1998; Edwards 
and Steiner, 2000).  
 
This chapter elaborates on the methodological shortcomings in empirical analysis on the crisis 
hypothesis identified in chapter 3 and discusses their conceptual implications in more detail. I argue 
that constructivist approaches are potentially better suited to interpret the mechanisms that link crises 
and reform due to the high degree of uncertainty induced by crises which prevent conclusive 
interpretations of mechansisms based on rational expectations models. Methodologically, I 
emphasize that case study research can offer important insights into the mechanisms and extent to 
which reform is induced by crises by reflecting country-specific socio-economic and political 
developments in the analysis.  
 
The shortcomings of models that investigate the relationship between crises and reform can be traced 
back to epistemological aspects of the approaches most commonly used to model the relationship 
between crises and reform. These approaches – which adhere to a rational expectations school of 
thought – are predicated on models that seek to generalize the effect that crises exert on policy 
outcomes, with post-crisis policy change characterized as the outcome of a struggle between interest 
groups keen to secure distributional preferences and avoid bearing the costs of reform (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991; Ranciere and Tornell, 2015). In this characterisation of the crisis-reform relationship, 
crises elicit predictable behaviour among interest groups – a feature which renders these models ill-
suited to the analysis of specific crisis episodes. 
 
Constructivist approaches offer alternative explanations for the mechanisms that link crisis and 
policy change and, as outlined below, are potentially better equipped to explain crisis-induced policy 
outcomes (Blyth, 2002, 2007; Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007; Chwieroth, 2010; Mandelkern 
and Shalev, 2010; Rodrik, 2014). Constructivism explores the relationship between actors and the 
environment in which they are situated and explains policy outcomes in terms of the prevailing ideas 
and beliefs of political actors. Constructivists contend that crisis situations are characterized by great 
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uncertainty (as opposed to risk or instability) both in how the crisis-hit economy functions and how 
the crisis might be resolved. Actors, therefore, cannot determine with certainty their distributional 
preferences within that crisis situation. Instead, actors must interpret the political or economic 
realities that confront them and develop their own imperatives in order to guide their actions.35 This 
approach is pertinent to the study of policymaking in the context of specific crisis episodes. It 
characterizes interest group policy responses as developing endogenously from their intersubjective 
beliefs in what is an uncertain situation, rather than interest groups adjusting their known distributive 
preferences in response to an exogenous shock.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 critically reviews the literature on rationalist and 
constructivist approaches on the crisis hypothesis. The section focuses on a specific phenomenon, 
namely policy divergence in the face of what are similar crises, that exemplifies the pertinence of a 
constructivist understanding of crises to explain political outcomes. Section 4.3 discusses the 
importance of case study research in depicting the nature of the crisis-reform relationship. Section 
4.4 concludes. 
 
6.2 Crises and Policy Change – The Role of Interests, Ideas, and Power 
 
While the political economy literature has paid significant attention to the relationship between crises 
and reform, competing schools of thought have emphasized different aspects of this relationship. 
While the role of distributional preferences has featured prominently among rationalists, 
constructivists have emphasized the uncertainty facing political actors as they assess both the 
prevailing crisis and possible policy responses. As outlined below, constructivists call for a greater 
engagement with the ideas underpinning both a given crisis and policy response in order to explain 
the mechanisms by which crises induce policy change.  
 
Rationalist Modelling of the Relationship Between Crisis and Policy Change 
 
Rational expectations models that link crisis and policy change focus on the interaction between 
interest groups, and how this interaction changes during crises based on material interests and 
distributional preferences. These models posit that actors delay reform as part of a contest over the 
distribution of the cost of reform. As economic conditions deteriorate, weaker interest groups 
concede to bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of reform when they realize that the marginal 
benefits (in terms of political power or economic resources) of waiting have become lower than the 
marginal cost arising from continued economic distortion (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and 
Grilli, 1993; Ranciere and Tornell, 2015).  
 
                                                     
35 For a recent review of ontology underpinning social constructivism, see Hay (2016). 
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Such rational expectations models provide valuable insights into explaining interest group dynamics 
in periods of rapid macroeconomic deterioration. Yet, they introduce a number of conceptual 
ambiguities that make them difficult to adapt for empirical modeling of specific crisis episodes. The 
amelioration of economic conditions after crises cannot be interpreted merely as the result of 
concessions of weaker interest groups, as this assumes that the solution to a particular crisis is 
contested but known. What is more, empirical models based on rational expectations in a quantitative 
cross-country panel regression setting have proved difficult to operationalize and interpret. In 
particular, the use of thresholds derived from a deterioration of macroeconomic variables in order to 
indicate the occurrence of crises is difficult to reconcile with the view that crises are subjective in 
nature and that the perception of what constitutes a crisis varies significantly across countries 
(Corrales, 1998; Edwards and Steiner, 2000; Pop-Eleches, 2008; Mahmalat and Curran, 2018). These 
empirical models, reliant on analysis of comparative statics, require that a similar ‘sense of urgency’ 
exists across countries in response to a well-defined deterioration of macroeconomic variables. As 
crisis experiences differ significantly across countries, comparative statics tell us little about the 
underlying mechanisms through which crises induce policy change (Scheemaekere, Oosterlinck and 
Szafarz, 2015).  
 
A characterization of crises which invokes subjective experiences and shared perceptions also 
impacts upon any characterization of crisis-induced policy response. For example, the onset of crisis 
conditions may not be sufficient to ensure that pre-crisis policies are perceived to have failed and 
require change (Pop-Eleches, 2008). Rather than crisis-induced policy change being triggered by a 
consensus that socio-economic conditions have become unduly harsh, policy change may be 
dependent on a commonly shared perception that change is needed.  
 
Constructivism and the Role of Ideas as Drivers of Policy Change 
 
How does a common perception for the need of reform translate into policy change? Recent 
scholarship from actor-centric institutionalism has reexamined the mechanisms by which crises can 
induce policy change. Rational expectations models neglect a central feature of crises, namely that 
crises are accompanied by deep uncertainty (as opposed to risk) as to how the economy functions 
and how to formulate appropriate policies to resolve the crisis (Harberger, 1993; Blyth, 2002, 2007). 
Crisis situations are qualitatively different from situations of risk in ‘normal’ times, in which the 
probability distribution of possible outcomes is known (Blyth, 2002). As Nelson and Katzenstein 
(2014) put it: “In the world of risk, the assumption that agents follow consistent, rational, 
instrumental decision rules is plausible. But that assumption becomes untenable when parameters 
are too unstable to quantify the prospects for events that may or may not happen in the future.” 
(p.362)  
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This uncertainty as to an actor’s own interests can disrupt established orders of power and open the 
way for alternative mechanisms of change. As Ejdus argues, crises in the form of critical situations 
can rupture established routines which induces insecurity into the ontology of collective actors. As 
crises bring “fundamental questions to the level of discursive consciousness”, actors are unable to 
‘bracket out’ fundamental questions related to issues such as their existence, autobiography and 
relations (Ejdus, 2018). These questions produce anxiety and eventually give rise to alternative policy 
choices as they remove the ‘protective cocoon created by routines.’ In a similar vein, Blyth argues 
that in moments of uncertainty caused by institutional failure, institutional choice becomes 
“underdetermined by structure.” In such moments, what matters “are the locally generated ‘crisis-
defining’ ideas at hand rather than simply the ostensible material positions of the actors in question.” 
(Blyth, 2007, p. 761) 
 
An important body of research has highlighted the central role of ideas for policy development in 
general, and more specifically how crisis-defining ideas can drive policy change in times of 
uncertainty. Generally, ideas can be defined as “claims about descriptions of the world, causal 
relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.” (Parsons, 2002, p. 48) As such, ideas 
“impact the ways policy actors perceive their interests and the environment in which they mobilize.” 
(Béland, 2009, p. 702)  
 
The existing political science literature points to three ways in which ideas influence policymaking.36 
First, ideas play a role in determining the issues that enter a political agenda. As policymakers face 
cognitive constraints as to the number of topics to attend to simultaneously, they need to focus their 
attention to the most pressing issues confronting them (B. D. Jones, 2001). Ideas as to what are the 
most pressing issues thus contribute to specifying the political agenda and constructing the range of 
socio-economic challenges that a polity faces.   
 
Second, ideas can constitute commonly held assumptions of how the economy functions, which 
either legitimizes or challenges existing institutions or policies (Hall, 1993; Culpepper, 2008). As 
Widmaier argues, such assumptions, which initially reduce uncertainty, can subsequently lead to 
overconfidence and obscure new sources of market power. Subsequently a crisis ensues which makes 
actors update their assumptions and beliefs and turn to new alternative ideas in order to resolve the 
new puzzle that they now face (Blyth, 2001, 2002; Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007; 
Mandelkern and Shalev, 2010; Widmaier, 2016). 
 
Third, new ideas can challenge existing institutional structures by offering a scientific and normative 
critique to existing policies and institutions. Ideas form public discourse that helps to convince policy 
                                                     
36 For a review see Béland, 2009. For a more detailed treatment, see also: Hall, 1993; Parsons, 2002; Schmidt, 
2002; Blyth, 2010; Béland, Carstensen and Seabrooke, 2016; Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016. 
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makers, interest groups and the public that change is necessary (Schmidt, 2002). In this way, ideas 
can lend force to certain policy proposals over others in public discourse. As Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2016) argue, ideas can be understood as a form of power that political actors (whether individual or 
collective) can exercise “to influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use 
of ideational elements.” (p.321)  
 
Constructivist Explanations of Policy Change After Crises  
 
The emphasis on ideas, as distinct from interests, in shaping political behavior allows one to develop 
more nuanced explanations as to how crises can induce policy change. Numerous studies highlighted 
the importance of ideas in explaining how policy change emerges in response to crises. In a study of 
what have become known as “New Order policies” in Indonesia of the 1960s, Chwieroth (2010) 
argues that until uncertainty could be reduced in the aftermath of what was a severe economic 
downturn, persuasiveness of crisis resolution ideas – rather than bargaining and negotiation based on 
interests – constituted the key mechanism for policy change. Mandelkern and Shalev (2010), in their 
study of the Israeli hyperinflation period of the 1980s, also emphasize the role of newly constructed 
ideas in shaping crisis responses. In a comparative study on two temporally distinct attempts to 
resolve the same crisis, the authors explore the conditions that lend force to one policy proposal over 
another. The authors show how “knowledge elites” during crises can petition political actors based 
on their technical of professional expertise rather than their formal authority or material interest.  
 
Similarly, Nelson and Katzenstein (2014) emphasize the role of “social conventions” based on shared 
templates of understanding that are needed to resolve situations of “substantial uncertainty”. Rooted 
in the work of constructivist scholars of international relations, such conventions can be understood 
as a means to “organize and coordinate actions in predictable ways," and serve as "agreed-upon, if 
flexible, guides for economic interpretation and interaction." (Biggart and Beamish, 2003, p. 444) 
Conventions help simplifying uncertainty as they enable actors to impose classifications schemas 
and therefore serve as a means of coordination. As Nelson and Katzenstein (2014) discuss, such 
conventions played a crucial role during the resolution of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
The Importance of Ideas in Explaining Policy Divergence to Similar Crises 
 
This ideational depiction of the manner in which crisis-induced policy responses emerge becomes 
important to understand important phenomena that are difficult to explain with rationalist 
interpretations, such as the reasons for policy divergence to what are similar crises. By exploiting an 
instance of policy divergence that occurred in the second half of the 19th century within what was 
then the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, I show in Curran and Mahmalat (2019) that 
politically dominant interpretations of the nature of a crisis – i.e. constructed narratives regarding the 
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nature of a crisis that dominate political discourse among both political actors and the general public 
– constitute the central mechanism that determines the shape of prevailing policy responses to a given 
crisis. Politically dominant interpretations of crises lend legitimacy to views and policy proposals of 
certain political actors over others, which strengthens their position in the political bargain from 
which the eventual policy response emerges (Matthijs and McNamara, 2015). As a consequence, 
political actors can exert a greater influence within the policy-making process even in the absence of 
a shift in the underlying institutional or political configuration of power. 
 
To arrive at this conclusion, we compare the implementation of a specific famine relief policy which 
was utilised in response to two crises which took place in a similar context but differed significantly 
in their outcomes: the Great Irish Famine or An Gorta Mór (1845-1850), which involved widespread 
famine, and the Lancashire Cotton Famine (1861-1865), which involved the threat of famine. Both 
crises took place in similar temporal, political, geographical, and institutional contexts, and both were 
triggered by external shocks. However, despite the specific famine relief policy under consideration 
in this paper being proposed in both cases, the ultimate policy outcome differed markedly in each 
instance.  
 
Our discussion focuses on the political implications, rather than origins of the crises, and follows 
Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke (2007, p.748) to define crisis not in terms of the material or 
economic effects but rather as an event which agents inter-subjectively interpret as necessitating 
change. Based on this definition, both the actual occurrence and the threat of widespread crisis 
warrant study along the same analytical dimension, as both induced uncertainty as to which policies 
or institutional structures were best suited to alleviate crisis conditions (Braun, 2015).  
 
In our case study, the politically dominant interpretations in question focus on the degree to which 
social groups were characterized as contributing to the onset or perpetuation of the crisis. We find 
that when crisis-hit regions or social groups are marginalized and become portrayed as contributing 
to the worsening crisis conditions, these groups are granted little influence in the formulation of 
policy responses. However, if regions or social groups are portrayed as an integral part of society 
who have had the misfortune to be struck by an unforeseeable crisis, they may be afforded a 
significantly higher level of influence on the process of policy formulation. 
 
The policy proposal in question was the Rate-in-Aid, a temporary levy placed on all Irish poor-law 
unions in order to raise funds to support indebted unions. The Rate-in-Aid was implemented in the 
Irish case despite strong parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. However, the legislation 
that emerged in the Lancashire case accommodated those opposing the Rate-in-Aid mechanism by 
allowing for an alternative, less onerous, relief mechanism which granted poor-law unions the power 
to borrow funds repayable from their future tax revenue. Although both crises were triggered by 
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exogenous shocks, the politically dominant interpretations that formed around these crises differed 
sigificantly. The Irish famine was characterized in this dominant interpretation as being exacerbated 
by endemic socio-economic problems related to the organisation of agricultural economic activity, 
while the Lancashire Cotton Famine was perceived as being of a temporary nature and the result of 
an unforeseeable economic disruption to what was an industrial powerhouse. Consequently, local 
interest groups in the Lancashire context were granted a level of influence in shaping the reform 
responses that was unheard of in the Irish case. While a rationalist interpretation of the Rate-in-Aid 
policy might emphasize the incentives for the most powerful group to shift the financial burden of 
famine relief to a weaker group, such burden shifting only became possible once a dominant narrative 
was constructed that accommodated such a policy approach. 
 
6.3 The Merit of Case Study Analyses 
 
In light of the complex interrelationship between crises and reform, case study analyses can offer 
important insights into the mechanisms that connect the two. Case studies are found to be a suitable 
means to explore heretofore unobserved causal mechanisms between variables “because they are not 
limited to the variables or measures of complex concepts that appear in preexisting datasets” 
(Gerring, 2007; Weller and Barnes, 2014, p. 4). 
 
Such analyses can reflect the political and institutional framework in which reform processes are 
initiated, which plays an essential role in both enabling de facto implementation of policy reform and 
precluding their reversal (Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Corrales, 1998; Edwards and Steiner, 
2000). While crisis conditions may induce governments to initiate reform processes, it is by no means 
certain that proposed reforms will ultimately be implemented (in whole or in part).  
 
In this regard, Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent (2010), as well as Tornell (1998), find political crises to 
be even more important determinants of reform than economic ones, calling for increased research 
activity in this direction. Related to this, literature is divided over assessing the complex 
interrelationship of political factors and interest group behaviour during crisis. As Drazen (2009) 
points out, the influence of interest groups might actually become stronger in a crisis situation. 
Whereas interest group opposition to reform may even have contributed to the emergence of a given 
economic or political crisis, the very same groups are often needed to mitigate the repercussions of 
a crisis since their expert knowledge is of great import. 
 
On the methodological front, empirical studies that adopt a cross-country macro-level modelling 
strategy tend to fail to capture the nuances of the reform process. Reform processes may vary in their 
required timeframe for elaboration and implementation: while stabilization measures to counter, say, 
hyperinflation may be implemented rather rapidly, more complicated reforms, such as labour market 
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or health care reforms, are likely to be subject to more societal resistance and hence require a lot 
more preparation and time, especially for governments with constrained resources (Naim, 1995). 
Furthermore, it may not be the case that all reforms undertaken in a given time period are directly 
attributable to a specific crisis.  
 
As I illustrate in Curran and Mahmalat (2016), these nuanced aspects of the reform process might be 
better served at a detailed case-study level of analysis rather than at a macro level. In the paper, we 
explore the extent to which socio-economic developments in the aftermath of the Great Irish Famine 
(1845-1850) can be regarded as a direct response to the famine onslaught, as opposed to being part 
of the broader incremental socio-economic evolution of that era which may merely have been 
expedited by famine-era distress. Specifically, we analyse the reform of the Irish Poor Law in 1862 
in order to assess the imprint of famine experiences on this process.  
 
The aim of the paper is to gain insights into whether this reform process should be characterised as 
a direct response to the famine onslaught, or instead characterised as being part of the broader 
incremental socio-economic evolution of that era. In order to explore this issue, we undertake a text 
analysis of archival material, such as expert witness testimony provided to the Select Committee on 
Poor Relief (Ireland) 1861 as they compiled the report which would form the basis on the 1862 
legislation, parliamentary debates preceding the 1862 legislation and the contemporary reportage of 
Irish newspapers surrounding the Irish Poor Relief Act (Ireland) 1862. This text analysis allows us 
to identify the extent to which famine conditions of 1845-50 are referenced in these documents and 
to assess the prominence famine-era experiences in driving the reform process. 
 
We find that the 1862 poor law reform has borne little reference to the famine crisis that preceded it, 
despite having made apparent the need to change the existing framework of famine relieve. More 
generally, we suggest that research into the aftermath of crises would be well advised to distinguish 
between post-crisis economic recovery and post-crisis economic (or socio-economic) reform. 
Economic recovery in itself is not necessarily indicative of purposeful reform initiatives implemented 
as a consequence of crisis-period experiences. With this conclusion, we follow similar case study 
analyses on the debt crises in Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s that show only a limited 
connection between specific reform episodes and crisis conditions (Williamson and Haggard, 1994; 
Corrales, 1998; Edwards and Steiner, 2000).  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the need for incorporating constructivist interpretations of crises into 
empirical analyses of the relationship between crises and reform. Methodologically, we emphasize 
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the merit of case study approaches to reflect the nuances of the ways in which crises determine 
political outcomes. The chapter has illustrated these arguments with evidence from previous studies.   
 
The arguments of this chapter echo in more detail the argument outlined in chapter 2 and 3, namely 
that empirical analyses should be creative in finding methodological approaches that enable a more 
nuanced interpretation of the concepts of crisis and reform. As the ambiguous results in extant 
literature exemplify (chapter 3), generalized conclusions about the relationship between crises and 
reform should be formulated with caution.  
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis aimed to contribute to one of the fundamental questions in the literature on the political 
economy of reform: which institutional and socio-economics factors impact political collaboration 
on reform? I have departed from the observation that, in countries such as Lebanon, there exist 
differing outcomes of political collaboration on reform across policy areas and time despite a similar 
configuration of political power. Theoretical approaches fail to sufficiently explain such variation, 
as they tend to model the delay or adoption of reform with distributional conflict as a function of the 
degree to which a country is polarized and fractionalized, not the variation across policy areas. 
Moreover, I have identified that empirical models in cross-country regression analyses offer limited 
additional insights into the phenomenon of political collaboration when reform indices are used. 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have addressed these challenges and developed both a methodological 
and a theoretical approach to explain observable variation in legislative activity, that is, political 
collaboration, in fractionalized polities. On the methodological end, the thesis discussed and analyzed 
a novel dataset on legislative activity that allows a researcher to circumvent the use of reform indices. 
The creation of the data set itself is an important contribution to understanding policymaking in 
Lebanon, as well as general to the understanding of political processes in fractionalized, developing 
countries with limited resources.  
 
Agenda setting in developing countries remains understudied (John, 2006). At the time of this 
writing, in the Comparative Agendas Project,37 for example, only Brazil and Turkey are covered as 
developing country, while all other countries are from the group of OECD states (Walgrave, Varone 
and Genève, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 2015). In 
particular, no Arab country is included. Established theories of agenda setting are subsequently 
derived from developed countries that have the resources for the parallel processing of issues as well 
as a polity in which actors are susceptible to electoral incentives. The creation of the data set for the 
case of Lebanon therefore allows for the provision of novel insights into agenda setting in 
fractionalized countries with limited resources, and in which electoral incentives cannot fully 
structure political life. 
 
By using legislation data as a key dependent variable rather than aggregate reform indices or the 
amount or quality of public goods, I make a theoretical contribution and depart from extant research 
in two important ways. First, the analysis treats the concept of reform as a multi-layered concept that 
enables a differentiation between issuing institutions, policy areas and other characteristics and 
                                                     
37 As introduced in chapter 4, the Comparative Agendas Project provides data set of legislative activity, coded 
according to a dedicated methodology that makes the political agendas of governments comparable across 
countries. For more information, see: comparativeagendas.net. 
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thereby makes possible more sophisticated conclusions about the phenomena under investigation, 
that are, political collaboration and reform. As discussed throughout this thesis, measures of political 
outcomes based on both public goods provisioning and reform indices is inherently restricted in 
scope as they focus on specific policy areas or regulatory changes at the expense of others.  
 
Second, the analysis in this thesis refines the scope of recent empirical work by focusing on the 
institutional setting in which collaboration takes place. Much of the analyzes of the effects of 
fractionalization are conducted by investigating the impact of fractionalization in the country as a 
whole, and not just governmental institutions (for example Kyriacou, 2013; Finseraas and Jakobsson, 
2012; Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016, Görens, 2014). Beach and Jones (2017) offer 
one of the few recent and important contributions to this field by determining the effects of greater 
diversity in governments on the provisioning of public goods. Using the example of city councils in 
California, the authors show that higher diversity leads to disagreement within the council, which 
eventually leads to lower spending on public goods.  
 
The theoretical work in this thesis offers a perspective on political collaboration that reflects not only 
the degree of disagreement over specific decisions, such as sending on public goods as in Beach and 
Jones (2017). Future research can instead indicate the policy areas and specific decisions on which 
political actors can achieve agreement despite fractionalization. Because legislative activity 
represents the outcome of a collaboration game in which major political actors, veto players in 
particular, have come to an agreement, an analysis of legislation offers an alternative, positive view 
of political collaboration. Rather than indicating specific areas in which disagreement impedes 
collaboration, the approaches outlined in this thesis indicate how analyses based on legislation data 
can help researchers to identify areas of political life in which agreement is nevertheless possible and 
on which actors place their priorities.  
 
In Mahmalat and Chaitani (2019), for example, I show that in the Lebanese case, political 
collaboration on policy areas related to banking and financial institutions are unaffected by political 
paralysis that otherwise leads to significant downturns in legislative activity in other policy areas. 
This is because banks constitute an important mechanism of rent distribution and therefore serve as 
a mechanism of elite integration that makes actors collaborate more easily. As shown within this 
study, systematic analyses of the policy areas in which actors are more likely to collaborate provides 
novel insights into the way the political economy of countries functions. 
 
I hope that these considerations and approaches will prove fruitful to guide future research. The thesis 
has identified a set of gaps in the literature that warrant further scrutiny and has offered 
methodological and theoretical approaches to address them. Gaining further insight into the 
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mechanisms of political collaboration is of curial importance for development practitioners in 
particular, who rely on an accurate understanding of policymaking processes.  
 
Therefore, continuing this line of research bears important policy relevance. First, a more accurate 
understanding of political collaboration will significantly increase political accountability of 
developing countries’ political elites by exposing policymaking processes to the public. As existing 
statistical capacities and legislation on accountability in developing countries are often either 
insufficient or not applied in practice, such research will constitute a major advancement in the efforts 
to devise accountability mechanisms and increase the quality of legislative processes.  
 
Secondly, analyzing political collaboration based on the theory outlined in this thesis, agenda setting 
theory in particular, will help increasing the success rate of both international assistance programs 
and civil society activities. As discussed in chapter 4, agenda setting is a central aspect of 
policymaking and its theory helps researchers and analysts to understand which issues are up for 
decision making in the first place and why. Analyzing agenda setting, then, enables an assessment 
of the characteristics and implications of a country’s institutional setup. As Schattschneider (1960) 
noted in his seminal work policymaking in the United States, “[o]rganization is the mobilization of 
bias.“ (p.71). The exercise will hence enable the identification of issues to which a given polity is 
inherently more or less receptive than to others. By identifying these issue areas, such research will 
provide guidance on the issues on which international assistance as well as domestic political 
pressure can increase their impact.  
 
Lastly, the approaches outlined in this thesis help to characterize the subnational capacities of 
individual formal institutions, such as line ministries. By tracing the quantity and quality of 
legislation from legislative institutions the data and theory enables a capacity assessment based on 
objective rather than indirect (economic) indicators. Such indirect indicators are usually influenced 
by a number of confounding variables, while legislation data provides a direct assessment of the 
outcome of a legislative process.  
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